WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE DPR ON PUNE METRO RAIL PLANNING

Summary of Points for Presentation to PMC after discussions during the meeting proposed on 13th Mar 10 by Janvani
Sub – WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE DPR ON PUNE METRO RAIL PLANNING

1) NARROW VISION PLANNING FOR METRO RAIL BY DMRC
BG - 5’6”
Coach Width 3.66m (12’-0”)
Capacity – 450 per coach
54000 PPHPD for 6 coach train at
3 min frequency –
Crush capacity life 100 years
Does Pune Need cracked wheels & coaches for Pune Metro Rail ?

SG - 4’-8.5”
Coach Width 2.9m (9’-6”)
Capacity – 260 per coach
31400 PPHPD for 6 coach train at
3 min frequency –
Crush capacity life 25 years
Wheels & Coach Floor cracking in 5 years Delhi Metro Phase – I
CAG Report Sept 08

2) PMC NEEDS TO EXPLAIN THE ADOPTION OF “LOW CAPACITY HIGH COST SG IMPORTED COACHES” INSTEAD OF “ A HIGH CAPACITY LOW COST BG INDIGINOUS COACHES” FOR PUNE METRO RAIL


3) PUNE METRO RAIL “DPR” IS A PAPER PROJECT REPORT “PPR”
• The Standing Committee & the General Body of the PMC have recently approved, in a “hurry” the “DPR” for the proposed Pune Metro Rail, without understanding the contents of the DPR.
• To enable members to understand the DPR, PMC may considered translation of DPR in Marathi
• The “DPR” is defective, deficient, inconsistent and is a reflection of the lack of understanding of the geography of Pune City and the need for a proper selection of Routes and Alignments.
• The technical feasibilty of the alignments on the ground has not been investigated. The alignments needs to be pegged out on the ground, showing locations of columns of the corridor.
• The Project cost has been grossly under estimated and is based on LS provisions without proper analysis. The basis of cost analysis has not been justified in the DPR.

4) TRAFFIC SURVEY
• Methodology for assessment of future traffic demand for Metro Rail, need a professional review
• Assessment of future traffic has been done only up to 2031 (i.e. for 17 years beyond 2014 – the proposed date for commissioning the project for operations) This should be done for at least 30 yaers, for an elevated corridor and for about 60 years for an underground (UG) corridor
• Identification of routes and their priorities should be based on traffic densities arrived at.
• Revenue assessment should be based on realistic assumptions and needs a review.
• The planning should intigrate with master development plan for the city keeping in view all other planned and future projects.

5) TECHNOLOGY
• DPR proposes only SG with imported coaches technology and compares the same with the bus transportation systems
• The Alternatives of BG with indiginous wider coaches from capacity and cost considirations along with alternatives of elevated / surface / fully UG corridors and other alternatives technology must be evaluated for technical feasibility, acceptability on long term needs and techno-economic merits evaluated for each alternative.

6) DUPLICATION OF ELEVATED CORRIDOR BETWEEN PMC & PCMC
• This elevated corridor proposed as priorty one should be dispensed with and the indian railwyas approached for streinghtning the existing Lonavla – Pune corridor by two separate dedicated suburban tracks between Lonavala & Pune with additional stations at about 1 km spacing and with improved frequency of trains for commuter traffic from existing 30min to 10 to 5min, depending upon the traffic demand
• Similar suburban service extension be provided for the commuteres from Pune to Daund by approaching the Indian Railways and sharing cost on 50:50 basis on line similar to that adopted for Mumbai suburban section implemented thourgh Mumbai Rail Vikas Corporation (MRVC)
• This will save Rs 1500cr for PMC & PCMC





7) PROPOSED ALIGNMENT
• The 2 corridors proposed in the DPR (Corridor-I & Corridor – II) do not have track connectivity due to partial UG alignment of corridor-I
• This has necessitated provision of 2 depots with Rs 100cr of additional investment a reflection of bad planning and 100ft depth of a common costly UG junction station at ASI
• DPR does not give details of justification for the UG portion proposed in the DPR
• DPR does not carry out the survey of the existing road width, footpath width, the distance of permenant strucutre from the center line of the road etc. It does not indicate the reduction of the road width during construction and after completion of the metro rail
• The alignment does not give details of crossing the Pavana, Mula-Mutha rivers indicating the size of the columns, number of piles and bridge spans etc. and the approach curves and gradiants
• The alignement does not list out the bottleneck areas of the alignment for project execution
• The alingment crossing the Pune Railway Station is technically not feasible and will not be acceptable to the railways. An alternative is feasible.

8) CAPACITY CONSIDIRATIONS
• Why narrow vision for adopting limited capacity corridor lasting for 25 years only
• Capcity is increased by
A) Adoption of wider coaches
B) Adoption of longer trains
C) Improvement in frequencies
• Under each of the above methods, the number of additional coaches required and the corrosponding increased capacity, will determine the economics of the above systems.

Capacity for 4 coach & 6 coach trains for different width of coaches
Gauge SG
Imported PUNE SG
Imported MUMBAI BG Local MUMBAI % increase of BG over SG of 2.9m
1 Width of coach 2.9m 3.2m 3.66m -
2 4 coaches / train-capacity 1034 1500 1800 74 %
3 6 coaches / train-capacity 1574 2250 2700 72%








CAPACITY COMPARISONS
GAUGE COACH WIDTH Coaches /
train cap. FREQ PPHPD*
SG 2.9m (9’-6”) 6 – 1574 3min 31480 **
BG 3.66m (12’-0”) 6 - 2700 3min 54000 ***
Future BG 3.66m (12’-0”) 9 - 4050 3min 81000 ****

1574 x 20 = 31480
2700 x 20 = 54000
4050 X 20 = 81000 ** CAPACITY LIFE LESS THAN 25 YRS
*** CAPACITY LIFE MORE THAN 50 YRS
**** CAPACITY LIFE MORE THAN 100 YRS
9) ROLLING STOCK
• Present Cost of 3.66m wide indigenous rolling stock for BG is Rs 2 cr per coach (non AC)
• And Rs 2.25cr per coach (Air-Cooled)
• The cost of Air-conditioned BG with all modern facilities will not exceed more than Rs 3cr per coach
• The selling price of imported SG coaches is Rs 10cr / coach
• For Pune Metro Rail planned for 6 coach train will need 288 coaches at 3min frequency on both the corridors, with an investment of Rs 288 x 10cr = Rs 2880cr
• The corresponding requirements for equal volume of traffic, for BG indigenous wider coach, would need 192 coaches for both the corridors, with an investment of 192 x 3cr = Rs 576cr at 3 min frequency, resulting in a saving of Rs 2880 – Rs 576 = Rs 2304 cr
• Due to reduction in BG train length for equal volume of traffic, there would be a further saving in platform length, platform covers, land cost for depots, reduce length of station and energy consumptions and reduction in land and O & M costs

10) The table below incorporated in the DPR for planning for coaches indicates gross calculation mistakes in the number of coaches and hence in the gross capital cost assumed for investment
PLANNING FOR COACHES IN DPR
Source: Salient Features of DPR – PMC website
Corridor year Headway (minutes) No of rakes Train composition Coaches required
1 2 3 4 5 6
Corridor 1
PCMC – Swargate 2011 4.5 22 4 car 72 x
2021 3.5 22 x 4 car 88
2031 3.5 25 4 car 88 x

Corridor II 2011 12 10 4 car 28 x
Vanaz to Ramwadi 2021 8 12 x 4 car 40 x
2031 8 20 x 4 car 40 x

• Assessment of coaches at col. 6 is = col.4 x col.5
• Figures under column 4 will depend upon headway under col. 3
• The figures under col. 4 for corridor-1, cannot be the same for col. 3 & col. 4. for 2011 & 2021
• Similarly figures at col. 4 for 2031 cannot be the same as that of 2021 for the same headway of 3.5min
• Simple arithmetic for col. 6 need rectification. Same arguments applied for corridor 2.
• The financial evaluation therefore, done on the basis of this chart for initial capital cost and subsequent capital investment are not correct. Hence FIRR and EIRR calculations need a complete review
• Similar calculations have to be done for BG indigenous wider coaches as there is huge capital cost savings hence the full review of DPR

11) SIGNALING FOR DRIVERLESS TECHNOLOGY
• For 3min service frequency / headway not required/ contemplated for 30 yrs in the DPR, there is no need for cab signaling, ATC-ATO (driverless trains), at an additional cost of around Rs 170cr as suburban trains in Mumbai are operated at 3min service with normal color light signaling



12) OVERALL COST SAVINGS FOR BG WITH WIDER COACHES
• Savings in BG coaches in lieu of SG coaches Rs 2300cr
• Replacement of UG by an elev. corridor Rs 1250cr
• Elimination of ATP, ATC & ATO signaling Rs 170cr
• Replacement of 2 depots by 1 & providing Track
• Connectivity Rs 100cr
• Elimination of imported track components Rs 50cr
• Savings in central taxes and duties Rs 300cr
========
Total Rs 4170cr
(Say Rs 4000cr)
• No reduction has been made in the standard of construction of the station buildings and provision has been made for increased cost of indigenous coaches for AC, furnishings, communication systems and other inputs, at par with those adopted for SG by DMRC.
• In addition to above there would be a cost saving of Rs 1430cr by elimination of a duplicate elevated corridor between PCMC & Range hill corridor-I
• PMC AND THE GOVT. OF MAHARASHTRA MUST LOOK INTO THE TECHNO-ECONOMIC MERITS OF GAUGE WITH WIDER INDIGENOUS BG COACHES AND COMPARE COST ON THE BASIS OF COST PER UNIT CARRYING CAPACITY. THIS WOULD BE AS PER THE DIRECTIVE OF THE GROUP OF MINISTERS IN THEIR DECISION DATED 24TH APR 2006

13) FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS- Source: Salient Features of DPR – PMC website
• Cost for Pune metro rail has been grossly underestimated and is based on adhoc basis without detailed investigation and analysis
• DPR does not indicate the time frame through a bar chart, methodology of construction and detailed analysis of cost
• The project cost is expected to be in the range of Rs 12500cr as against Rs 9514 stated in the DPR estimated for the 2 corridors of Pune Phase-I

Particulars Completion cost without taxes Completion cost with central tax only
FIRR 3.23% 1.93%

• The DPR should make an assessment of the realistic cost updated at 2011 level and work out the revised FIRR
• Based on the above, DPR should indicate the viability gap funding necessary for the project to be implemented on the PPP model. In view a very low rate of FIRR, which should be around 15% for project acceptability for the investor, the VGF would be required to the extent of 70 to 75% of the project cost
• The assessment of EIRR of 18% is based on wrong assumptions and need revision by financial expert company outside DMRC.

14) OTHER ISSUES
• The DPR does not cover the cost of station circulating area facilities required for proper integration with other moods of transport arriving and departing to & from each station
• DPR does not include the assessment of water supply requirements during construction and during operation, as this demand would be exceptionally high resulting in further shortage of water supply to the public.
• Similarly electric supply has been planned to be sourced from the existing supply. This would result in further shortage of electricity supply to the citizens

15) ALTERNATIVE - A FULLY UG CORRIDOR WITH BG WIDER COACHES
• NO LAND ACQUISITION ,
• NO CUTTING OF TREES,
• NO DEMOLITION OF BUILDINGS
• NO REMOVAL OF U/G & OH UTILITY SERVICES,
• NO REDUCTION IN ROAD WIDTHS DUE TO COLUMNS
• NO NEED FOR ROAD WIDENING
• NO CHANGE IN NOISE POLLUTION
• NO LOSS DUE TO REDUCTION OF SPEEDS OF VEHICLES
• NO IMPACT ON ENVIRONMENT

• COST OF U/G –
RS 400CR/KM SG
• SAVING DUE TO BG
(–) RS 100CR/KM
• ECONOMIC SAVINGS
–) RS 200CR/KM
• TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE WITH LONG TERM ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES
• 18 MILLION CUM ROCK EXCAVATED FROM TUNNELING TO BE USED FOR NEW ROAD
CONSTRUCTIONS


• Rs 400cr / km will be reduced by Rs 100cr/km by adoption of BG indigenous wider coaches. Though UG will cost initially more, will provide an economic savings of around Rs 200cr / km with long term economic advantages to the city.
• This alternative needs to be seriously looked into and the financial viability assessed on a long term period of at least 60 years.

16) LEGAL ISSUES
• The DPR states that “The Metro rail is a Railway and has to be implemented under the Indian Railways Act” and should therefore, follow the “Indian Railways code of practice” for preparation of DPR
• The Constitution does not provide legal jurisdiction to the State Govt. to construct a railway system. Hence, the legal aspects of this planning and execution needs to be looked into before the same is declared void under Art. 254 of the constitution

17) EXECUTION MODEL – PPP OR DMRC MODEL
• In the context of the recent failures of 87 concrete cantilevers and 18 serious cracks in columns, supporting the metro systems on 5 routes of Delhi Metro Rail – Phase-II. Pune city has to reconsider the adoption of DMRC model proposed in the DPR
• This model has also to be looked into, in the context of the CAG report of Sept 2008, for Delhi Metro Rail phase-I, which has exploded the balloon of the self magnified image of DMRC, in terms of quality of construction, application of financial prudence and the series irregularities, brought out by CAG, in the implementation of the project by DMRC.
• DMRC model does not reveal the final construction cost of the project, till its completion unlike in the PPP model where the cost is frozen at the time of award of contract. In view of the fact that we are claiming that the project cost has been grossly underestimated by DMRC, if the DMRC model is taken up for implementation as recommended by PMC, DMRC should be responsible for excess cost over the estimated one for identical scope of the work.
• I am sure this will not be acceptable to DMRC, as internally he is aware of the underestimation of the project costs.

18) BASIS UNDER ESTIMATION OF COST FOR SG
• Quantities, unit rates and cost of major item like bridges, stations, utilities etc. are based on LS basis and not on GAD drawings.
• Depot cost are not based on GAD drawings
• EM works cost are based on LS basis
• OHE cost have been grossly underestimated
• The cost of UG section highly underestimated
• Number of rolling stock and the unit cost of each grossly underestimated.
• The OH cost of the SPV Interim Consultants, the General Consultants, the Prime Consultants, thse Proof Consultants, Legal charges, the risk cost and the financial cost for securities and insurance have not been incorporated. These will total to more than 20%.
• The cost of electrical charges have been taken at concessional rates
• The cost of import duties and other charges not incorporated

19) BASIS FOR SAVINGS IN BG INDIGINOUS WIDER COACHES
(For the same standards and quality of construction as that for SG)
 Reduction in the number of coaches and the unit cost of each coach from Rs 10cr to Rs 3cr including AC and furnishings
 Reduction in the train length and hence the length of platform and platform covers
 Reduction in land for depots due to reduction in train length for equivalent volume of traffic
 Reduction in the cost of signalling – ATC &ATO etc not required upto 3min service
 Reduction in the cost of indigenous track items (no import required)
 Reduction in the cost of overseas supervision consultancy and training etc.
 Reduction in the cost of import duties
 40% reduction in BG cost will need no VGF and will reduce the cost of fares by 30%

V K J Rane – Ex-MD/IRCON
11.03.10