CRITICAL COMMENTS ON THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND
THE DETAILED PROJECT REPORT (DPR) (DATED 12TH MARCH 2009)
OF DMRC, ON THE PROPOSED PUNE METRO RAIL PROJECT
By
V K J Rane – IRSE (Retd.)
Ex-MD/IRCON
INTRODUCTION--The project report dated 12.03.09,(DPR) received by PMC from DMRC, comprise of a Foreword, Salient Features – of the Project, Executive Summery and 15 Chapters of the DPR, including A4 size plans without dimensions. Detailed drawings incorporating Index Plan and Section, layout of Depot, layout of Stations Bridges, Alignment with locations of columns and other details, in A2 size drawings, as prepared for Mumbai Metro and Hyd Metro, have not been received. Hence a detailed technical appreciation could not be made.
No reference has been made to the meaning of the Short Forms used at a large number of places. This should have been done at the beginning of the chapter 1 as these reports will be read and seen not only by experts within the country but also those at international levels. Generally all professional reports do cover such clarifications .
1) Comments on Foreword –
1.1 Terms of Reference of PMC -Foreword does not indicate, any reference in DPR to the terms of reference given by PMC to DMRC for undertaking the preparation of DPR of the project. Thought the foreword has been signed by MD / DMRC, he, nor his deputy seem to have, even glanced through the attached report before submission to PMC, as seen from the obvious inconsistencies, deficiencies, omissions, deletions of references to Ludhiana during copy pasting , and the general substandard quality of contents and presentation. This report is to be presented to the State cabinet for approval and sanctions and will be read by International experts & consultants . .
1.2 Alternative Studies - The Foreword does not make any reference to DPR regarding alternative studies of BG, with indigenous wider coaches or MG (LRT) with the indigenous technology, available within the country. The State Cabinet, before taking techno-economic decisions on this project, would have been, in a better position, to convince the citizens, the techno-economic merits of the project and safeguarding the public interest, for its implementation. The report is biased in favour of SG with imported coaches and adoption of technology not required for the performance stipulated in the report. Our detailed para wise comments on the justification for adopting SG with imported coaches, at exorbitant cost as given at para 4.3 of chapter 4 of the DPR, are given in our comments under that chapter.
2) COMMENTS ON SALIENT FEATURES & EXECUTIVE SUMMERY-
2.1 Details of the salient features - of this project as furnished in the DPR by DMRC is attached as annexure 1 to this report, for ready reference. It is seen from this annexure that the total length of these two corridors is 31.515 km with Corridor 1--PCMC to Swargate is 16.589 km and Corridor 2 --Vanaz to Ramvadi all elevated (14.925 kms). Corridor 1 is underground for a length of 5.019 kms with 6 UG stations, & balance 9 stations of Corridor 1 and 15 stations in corridor 2 are all elevated.
2.2 Track Connectivity - The salient features do not make a mention, that there is NO track connectivity between the two corridors and that the Corridor 2 crosses Corridor 1 over its UG section, at ASI station, necessitating physical interchange by commuters from 12 .5 m above the ground level to about 22m below the ground level. The salient features also do not indicate the number and locations of the river crossings and the under river crossing of the alignment for Mutha river and the railway track crossings a number of lines across the middle of station yard. These are important features deciding the technical feasibility, the period of construction and the cost of the project, and, therefore, should have been brought out in this para.
2.3 Traffic forecast upto 2031 - It is seen from salient features that the traffic forecast has been assessed for the two corridors for two decades only, upto the period 2031, The project has been planned to be commissioned in the year 2014, that is, the assessment has been done only for a period of 17 yrs after commissioning. This assessment should have been done for a period of at least 50 yrs or a minimum of 30 yrs that is up to 2045. This would have covered the life cycle period of the coaching stock.,
2.4 Contradictions in number of coaches - There is a contradiction in the figures given in the tables presented at Table 0.5 at page 15/36 under para 0.6 –TRAIN OPERATION PLAN of the Executive summery and at table 5 TRAIN OPERATION at page 2/4 of the Salient features. The number of coaches as per table 5 at salient features for Corridor –I for the year 2031 work out to 25 x 4 = 100, as against 88 mentioned for the same year in table 0.5 of the executive summery. Similar mistakes are seen for the year 2011. Similarly for Corridor 2 the number of coaches required for the year 2011 should be 40 (10x4) instead of 28 and for the year 2021 it should be 48 (12x4) instead of 40, and for the year 2031 it should be 80 (20x4) instead of 40. It is not clear on what basis the cost has been assessed for the Rolling Stock in the project estimates . There are many such contradictions and mistakes and the report need to be sent back to DMRC for corrections.
2.5 PERMANENT WAY—Justification given for adoption of SG for Metro systems in Pune is not convincing nor logical particularly in the context of capacity requirements, compatibility, connectivity and existing standards in the country including economy. Para wise comments on his justification, has been included in the appropriate chapter of our comments on the DPR. It is necessary to adopt the Track Structure for the Metro System, so as to provide connectivity with the existing BG system in Pune Rly Division, to enable commuters to travel without interchange from Lonavala to Hadapsar and back. SG Structure proposed involves importation of rails and Turn outs.
2.6 SYSTEM TRACTION—Techno-economic justification for adoption of a costly 25 KV AC overhead traction verses 750 V. DC system for such a low level of traffic has not been given in the report . Adoption of a 3-phase AC induction motors for the drive , is NO reason to opt 25 KV AC supply Single Phase as the power has to be obtained through an inverter worked from a DC supply. Features of Disc Brakes or Air Springs adopted are not required for slow speed trains on Metro as these are required and are of advantage for high speed trains. Telecommunication and Fare collection systems proposed can also be provided on BG systems and are locally available
2.7 ROLLING STOCK – It is seen from this chapter that the width of the imported rolling stock has been limited to 2.9m wide only, as against 3.2m wide for Delhi, Mumbai ,Hyd, Bangalore and other metros in the country. The axle load has also been limited to 16T. as against 17 tons for other metros. This affects advantages of economies of standardization.. There is NO provision for future adoption of wider Rolling Stock (Coaches) and increasing the capacity for future conversion to BG, to accommodate additional future traffic demand requirements beyond 25 yrs. This restricts the capacity permanently This should be known to the citizens and must be mentioned in the salient features so that the Cabinet members, are aware of the type of metro they would be approving, even though, it is against the benefits of future citizens. The justification for selection of the SG rolling stock at para f at page 7/36 of the executive summery is factually not correct and has not been proved with facts and figures. and not compared with indigenous rolling stock.
2.8 DEPOT – (MAINTENANCE FACILITIES) & ASI STATION -- The salient features must indicate, for the benefit of the knowledge of the cabinet Ministers, that there is NO rail connectivity between the two Corridors and hence between the two depots. And that certain maintenance facilities required for Corridor 2 have been made provision of, at Corridor 1 Depot, and carried out by transferring these coaches in dismantled conditions, in trailers by road. Similarly the need for physical interchange of passengers at ASI stations from elevated to UG and vice-a- versa, for a level difference of 35m ,and a costly station at ASI, due to non-connectivity of the two corridors, must be mentioned in the salient features itself.
2.9 SIGNALLING – Mumbai suburban section trains have been running at 3min headway, on automatic color light signalling, without the use of ATP, ATC ATO etc. The need for Pune metro with 3 .5 and 8min service upto the period of 2031 with adoption of cab signalling and continues automatic train control with ATP, imported at exorbitant costs, resulting in heavy fare structure, is neither appreciated nor necessary technically & operationally. It only helps the international vendors.
2.10 POWER SUPPLY— the source of power supply to the Metro system will be from the existing sources which are drastically inadequate tor the requirements of the city. Demand for Metro operations without augmenting the existing supply will create additional problems to the citizens.
2.11 COST ESTIMATES— The Executive summery, in the chapter of Capital Cost Estimates under Table 0.9 , . does NOT give the quantities and Unit rates against the various items of works mentioned there in, though these are mentioned and available in the DPR.
2. 12 –UNDER ESTIMATION OF COSTS-The project costs have been grossly under estimated to the extent of more than 25%.. There is NO provision for various consultants and other charges mentioned in the DPR .We have reviewed the item wise details of this estimate, based on costs of similar items for other METRO projects under execution in the country and item wise revised cost has been prepared and compared with DMRC project estimate. Similarly we have compared item wise costs of the project if BG wider indigenous coaches with Air Conditioning ,improved furnishings, and air conditioned Stations and other identical facilities, provided in our costs . A comparative statements of costs along with all details item wise have been enclosed in the chapter of costs of this report It is seen from this statements that the BG wider coaches, indigenously manufactured, with necessary inputs of technology and to equivalent standards of performance, and stations, will cost 30% lower, with NO need for VGF subsidy and reduced fare structure by 30% and NO long term dependence on overseas manufactures and without heavy Taxation on Pune citizens.
2.13 PARKING AREAS—Page 12/36 of the executive summery states that NO provision has been made for parking of vehicles at stations and that the integration facilities at stations, is left to the state GOVT and are NOT included in the cost of the project. This is an important aspect of the system for smooth and efficient operations and the cost of the same, whether borne by DMRC or PMC must be taken into account in assessing the viability.
2.14 LAND—Detailed assessment of land requirements has been done, but NO mention has been made regarding the assessment of the rates assumed and compensation payable for private lands, has been mentioned anywhere in the report.
2.15 CAPACITY OF TRAIN—
A 4 car train –1034 Passengers (sitting 186- Crush Standing-848) at 8 pass/Sq.M
A 6 car Train-1574 Passengers (sitting 286, Crush standing-1288)at 8 pass/sqM
For assessment of coaches a terminal reversal time has been taken as 6 min. This seem to be wrong as this will depend upon the frequency for which the assessment of coaches is done .This needs to be reviewed(Ref-page 15/36 of Exe. Summery)
For working out the project system cost for say 30 year life span of coaches ,the number of coaches should correspond to the system capacity provided by the corridors. These corridors are designed for a 6 coach planned capacity at max.of say 3min headway and at an ave. speed of 30 to 33 kmph speeds These corridors will need a max of 24 trains for each corridor , to match these capacities.. With 6 coach train capacity planning, we will need 24x6=144 coaches per corridor. The comparison of economics of the capacities for 2,9m wide SG coach and 3.66 m wide BG coach train systems has, therefore, to be based on these fundamental assumptions for techno-economic comparison of the two systems.
2.16 FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS – The financial indices of the project, based on revenue from FAR trading, indicate that the project FIRR is 1.93 % with central Taxes only, as against the requirement of , at least, 15% at the cost of funds at 12% minimum. FIIR is negative if the additional residual rental income accrued from property development is NOT considered. This is also based on 25% under estimated cost of the project This shows that the project is grossly unremunerative and would be a permanent burden on the citizens of Pune as well as the Maharashtra State and the Nation, for heavy taxation and subsidy. FOR GENERATION OF FUNDS, ADDITIONAL TAXATION ON THE CITIZENS OF PUNE ARE RECOMMENDED AS UNDER—a) Professional Tax at 1% of the salary of the employees. B) A Cess on petrol and diesel sale in the city c) Increase in FAR to 4 and its trading d) A surcharge on the property tax in the city e) A surcharge on the Motor Vehicle Tax in the city. f) An entry tax on the commercial articles entering the city. Hence alternatives appropriate technologies will have to be investigated for handling the Mass transportation problems of the city, including finding solutions for the daily inputs of additional 4 wheeler vehicles on the existing roads of this city.
2.17 FARE FOR COMMUTERS-- Fare structure for the year 2014-15 has been given at page 28/36 of the Exe. Summery. This varies from Rs 7 to Rs 24 for 2km to 30 km .For a lead of 12-15 km it is Rs 16 .This is very high as compared to Bus and Mumbai Metro Fares.
2.18 LEGAL ASPECT-At this page without giving detailed justification, the project has been recommended by DMRC for execution through the State SPV. Under the present constitution art, 366/20, States do NOT have legal Jurisdiction to construct even a tramway connecting two Municipal Corporations. This power vests with the Centre only, unless the constitution is changed to exclude Metro Rail from the definitions of a Railway
2.19 PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT—DPR at page 29/36 of Exe-Sum- state that 4Ha of depot land at Agricultural University will be commercially exploited to support this project. This land of 10.4435 Ha will be given an FAR of 4. for commercial exploitation, with a up front yield of Rs 600 Crs. And further supplemented with a lease rental to the fare box collections. PMC has confirmed additional FAR of 4 to DMRC. There is NO gazette notification on the subject and this is not yet discussed with the citizens affected by such action. If this is not accepted, the project viability will be grossly affected. FIRR without this revenue should be worked out to know the implications..
In addition to above earnings from sale of FAR along the corridor at Rs 5000 per SqM for 50% length (31.514km –including UG portion) for a width of 500 m on either side, and collected over 20 years has been assumed. The practical feasibility of these assumptions need to be debated
2.20 =PLANNING FOR IMPLEMENTATION— The DPR should be debated with the citizens group and approved by them before the same is forwarded to the State Govt, for consideration. The legal jurisdiction under the Constitution must be examined and steps taken before any approval to the project. There is no BAR CHART planning shown for the period of construction .in the DPR The quality of inputs and presentation of contents , including inconsistencies in the report and omissions on detailing etc are much below the standards stipulated in the Preliminary reports stipulated by the Indian Railway standards Engineering Codes for similar reports. This needs to be returned for resubmission on professional standards.
3.0 COMMENTS ON DPR
Sr No REFERENCE TO PARA OF DPR COMMENTS
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1 3.1.1--Para 1.1 Reference has been made in this chapter to Pune, as a birth place from Saint Tukaram to great freedom fighters like Tilak, Agarkar and Gokhale including the current scientist Mr. Narlikar. But a reference to the King of Deccan “Shivaji Maharaj” has been missed. He was a freedom creator and “Established Independence and Promoted Swadeshi pride”, and has, therefore, great significance, in the context of the recommendations of DMRC, for long term dependency on overseas manufactures and adoption of Videshi culture, at the cost of the citizens of this city and the country.
3.1.2 Para 1.1.2 LOCATION, --Details of maximum and minimum rainfall with its intensity and period including the temperature variations, have not been indicated, since they form an important part of the execution of railway project from considerations of working period, rail welding etc.
3.1.3 Para1.1.5 ROAD WORK-- “The following national highways passed through the district” - details have been omitted in the summery though indicated in the DPR
3.1.4 Para 1.1.6 – Suburban Rail Network - Rail Network does not make a mention of an important aspect of this rail network, that is, the suburban trains from Lonavala to Pune, running at present at 15min service to meet present traffic demand, with future increase to 5min service, after addition of coaches on the system. This suburban train would be extended, shortly, up to Daund, as the demand exists. Though existing suburban train pass though Shivajinagar, why efforts are not being made to provide connectivity to the proposed metro system, so that passengers can have a seemless travel (without physical interchange) from Lonavala to Hadapsar by adopting the Metro System to suite the existing system, for the benefit of the commuters . This can be achieved, indigenously, at economical costs and at reduced fares to the commuters. This aspect must be examined in the DPR in consultation with IR, C Rly Pune Rly division.
3.1.5 Para 1.4 – Typographical Mistake - Reference has been made in this para to PMC’s letter no 9002 dated 05.12.2009. This should have been 2008. Such typographical mistakes should have been avoided, as these reports will be read and seen at international levels.
2 CHAPTER 2
TRAFFIC DEMAND FORECAST
3.2.1 The priority alignments selected are
COR-I PCMC – Swargate Corridor for a length of 16.69 kms with 15 stations
COR-II Vanaz to Ramvadi Corridor for a length of 14.93 kms with 15 stations .
The key plan showing the above two corridors supposed to have been shown in annexure 0.1 is not enclosed. This should be done in the executive summary & DPR both.
3.2.2 – Population Forecast - The population forecast indicated in table 2.2 and 0.2 of Exe. Summ.(E.S.)is restricted for a period of 17 years from 2014 to 2031. For such a heavy investment for a rail corridor, the planning should have been extended at least for a period of 50 years if not for 30 years, with provision for expansion, which has not been done in this case.
3.2.3 . The figures for PHPDT in table 0.2 of E S indicate that we have to cater for the next 20 yrs hourly peak traffic of 18000 to 20000 for corridor 1 and 6000 to 10000 for corridor 2.
The above shows that corridor 1, can be catered for by BG wider coaches with a capacity of 450 per coach in a 4 coach train at 5min service giving 21600 PHPDT (450x4x60/5=21600) and
And for corridor 2, BG wider coaches with a 2 coach train will provide a capacity of 10800 PHPDT, at 5min frequency. (450x2x60/5=10800)
3.2.4 This shows that if BG with wider coaches (3.66m) is adopted, their will be heavy savings in the number of coaches and in depot length, in the platform length, station length, reduction in signalling cost, resulting heavy reduction in initial capital cost, with consequent improvement in IRR and reduction in VGF subsidy and reduced fares for the commuters.
3.2.5 The flow diagram for the Horizon year 2031- fig 2.2 at page 43/61 chapter 2 indicates that the traffic density along line number 4 from Bund Garden to Ramvadi is much less compared to the traffic densities on line no 5 & 6 towards Hinjewadi and towards Hadapsar. The selection of line 2 in priority II, doesn’t seem to be justified at this stage. This needs clarification and review.
3 CHAPTER 3
NEED FOR METRO
3.3.1 It is stated in the report, that the road mixed traffic carries 8000 PHPDT. This means as per table 0.2 of E S, there is no need for corridor II, which has PHPDT of 8500 by 2021 and 11000 by 2031. This can be achieved by improvement in the road sector by road mass transit, with dedicated corridors and by BART improvements. So far as corridor 1 is concerned, it would be prudent to consider, an elevated road corridor, along the proposed rail alignment, with 22m wide (3 lanes in each directions of 11m each) which will carry, the dedicated bus line of 2 lanes covering 7m in each direction and the remaining 4m for 4 wheelers, in each direction. This will reduce the congestion of road traffic on the existing ground level. So far as the pollution is concerned the latest technology allows pollution free road vehicle transportation systems. This will reduce considerably the capital investment, for metro rail and will take care of the daily inputs of road vehicles in the City, resulting in congestion on the existing roads.
3.3.2 In chapter 3 of the DPR – Need for Metro system - Comparison of the Dedicated Metro Rail corridor has been made with mixed bus corridor which is not correct. A dedicated bus corridor with comfortable, AC, 100% sitting capacity of 75 passengers per bus at a 30 sec frequency (headway) will carry a PHPDT of 75 x2x 60 x 60 / 30 = 18000 PHPDT which is much more than what is required for corridor 2 by 2031.
3.3.3 Para 3.2 at page 3/4 of Chapter 3 of the DPR – Limits the capacity of the LRT system up to 30000 PHPDT and states that “ in view of the present and projected PHPDT on the proposed corridors of Pune City a medium capacity metro system is considered adequate to meet the traffic demand” . The report does not state here, the year’s upto which, this demand will be met with and thereafter will need an additional parallel line beyond such limiting demands as stated in the earlier para. On the other hand it limits the capacity to 2.9m width coaches with no future provision for adoption of wider coaches beyond 2.9m. The basis of its statement in the earlier para that
3.3.4 “ beyond the traffic level of 80000 PHPDT, additional parallel line are normally planned”. The logic and the evidence of such a statement, needs clarification . Common prudence of not making any provision in the existing model for additional capacity beyond 25 yrs, in the planning stage itself, is NOT understood.
3.3.5 This chapter should have discussed the techno-economic merits of a BG wider coach as well as a MG indigenously manufactured narrow width coach which would not need importation. Metro systems on MG are in place in Japan and other countries.
4
CHAPTER 4
SYSTEM SELECTION
3.4.1 Para 4.1 of the DPR indicates – That the peak hour peak direction traffic (PHPDT) demand for corridor 1 – PCMC to Swargate varies between 18000 to 20000 for the years 2011 to 2031 and for corridor 2 between Vanaz to Ramvadi varies from 5800 to 11000 for the years 2011 to 2031. Further stated that the road based system optimally carry a maximum of 8000 PHPDT, This may be true for a mixed road base bus system but is not true for a dedicated road bus system, which not only improves the average speed from 20km to 40kms and more, but also permits headway of 10 to 15sec. A 2 lane dedicated uni-direction road corridor will also permit running of express busses, thereby further increasing the average speed and carrying capacity. The capacity of even one dedicated bus corridor would be 75 x 60 x 60 / 15 = 18000 PHPDT. Thus a single lane per direction for a bus elevated dedicated corridor will more than match the traffic demand of 11000 PHPDT by the year 2031 at a cost of less than Rs 30 cr/km. A double lane per direction, elevated dedicated bus corridor will more than match the requirements of 20000 PHPDT for corridor 1 proposed metro rail at a cost of less than Rs 40cr/km. (Excluding cost of busses)
3.4.2 DPR recommends a) A light rail metro system for a PHPDT in the range of 15000 to 30000 b) A medium capacity metro system for a PHPDT in the range of 30000 to 50000 and a Mass Rapid Transit Rail System for a PHPDT in the range of 50000 to 80000. DMRC is guided by standards probably laid down by the European countries or probably laid down by DMRC themselves, to justify imported limited capacity rail systems. For Indian conditions where the traffic demand is increasing in geometric proportion every year, and has no comparison with the population growth in India, as compared to those in European countries. The application of these standards to Indian conditions and environment, has absolutely no comparison with Indian Standards and environment, and, therefore, not applicable to Indian conditions and requirements. Hence the adoption of wider 3.66m coaches, indigenously manufactured at 1/3rd the cost, should be adopted for Indian conditions, which will not only be economical in initial and life cycle costs but will permit adoption of this elevated corridors to be economically and effectively used for more than 100 yrs without the need for laying another parallel corridor on SG on a new road to be identified for achieving equal objectives. The additional investment required for such parallel corridor needs to be taken into consideration in the techno-economic analysis for such alternatives. Unfortunately DMRC has not compared in his report, the realistic on the ground situation of indigenously manufactured wider coaches with that for imported narrow width coaches, while justifying the case for the choice of gauge.
3.4.3 a) Permanent way
(i) Choice of gauge – SG is being justified for its world wide adoption. What is good for European standards of population is not suitable for Indian standards, where the two are not comparable. The national gauge in the country exist since 1853 from its initial introduction of a railway system, from compatibility, connectivity and for economy in its expansion, construction and operation and maintenance and the available expertise within the country. There is no wisdom, nor techno-economic merits, in adoption SG for Indian Metro Systems. The justification given by DMRC, is neither valid, nor is, in the interest of the nation. Item wise comments on the justification given in the DPR for adoption of SG under the heading of Choice of gauge vide para 4.3.1, is explained below.
(ii) Track Structure – The Track structure proposed for the metro involves importation of points and crossings and head harden rails. Our existing track structure adopted on Mumbai suburban section with elastic fastenings, ballastless track and continuous welded rails, adopted on the Indian Railway systems is equally efficient and economical for adoption on the BG system. For track structure in depot, adoption of track with ballast, Indian Prestressed BG sleepers can be economically adopted in lieu of SG PRC sleepers, which will have to be imported at heavy costs, in addition to payment of royalty for design and drawings, or adoption of alternative costly systems, with imported technology. All the requirements laid down for safety, reliability etc. are available in existing BG track structure indigenously manufactured and fits well into the standards required. The requirements of maintainability of track and riding comfort are available indigenously in the design of ballastless track.
(iii) Turnouts – Adoption of SG involves importation of turnouts of different angles from those adopted on BG indigenously manufactured and adopted on Indian suburban section as well as on high speed lines. There is no need for importation of such turnouts at abnormally high costs for the benefit of the International suppliers. Introduction of scissors cross – overs on main lines, 1 in 9 type – imported, necessitating adoption of 4.5m track centers at stations approaches, as against 4m along the length, will involve introduction of reverse curves on the approaches of such scissors cross over, which is not considered good for the track layout. Thus a uniform center to center distance between the tracks of 4.76m proposed for BG will eliminate these permanent problems in the alignment, imposed by occasionally required such scissors cross overs.
(iv) Check Rails – It is stated that check rails of UIC- 33 rail section will be adopted on sharp curves to reduce wear of outer rails on curves. However, the latest design of ballastless track does not cater for provision of such checkrails on the main line.
(v) Ludhiana Metro - It is interesting to note, the reference to “LUDHIANA METRO” at para 2/43 of chapter 4 and at page 13/43 , and at many other places, reflecting, the quality of presentation of DPR adopted by “COPY PASTE” technique from other reports. . Municipal Commissioner of Pune is reminded of his high confidence in DMRC, in accepting the report without any application of mind, from his side, being ignorant on metro technology, as stated by him in our personal interview with him, and paying a very high price for such report, which probably included the “COPY PASTE” technology.
3.4.3 b) (i) Traction system – Under para 4.4 of traction system at page 14/43 reference has been made to the traffic requirements of the Pune Metro Rail having been projected in the range of 25000 PHPDT in the year 2031 by the traction expert while at table 4.1 under para 4.1 the same has been reflected to 20035 for corridor in the year 2031. This variation may also probably due to the adoption of “COPY PASTE” techniques from Ludhiana report which needs to be looked into. The typical 25KV AC category arrangement shown in fig 4.6 at page 14/43 is a photograph neither of an elevated track nor of an underground track but of a track structure of the ground level. Copied from some other report not applicable to the DPR for Pune Metro. The entire chapter 4 & 5 of the DPR gives at the bottom line the date as Feb 2009, March 2009 and also at 1st page of chapter 6. This also appears to be of victim of modern “COPY PASTE” technology.
(ii) It is seen that the project cost is based on the unit rate for power consumption assumed at a concessional rate of 2.50 to 2.75 per unit on “no profit no loss basis” to the Govt. The FIRR of 1.93 is based on these unrealistic and unaccepted figures. This should have been got confirmed from Govt. before incorporating in the report and under estimating the project cost and IRR
3.4.3 c) (i)Signalling and train control – The proposed metro system has been designed for a 3min service with initial operations at 5min service. The Mumbai suburban section of W & C Rly is being operated at 3min railway with high level safety and reliability. There is no justification therefore, to adopt an alien system and import ATP, ATS, and ATO operations even for future requirements at exorbitantly high cost. For the same operational requirements, there is NO need for paying 3 times the cost for importation of SG smaller capacity trains and imported signalling system which does not provide any specific advantage. This is a waste of money, based on the advice of overseas manufactures to export their products, at high initial and operational costs. The report does not clarify how the capacity is optimized by such imported coaches.
(ii) All these advance systems of ATP,ATC, and ATO can also be adopted on a BG system as can be seen from the provisions in the BART BG metro opened in the year 2003 with best in the world technology at San Francisco in USA. What is required to be questioned is whether such high technology at abnormally high investment is required to be provided for the level of traffic and the headway and Indian Environment, prevailing for Pune Metro Rail as assessed for a traffic level of 2031. This is being recommended by International consultants under the advice of the international manufactures to make a provision to sale their equipments at a high initial cost which will not be utilized in the next 20 yrs and will involved 70% of the parts to be replaced within a period of 16 yrs. without use.
(iii) With all the justification for a Fail Safe system of ATP, accidents have taken place in Japan, as late as in the year 2006 due to human failures, as will be seen from the photograph given below
On 25 April 2006, in Japan, a seven-car metro train derailed on a curve and smashed into a multistory apartment building.
“The derailment at the curve was allegedly caused by the 23-year-old driver’s over speed.”
(iv) Similarly the standard of signalling adopted for train depots and their operation need to be reviewed in the context of the level of traffic and the number of coaches control in such operation. The standard of signalling mentioned in table 4.2 can also be provided on a BG system but is this required for the level of traffic demand, proposed to be operated? It appears that the advice of foreign consultants / general consultant and others have been copied and inducted without application of our technical knowledge on the subject and the need for such requirements at such exorbitant cost. We have been running a high capacity heavy mass rapid transit system on the Mumbai suburban section laid on the ground as well as on an elevated corridor of the Harbour branch in the Mumbai suburban section and operated at 3min frequency with co-existence of the main line trains on the fast tracks carrying about 5000 passengers in a 9 coach train with outstanding reliability and punctuality and safety thought the year except those couple of days affected by flooding of tracks in Mumbai. When we have within the Indian railway system an operating force capable of managing such system efficiently we fail to understand why we should pay heavy price to a private sector by providing more than 25% as a viability gap subsidy who utilized this fund for payment to foreign manufactures and paying them more than 3 times price for coaches than what we are at present procuring at 1/3rd the cost through indigenous technology. Is this policy, promoted by one organization against the public interest and against the advice of Indian Railways, a rational policy promoted by the present govt. against the public interest and at heavy cost to the ex-checker.?
3.4.3 d) & e) Telecommunication / Automatic Fare Collection – The telecommunication system proposed in the report can be provided indigenously by Indian Engineers on BG coaches also and there is no need for international consultant for such systems.
3.4.3 f) Rolling stock – (i) The BG rolling stock can also be provided, based on the criteria indicated in the report. The BG rolling stock costs less and will have the added advantage of capacity and flexibility, to meet increased traffic demand, which is not available in the proposed SG rolling stock, and which reaches its limiting crush capacity in less than 25 yrs. and in view of the closed door systems and the narrow width of the coaches, 3 to 4 pushers per door will have to be engaged for peak hours of morning and evening, to push the commuters in the compartments within 20 to 30sec dwelling time at stations, without which the doors cannot be closed and the train cannot be started.
(ii) It is further seen that the width of the coach proposed for SG is 2.9m against 3.66m for BG. This further limits the passenger carrying capacity of such corridor. The design further indicates that the center to center distance of the tracks has been kept at 4m which will not allow future increase in width of the coaches, if needed to meet traffic demand. This planning is not in the interest of the Pune citizens nor the nation. All the features indicated in this paragraph can also be provided BG with wider coaches. The higher level of acceleration and deceleration are not required for such corridors having lower speed less than 100kmph and where inter station distances are around 1km. The analysis of lower cost of service has not been proved by calculations. For equivalent volume of traffic the operating cost of BG wider coaches will be much less due to reduction in train length. The capital cost of SG coaches increases almost 3 times due to imports and manufactured by overseas companies, and the depot area for such train will be much more, resulting in higher cost of land acquisition for depot as well the depot cost. I would emphasize that the life cycle cost of BG indigenous wider coaches will be much less than these imported narrow width coaches, thereby resulting in elimination of VGF subsidy and reduction in fares. The basis of indicating the “optimum” size of the coaches has not been justified by calculations for alternative adoption specially for BG coaches.
(iii) Carrying capacity and axle load for design of the corridor and system- Para 4.8.4 at page 31/43 of chapter 4 indicates that for the purpose of calculation of the maximum axle load, the system is designed for a weight of 65kg per person. In earlier reports for Mumbai, it was assumed at 60kg per person (probably this is based on the average weight of people in Ludhiana as compared to those in Mumbai),In both these cases the average weight per person has been under estimated and as per Codal standards including international standards, the weight has to be taken at 68 kg per person. (This will also be seen as exhibited in the lifts used in buildings). Based on the axle load calculations given in table 4.8 at page 33/43 under para 4.8., the axel load has been calculated at a crush capacity of 8 person per sqm of standing area, which is equivalent to 343 passengers per coach. Based on an average of 343/8 = 42.87 sqm. Designing the structural units for 8/sqm is an under estimation as during emergencies it is feasible to accommodate an over crush capacity of 10 to12 passengers / sqm. Revising this at 10 passengers / sqm (adopted for design of mechanical systems as per annexure 1 at page 40/43 of chapter 4 of the DPR) on an area of 42.87 sqm the total number of passengers for live load would be 42.87 x 10 = 428.7 say 430 passengers calculating the total live load / coach as 68 kg/ person the total weight would be 430 x 68 = 29.24 T adding to this the tare weight of 39T (which is not justified by calculations), the total load would be 39+29.24 = 68.24. This is equal to an axle load of 17.06 T under static conditions. Keeping a margin of additional load for dynamic conditions, additional forces on curves and other factors the system should be designed for at least 18T axle load for the design of the RCC corridor, which is supposed to have a life of 120yrs as per British Code BS 5400.
(iii) Specific attention is drawn at page 43/43 of chapter 4 of the DPR vide item 34 it is stated the average cost per coach exclusive of taxes and duties and Oct 2008 price level is Rs 10cr while the estimate for the project for corridor 1 and corridor 2 provides for a price of Rs 7.81cr as seen from page 4/26 of chapter 11 cost estimates at Sept 2008 prices for corridor 1 & the same rate adopted for corridor 2 as seen at page 6/26 of chapter 11
5 CHAPTER 5
CIVIL ENGINEERING
3.5.1 Geometric Design Norms – It is stated in the report that the design parameters have been worked out based on detailed evaluation, experience and internationally accepted practices. It is commented that, international practices and experience does not necessarily suite Indian conditions, environment and requirements. What is “best suited” for them, is not, necessarily, best for Pune.
3.5.2 The horizontal curves for elevated section has been limited to 120m. The same limitation can also be negotiated by BG alignment. The maximum permissible cant (Ca) of 125mm and Cant Deficiency (Cd) of 100mm, for SG, limits the speeds on curves. Higher cant and cant deficiencies are permissible on BG with resultant increase in maximum permissible speeds. This would reduce the turn round time of the train and therefore, requiring less number of coaches. A computer simulation analysis will give the realistic figures.
3.5.3 Elevated Section - The track centers for elevated section has been limited 4.0m through out the length of the corridor, this will restrict future provision of wider coaches even beyond 2.9m width. For BG wider coaches this should be 4.76m. This planning is against the future increase in capacity and is not in public interest
3.5.4 Underground Section – The location, the approach gradient, the depth of the rail level, the diameter of tunnel, has not been mentioned, in sufficient details. The justification for adoption of underground alignment in this location has not been mentioned. This portion increases the cost of the corridor exorbitantly and therefore, should have been given adequate importance for describing in details in the summery, for proper appreciation by the citizens. In the absence of the plan, to a bigger scale the exact route followed by the underground alignment is not understood. Adequate justification, bringing out the road width above and the adjoining areas occupied by the buildings, their types etc and inability to widen the road width in this stretch, to provide an elevated alignment in this portion, should have been given in the DPR.. The details of the location of the commencement and exit points of the underground section gradients, the problems of land acquisition in this area and other technical details have not been mentioned at all.
3.5.5 River Crossings – The corridor 1 alignment crosses rivers at two locations, one near Mula & Pauna confluence between Dapodi & Khadki and later Mutha river between Shivajinagar and Swargate. This means the underground alignment crosses the river below its bed. The adequacy of the depth for underground portion need to be justified. The details of bridge crossings across the Mula river in terms of length, spans etc. have not been mentioned. These details are of great importance for the construction, as well as, for the cost of the alignment. Unfortunately, the DPR does not make any mention of the same.
3.5.6 Design Speed – The maximum sections speed of 80kmph can also be adopted for BG and has been adopted on Mumbai Suburban section. It is necessary to carry out simulation studies to work out the limiting frequency of train permissible for adoption on these corridors, with such limiting grades, curves etc. of the alignment. This will bring out the limitations of the capacity of the alignment for future improvements. The rolling stock need not be designed for 95kmph. To attend a speed of 80kmph for commercial operation, the design of the rolling stock can be based on a max. speed of 90kmph. The unnecessary increase in cost to design the rolling stock for 95kmph can be eliminated.
3.5.7 Route Alignment - The alignment is underground for length of 5 kms with both Shivajinagar and Swargate station underground. The underground station have island platforms through out while elevated section have side platforms. The merits of provision of island platform for underground alignment have not been discussed. The width of platform on elevated and underground portion have not been indicated. The radius of curvatures on reverse curves with straight in between, in the graded portion from elevated to underground, have not been indicated, even though these are important aspects of safety. Similarly for UG corridor the approaches at all UG stations will have reverse curves due to change in center to center distance for island platforms. The locations of open foundations and the pile foundations and the depth of the piles assumed at various locations have not been mentioned. This is an important factor affecting cost of the project. The section/profile of viaduct structure proposed for the elevated portion has not been shown anywhere though this is an important factor in cost, safety and period of construction.
3.5.8 The index plan and section need to be furnished at a bigger scale and the location of various columns for the way structure indicating their spans, the number and size of piles and the depth of piles should be indicated. The GAD showing the bridge elevation and cross section for each bridge crossing should be shown to a bigger scale, indicating the rail level existing adjoining road level, the height of piers the level of pile caps and the depth and diameter of piles and spans proposed, including the geotechnical details based on borehole data collected and the approach curves and levels for the bridge and its distance upstream of downstream from the existing bridge across these rivers should be indicated and I presume the cost estimate have been separately evaluated for each bridge, based on the quantities so assessed and the rates adopted, should be exhibited separately.
3.5.9 The DPR does not indicate a typical plan of a station premises with elevation, and longitudinal section, with dimensions thereon. This should be shown on a bigger scale plans. It is interesting to note that no parking areas for private vehicles have been proposed due to scarcity of land along the alignment. In such a case how do you expect the road vehicle traffic be transferred to LRT. This is important function of the planning for integrating the facilities at metro stations and feeder road traffic. This needs to be incorporated.
3.5.10 Geotechnical Investigations – It is stated that 44 boreholes were drilled for geotechnical investigations up to a depth of 30m. It is seen that the location and the details of the borehole data has been incorporated in the detailed project report.
3.5.11 Utilities – It is stated that the detailed study of the underground and overhead utilities has been carried out along the alignment. It is seen that the details of these utilities indicating the type, the size, the depth and their alignments have not been shown in a detailed plan and the cost of relocating these utilities have not been taken into account in consultation with the concerned authorities and provided in the detailed report in the cost estimates of the project on a realistic basis. As this is a time consuming work, affecting the period of construction of the project, it is presumed that the detailed time schedule for relocation and their planning has been done in consultation with the concerned authorities and the concerned data received from such authorities regarding the cost and period of diversion of such utilities have not been incorporated in the detailed project report for future reference during implementation.
3.5.12 Land requirement – It is seen from table 0.5, indicating summery of permanent land requirement that the total land requirement for both corridors is 32.27Ha (Govt.) + 12.48 Ha (Pvt.) = 44.75 Ha. This equals approximately 112 acers. Out of the above, the major portion is a govt. land with 8.38 Ha, is commercial costly land with major portion falling in corridor 1.
3.5.13 It is mentioned in the DPR at page 3/97 under chapter 5 that the track centers on the elevated corridor is kept at 4.1m while in the summery the same is mentioned at 4.0m at page 9/36 of executive summery. The location of corridor 2 alignment crossing the railway track seem to be the most difficult for execution crossing large number of tracks at the stations. It is presumed that the railway authorities have been consulted to cross the alignment at this location. The location of the alignment crossing Mutha river down stream of Yerwada bridge need to be exhibited to a bigger scale to appreciate the alignment location from the at the existing bridge. The proposal of the state govt. for a road bridge planned at this location has, we presume, been taken into account.
3.5.14 It is seen from the DPR that the platform width for elevated corridor is 4.5m wide side platforms, and for the UG portion it is 10m wide with island platform (ref page 33/97 para 5.10.4 – Platforms of chapter 5) while the executive summary at page 9/36 indicates 12m wide island platform for UG section. This needs to be reconciled. The requirements of platform width staircases escalators and lifts, ticketing gates etc are required to be justified with calculations regarding the assumptions made. It is seen from para 5.10.2 of the DPR that the above facilities have been provided for the passenger forecast for the horizon year 2031, to compute the maximum design capacity with no provision for increasing in future. This means that after opening the corridor for 2014, the corridor capacity will reach the maximum limits in a period of 17 yrs with no provision for expansion. This is not the way railway corridors involving heavy initial expenditure are planned. The structural designs of the elevated corridor are planned for 120 yrs of life while the passenger amenities have been limited to 17 yrs with no feasibility for future expansions. This planning needs to be reviewed on top priority.
3.5.15 --5.11 of the “Traffic Integration of the DPR refers the corridors as Mass Rapid Transit System (MRTS) – while the classification indicated in chapter 4.1 of the DPR, planned for the year 2031 falls under the category of Light Rail Transit (LRT) which limits the capacity to 30000 PHPDT. By merely planning of platforms for running 6 coach train in place of 4 coach train in LRT the corridor doesn’t become MRTS, as the other requirements of passenger movement planning width of platforms staircases, escalators lifts etc. will also have to be made a provision for, to meet the capacity levels of 30 000 to 50000 PHPDT specified for MRTS. The entire planning needs are based on in consistencies of assumptions and standards and need to be completely reviewed at the PMC’s level and the entire DPR modified with corresponding changes in costs, FIRR, EIRR, and conclusions and recommendations .
3.5.16 Park and ride facilities – Para 5.11.2 of DPR page 34/97 on traffic integration facilities recommend the use of park and ride commuters. However, the metro system does not provide any parking places or car parking buildings due to limited availability of land and leaves it to the State Govt. to decide this issue. The planning and the financial implication of this corridor has assumed that private car owners will patronize this LRTS and analysis based on this assumptions, which is inconsistent with the planning.
3.5.17 Para 5.12 Civil structures of DPR page 34/97 – This deals with UG construction and UG stations. This does not indicate the volume of earth work taken out by the Tunnel Boring machines (TBM) and by cut and cover methods and the location at which the same will be dumped and the lead involved thereon. In the absence of the bar chart and the CPM chart for such an important project, the timing of these activities of the construction of the UG section simultaneously with other sections, have not been co related. The presentation of the planning of this project in the DPR which is going to the cabinet for approval has been done with the most unprofessional manner in spite of heavy fees charged for its preparation.
A priority works in the cut and cover method for the UG section is a diversion of UG utilities. Layout plan with quantum of work methodology for execution and time period required, has not been indicated nor a BAR chart for these activities have drawn to enable the public to appreciate the road diversion plans in these heavily crowded areas. The environmental impact of this major activity affecting the citizens of this city should have been given adequate importance in the planning of this activity of this corridor.
3.5.18 Supporting walls for cut and cover method – The report indicates the theoretical methods to be adopted for different conditions of soil. Based on the geotechnical investigation carried out, the DMRC engineers should have indicated the locations where alternative methods of support walls such as RCC diaphragm, sheet piles etc. as specified in the report at pages 36/97 &37/97, should have been shown in drawings and explained in the report to asses the realistic time schedules and performing costs for these activities of these report.
3.5.19 Para 5.12.4 Elevated section & para 5.13 Construction Methodology page 38/97 of DPR - This para describes different types of precast segmental construction and their advantages and disadvantages including construction methodology and the area of land required of about 2.5 to 3 Ha for each precast construction yard. What is more important to be indicated is which segmental method is proposed to be adopted for working out the cost of the project and the quantum of work involved, the time schedule for precasting, transportation and erection should have been worked out and reflected in a bar chart, to enable the work to be completed for this activity within the overall framework of time required for the completion of the entire project. This is essential as the volume of work, the time frame mentioned and the cost assessed in the estimate chapter would be more realistic for appreciation by the cabinet for sanctioning this project. The launching scheme paragraph does not indicate the methodology proposed, the quantum of work, the time schedule for each span and the overall project, should have been given in more details with sketches etc. The extra time required for launching of girders across the railway tracks at Pune Rly station and the safety precautions to be taken for temporary supports if any and the spans proposed at this locations and the traffic block required during launching operations due to electrified section should have been covered more in details with necessary drawings. The technical Report of the DPR appears to be superficial generalized and not specific to this project and complied with “copy paste” technology from other projects. Similarly details of spans proposed to be adopted for the various bridge crossings and have not been detailed out nor planned as specifically applicable to the bridge site.
3.5.20 Substructure and Foundations – The details and sizes and the type of foundations piles / wells proposed to be adopted for the river crossings the difficulties anticipated and the span proposed have not been detailed out nor the time and cost assessment done, to these items of the work.
3.5.21 Construction of stations para 5.16 page 46/97 of DPR – Typical station layout do not indicate the spans for the station area accept indicating the use of a single viaduct column along the alignment in the station area. A dimension plan for the station area for structural arrangement should have been given for better appreciation of the project planning in this DPR.
3.5.22 Para 5.16.3 – Road width required during construction page 47/97 of DPR – It is indicated that a width of about 9m would be barricaded during construction by either widening the roads or by introducing one way traffic. The detail planning of this area of activity has been left to the SPV by DMRC by appointment of consultant for project management and another consultant for proof checking. Simultaneously SPV will have to take action for detailed structural designs of elevated corridor, every professional consultant appointed for preparation of DPR has to base his costs on a general planning of the various structure location, widening areas required and one way traffic to be planned. The detailed cost of this planning will depend upon an overall broad planning of these sub activities by proper coordination with the counter part of the Municipal Corporation and involvement of police transport department and overall broad plan of such planning and recording minutes of discussion with the various local authorities shall form the basis of the broad planning in the right direction and the cost estimates based on such planning. In this report of DMRC such professional method of planning the corridor activities and sub activities and preparation of plan thereon and working out the cost thereof, have been missing in this report.
3.5.23 --5.17 – Geotechnical investigation page 48/97 of DPR – This report deals with the Bore Hole details their location and depth below ground level and the test carried out by the specialized agency with their recommendations has been covered. A location plan showing the chainages of these Bore Holes including locations of these Bore Holes below the river beds crossed by the alignment, should have been given for better appreciation and presentation.
3.5.24 --5.19 Utilities and service page 52/97 -This chapter is also based on “copy paste” technology from the report for “Ludhiana”. The report says that the provision has been made in the project cost estimate towards diversion of utility service line as these services would be diverted by concerned department. The basis of incorporating the project cost has not been indicated nor the split up of the cost for each of 7 departments mentioned at table 5.16 at 52/97 of the DPR, has not been indicated. It is further stated, that “the details would be furnished in the final report”. This means that the present report is not final for providing approval and sanctions by the cabinet. Such sanctions cannot be given on preliminary under estimated and unrealistic report of DMRC. PMC need to specifically look into this aspect.
3.5.25 Land for corridor para 5.20 page 54/97 The normal width of the viaduct structure of the elevated metro is 10m edge to edge wide, for reasons of safety and margins 5m width on either side is provided as a no structure zone. In special cases this width of 5m is reduced to 3.5m on either side. For Switchover Ramps approaches to UG section a width of 11m including protection works has been proposed, with the alignment gradient of 3 to 4%. The area of land required for stations and traffic integration has been made at selected locations were land is available. Details of land required of 24282 sqm for stations and traffic integration has been given in table 5.18 land for traffic integration will be paid by the State Govt.
3.5.26 The depot land of 11.51 Ha at Hill Range station has been identified for full fledged maintenance depot at corridor 1. This depot needs earth filling being a low line area. The land required for corridor 2 at Katchara Depot at Kothrud is 12.11 Ha. Making a total depot land of 23.62 Ha. All these land is a govt. land. The DPR gives under table 5.21, land requirements for running section the details of land whether Govt. of Pvt., whether residential commercial, or offices etc. have been given in extensive details at pages 60/97 to 66/97 of DPR chapter 5 for both the corridors, totaling 25319.5 sqm. It would have been better appreciated, if these figures in tables were also represented on a plan showing their locations. 4 pockets of land two on each corridor, total area of 9.5 Ha have been identified for temporary acquisition for construction. This covers private land of 9 ha for corridor 1 and only 0.5 ha for corridor 2. It is considered desirable to locate to some are in corridor 2 in the section ASI to Vanaz to reduce transportation lead and costs. The land required for property development by builders or developer has been assessed at 64435 sqm most of these land is privately owned and has been shown at table 5.23. Major part of this area is at Wadgaon Sheri and Swargate. A location plan of this land and the present price of land for development should have been indicated . Details of permanent land required for this project totaling to about 45.75 ha for both the corridors has been indicated in table 5.24 at page 69/97 of the DPR.
3.5.27 The copies of the sketches furnished from page 70/97 under chapter 5 of the DPR upto pages 97/97 are not legible, nor in sufficient details, being furnished in a smaller scale and cannot be appreciated nor commented upon.
6
CHAPTER 6
TRAIN OPERATION PLAN
3.6.1 It is seen from this chapter that the average speed for corridor 1, has been taken at 33kmph for corridor and 31kmph for corridor 2. The basis of arriving at these figures should be furnished as no reference to the basis of these figures have been indicated in the detailed report. This is an important factor as the total turn round time of the trains and the number of trains and coaches required at different frequency (headway) will be dependent on these factors. It is desirable to make a simulation analysis taking into consideration, the station locations, the stoppage time, the speed restriction on curves, gradients, and the reversal time at terminals, to arrive at these figures. The details of this simulation analysis should be provided as annexure to the detailed project report.
3.6.2 Four car & Six rakes - It is further stated in the summery report that “the possibility of running trains with composition of 4 car and 6 car trains, with different headways of 2.5min to 15min has been examined. The methodology adopted for arriving at such composition will depend upon the hourly traffic data As stated earlier the simulation analysis should be done to assess the limiting frequency at which the corridor is capable of running the trains based on the alignment and other factors. The composition of cars namely 4 car and 6 car trains for corridor 1 and corridor 2 respectively would also be during the non peak period and the adjustment is done by changing the frequency. It would be desirable to compare the traffic hourly demand in each corridor and the frequency to be adopted to ensure optimum utilization of assets for operational efficiency and operating economy. This should be given in the detailed project report to reflect a professional approach in preparation of DPR. A comparison of the above has to be made if BG wider coaches of 3.66m and SG wider coaches of 3.2m are adopted on these corridors to assess the efficiency and economy in adopting the size of the coaches and the train composition.
3.6.3 Coach composition – A 4 car train will have a capacity of 1034 passengers (sitting 186, crush standing 848) ,.and for a 6 car train 1574 passengers (sitting 286 and crush standing 1288). It is seen from the above that the ratio of standing to sitting works out to a) for 4 car train 848 / 186 = 4.55 and b) for 6 car train the ratio of standing to sitting works out to 1288 / 286 = 4.50.
3.6.4 Requirement of Coaches – Table 0.5 at page 15 of the summery indicates the requirement of coaches for different years for different headways. It is seen that the requirement of coaches for both the corridors upto the year 2031 is based on the requirement of 4 car trains at 3.5min headway for corridor 1 and 8min headway for corridor 2.
3.6.5 A comparison and economics of assessment of coaches with 3.2m wide to SG and 3.66m wide for BG should also be done to get of the techno-economic merits of the other alternatives. Similarly assessment of demand for the next 30 years should also be done to cater for future increase in capacity. For corridor 2 it may be worthwhile to assess the requirement of coaches with 3-4min headway so that the same can be better patronized by the commuters. The entire planning seems to have been aimed at providing more imported coaches at abnormally high costs to suite the overseas suppliers.
3.6.6 IT is seen that the number of coaches assessed at 88 nos for corridor 1 and 48 nos for corridor 2, is based on the requirements of the traffic demand for the year 2031 only. That is for a period 17 yrs after commissioning the corridors in 2014. This is not the correct way of assessment of the number of coaches, as the corridor has to be fit to meet the traffic demand 30 yrs at least, with provision for future improvement in PHPDT.
3.6.7 It is seen from annexure 5 at page 19/22 of chapter 5 that for corridor 2 for the year 2031, the 48 coaches have been assessed on the basis of headway of 6.5 min, while at page 9/22 of the report for corridor 2 vide item ‘c’ a headway of 8min have been mentioned. This may be reconciled. Similarly at page 10/22 vide para 6.5 of chapter 6 the number of rakes assessed for corridor 2 for the year 2031 has been shown as 10 nos instead of 12 nos and the number of coaches should 48 instead of 40 nos.
3.6.8 At page 10/22 under the heading assumptions vide item vii the total turn round time is taken as 6min at terminal stations. This will very for each corridor and will be equal to the frequency that is 3.5min for corridor 1 at each end and 8min for corridor 2.
7
CHAPTER 7
POWER REQUIREMENTS
3.7.1 The traction power at 25KV AC (single phase) is suitable and economical for mainline long distance trains. There is hardly any advantage for utilizing this traction, for a localized system like the metro rail, Such high voltage transmission entails more equipment items on the motor coach, such as, pantograph, air blast circuit breaker, step down transformers, tap changer, rectifier for DC supply etc. thereby making the motor coaches heavy and costly. When the final voltage for the traction motors is going to be DC 600V – 750V or so, it is better to use say 900V DC for traction power to be drawn from the third rail. This will render the motor coach design simpler and economical. This has been done for Kolkata Metro and is being adopted by Hyd metro. This also eliminates the need for overhead catenaries and the masts along side track, thereby saving in capital cost of the project. The merits of DC vs 25KV AC supply and its economics have not been discussed in the report.
3.7.2 Even if the traction motor drives is 3 phase AC, that power shall have to obtained through an inverter worked from the DC supply. The use of 3 Phase AC induction motors for the drive cannot therefore be any reason to opt for 25KV AC single phase supply as a traction power. The only justification for 25KV would be to provide compatibility for the existing Lonavala – Pune Suburban trains which are running under 25KV AC supply. As the project does not envisaged compatibility with the suburban section of the central railway. The Merits of adoption of 25KV as applicable to Pune, needs to be further analyzed in terms of techno economic advantages.
3.7.3 Incidentally a number of EMU formations running on Mumbai sub. System (using 1500 V DC for traction), are running on 3 phase AC drive on power supplied through IGBT inverters which has been talked about in the DPR. This formations have been supplied by ICF / Madras.
3.7.4 Rolling Stock Chapter 4.8 at page 30/43 System selection in table 4.8 (page 32/43) shows the tare weight (max.39T.) With all the above mentioned equipments on the motor coach, its tare weights, the basis of arriving at the tare weight of the coach at 39T has not been explained in the DPR. This is important as it has a relation with the axle load for which the system has been designed.
3.7.5 The acceleration is achieved by the number of motor coaches adopted in a train set and has nothing to do with Rolling Stock technology. It however increases the cost of the 4 car and 6 car units considerably.
3.7.6 The features like disc brakes or air springs were introduced in the bogie design by the western countries and Japan, for their long distance high speed trains like the ICE (inter City Express) or TEE (Trans European Express) trains which run at 160 to 200kmph. As the metro trains do not exceed 80 / 90kmph, there is no justification in providing these at exorbitantly high cost. This is probably on the advice of overseas consultants to promote international business at our cost.
3.7.7 The velocity time operation curve shown at page 33/43 of chapter 4 does not mention the length of the section. Ruff assessment indicates a length of around 1.8km. As the inter station distance of metro rail is generally at 1km or even less the scope for coasting or regenerative breaking doesn’t exist on these corridors. The DPR should have carried out a section by section exercise to identify whether the scope for regenerative is at all applicable and necessary for the metro. Regenerative breaking is generally useful for long stretches of level / falling gradients and for high speed trains.
3.7.8 Considerable advantages would be available by making the metro rolling stock similar to 100s of EMU coaches already running in the suburban areas of the country. Wheels, axles, couplers, Roller Bearings, Motors, gears, wheels and many such components are vital for effective maintenance of the rolling stock and the more of them can be made inter changeable, the greater shall be the economies of maintenance. Para 4.8.6 at page 33/43 talks about “Low Life Cycle Cost” and the most effective way of achieving it by ensuring a policy of interchangeability with existing stock and the maximum use of unit replacement maintenance policy. The large number of railway workshops can be effectively used for optimal maintenance of metro rail rolling stock.
3.7.9 Para 4.8.6 at page 33/43 of chapter 4 – also talks of “ aesthetically pleasing interior and exterior”. This apparently a useful thin end of the wedge to facilitate improving coaches at exorbitant cost. This matter is highly subjective. But we have manufactured the “Palace on Wheels” which shows the level of “aesthetically pleasing interior” which we can attend if demanded and specified. Stainless steel sheets would be at least 10 times more costly than the normal deep drawing quality mild steel sheets used by indigenous coach builders. There is no difficulty in indigenously providing stainless steel sheets coaches if demanded by the citizens at exorbitantly high prices and necessitating higher fare rates to the commuters.
3.7.10-- Air Conditioning – During peak hours with a crush capacity of 260 to 300 passengers packed with doors closed and windows sealed, on the narrow width 2.9m coaches, the space envelope may not be able to handle the removal of return air and effective addition of cooled fresh air into the coach. in summer time with out side ambient temperature as high as, 40 degree C of so, the air conditioning may posed a formidable problem. This is seen from the press reports in Hindustan Times, that the commuters a suffocated during peak hours and the air conditioning is ineffective in Delhi Metro.
3.7.11 At page 11/16 para 7.12 of chapter 7 Electric power tariff is based on in the range of Rs 2.5 to 2.75/unit propose at a concessional rate of Govt. Maharashtra on no profit no loss basis. This would be a gross under estimation of costs and the financial implications shall be based on the market rates which should be obtained from Pune Electricity Board.
3.7.12 The assessment of total traction and auxiliary power requirements of 34.2 MVA for corridor 1 and 15.9MVA for corridor 2 as indicated in annexure 7.1 &7.2 of chapter 7 at pages 12/16 and 13/16 need to be reviewed for the years beyond 2031. There is no uniformity in assessment of passenger weight in different subsystems of this report as have been assumed at 67.2kg / person in chapter 7 while 65kg in other chapters. With the existing power shortage, this demand cannot be met with .
8 CHAPTER 8
VENTILATION AND AC
3.8.1 It is added here that Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, energy saving majors, ventilation and AC systems can also be adopted on BG system with equal efficiency. Assessment of tunnel ventilation fans requirements and other allied tunnel ventilation system requirement need to be supported with detailed calculation for adequacy of provisions and to confirm to CODES and Standards. Similarly, mechanically ventilated or AC equipment assessment should be supported by calculations so that at a later stage, the costs are not exceeded. Station AC, tunnel ventilation system and space requirement for VAC systems and control and monitoring facilities can also be provided on BG systems.
9 CHAPTER 9
DEPOT MAINTENANCE
3.9.1 Two depots cum workshop have been proposed - near Hill Range station for corridor 1 and the other near Kothrud at Vanaz station (smaller in size) for corridor 2. It is indicated in the report that the depot inspection and workshop sheds are being constructed for 6 car formation and the station platforms are also being planned for 6 car formation, while the traffic demand and coach assessment has been done on the 4 car requirements till 2031. This is an in consistency in planning and investment which could be made provision for, without capital investment initially for 6 car formation. The estimate for costs do not provide details of actual provisions and gives LS costs. It is not possible to appreciate what exactly has been provided in the costing exercise.
10 CHAPTER 10
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT
3.10.1 Under the funding pattern specified in chapter 0.13 – Property Development is suggested that 500m on either side of the alignment should be developed by providing 4 FSI and demolishing the existing buildings. The social and environmental impact of the same should also be incorporated in the DPR . Environmental impact of earth excavation for tunneling and cut& cover method should be reflected.
11 CHAPTER 11
COST ESTIMATES
3.11.1 The capital cost estimates provided in the executive summery are scanty and provides LS amounts against the various items, without providing quantities and rates for assessment of detailed cost. A brief note, need be given, explaining the basis of the rates and quantities, so as to arrive at a realistic cost estimate of the project, at Sept 2008 prices. The details of the items and sub items must be shown separately for items for elevated and underground portions. The basis of P-way and ballasted and ballastless tracks indicating the types of sleepers proposed for ballasted tracks and the quantities of ballast thereof. The details regarding the provision of check rails on sharp curves need to be indicated. The station building cost should be furnished more in details separately for platform and platform covers, width of the platforms adopted both for side elevated platform and island underground platforms. The rolling stock cost should be based on the assessment of rolling stock for required for 30 yrs period (the life of such stock). Separate signalling cost for ATC, ATP and ATO should be indicated. The depot cost should be worked out in more details.
3.11.2 Under estimation of Cost - It should be realized that this is a detailed project report and the cost should be worked out in as much detail, as possible, based on general arrangement drawings for the entire corridor and quantities assessed and the unit rates provided, based on the price structure for Pune. It is seen that the cost of the head quarter office Over Heads of the SPV, interim consultant, the general consultants and the detailed designed consultant, the proof consultant and the prime consultant for PMC who would oversee the work of the general consultants and contractors, need to be separately indicated as they form a heavy element of the total costs. The cost of land and the rate assessed, including that for compensation payable, should be separately assessed and incorporated in the summery, so that adequacy of such provisions will ensure the proper final project costs. The details of imports and custom duties and taxes etc. should be separately worked out and shown in an annexure and provided for the total costs. The financial charges of insurance, bid bonds, BG, risks factors etc. which are generally provided for by contractors in their bid prices, should be assessed and provided for. The provision should also be made for price escalation and expected arbitration claims which are inevitable in such complex constructions. Interest during construction should also be provided for and shown separately on the basis of the annual cash flow. A detailed cash flow plan should be worked out to assess the overdraft necessary for the contractors and the interest thereon, so that the bid prices and estimates match reasonably. The detailed cost for rehabilitation of existing structures and commercial units should be assessed in detail instead of providing as a LS item. The details of cost of underground portion should be indicated separately to assess its impact over and above the elevated portion. As the 500m width of adjoining area of the alignment is being provided for an FSI of 4. a detailed drawing showing the layout of the alignment with structures required to be dismantled be shown and their cost implications worked out. The elevated alternative, in lieu of this underground alignment, showing existing width of road, adjoining area of development and the additional width, if any, required for widening the road to provide for an elevated alignment with additional cost of land for widening and expenses for compensation for adjoining area be worked out, so as to compare the techno-economic feasibility of alternative elevated alignment on this stretch.
3.11.3 Separate cost of operation and maintenance for period of say 30 yrs after completion, with specific reference to the staff costs for operation, the training of staff initial and regular, infrastructure for the same, energy consumption cost, replacement cost, repairs and maintenance cost and additional water requirement cost during construction & operation both and any other costs required, should be worked out to get a realistic assessment of the life cycle cost and the internal rate of return
The cost of SG has been under estimated and need s to be reviewed. The cost of BG wider coaches has also been worked out. All the working sheet of the comparative costs of BG with wider coaches, SG revised cost and the cost as worked out by DMRC is attached as annexure to this report and the summery of comparison is given below
3.11.4 SUMMERY OF COMPARATIVE COSTS OF SG & BG
DMRC Estimate – SG (As per DPR) Core Group Estimate
SG (Rev.) Core Group Estimate
BG
Cost Cost/km Cost Cost/km % Change Cost Cost/
km %change from
core group SG
Corridor I 4930 297 6186 373 24 5089 307 (-) 21 (373-307/307)
L= 16.589
Corridor II 2217 148.5 2841 190 27 2104 141 (-) 34 (190-141/141)
L=14.925
Total I+II 7147 227 9027 286 25 7193 228 (-) 25 (286-228/228)
L=31.511
DMRC cost under estimated by 25% (286-227=59/227=25)
CHAPTER 12
FINANCIAL VIABILITY AND FARE STRUCTURE AND FINANCING
3.12.1 It is seen that FIRR works out to 3.23% without taxes and 1.93 with taxes. This is further based on under estimated cost of the project & at a concessional rate of power tariff of Rs 2 to 2.5 per unit. This shows that the project is financially not remunerative and is a burden on the citizens by generating funds by heavy taxation on the citizens of Pune. The fare structure as indicated also is abnormally high compared to the one adopted for metro one Mumbai. Which is Rs 8/- for 3-8 km corridor and Rs 10/- beyond it. While the fare proposed in the year 2014-15 for 6-9 kms is Rs 14/-. Compared to the bus this is abnormally high and needs a second look, regarding the need for such construction and to find alternatives.
3.12.2 The proposal for acquiring 500m Radius land on either side of the corridor with an FSI of 4 will not be accepted by public, at it involves heavy demolition of buildings. Without actually assessing the areas with minimum inconvenience to commercial traders and residents of these areas, the planning of the corridor is incomplete and will result in agitation by the public. The Mumbai is already facing similar problems for Charkop-Bandra, Chembur-Mankhurd areas, where heavy agitation by public is being faced by MMRDA.
3.12.3 In view of the above it is felt that instead of an elevated metro rail corridor, the alternative of an elevated road based corridor, of 3 lanes in each directions, with entry exit points at major inter sections be considered as an alternative, all along this route, by provision of a double lane in each direction for a dedicated bus corridor which will enable running of express buses and can provide, in addition, one lane in each direction , for car and other vehicular traffic. This will also meet the requirements of additional road width necessary for the daily inputs of cars in the city and cannot be provided at the ground level. This will also improve the average speed of busses and provide adequate space for pedestrian to walk on the existing roads and reduce traffic density of vehicles on the existing roads underneath and later, if at all metro system is justified, the same can be provided underground as the width for the rail system is much less than that for road system, and would be more economical for underground than that for a road system. This alternative needs to be given a thought and the proposed metro rail corridor should be stopped forthwith. Alternatively as LRT is proposed, an indigenous MG Metro system may be investigated and compared with BG indigenous wider coach Metro rail analyzed.
13 CHAPTER 13
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
3.13.1 The EIRR of 18% assessed needs to be investigated in more details as the assumptions made, appear to be theoretical and the financial experts need to look into this subject.
14
CHAPTER 14
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
3.14.1The so called DPR has not been prepared in detailed to cover the standards laid down by the Ministry of Urban Development for preparation of such DPR’s and Govt. of India and need to be revised so as to work out the cost in sufficient details, based on the general arrangement drawings for various subsystems and assessment of realistic quantities and performing rates for Pune, so as to get an idea of the total final costs and its implications for generation of funds, to enable to Govt. to decide whether the project is to be taken up and recommended for construction.
3.14.2 Before the PMC & PCMC submit the report to Maharashtra State Cabinet, the citizens approval should be taken on priority and their observation should be recorded and furnished to the State Govt. for the information of the cabinet so that there is a minimum disturbance after sanction of the project.
3.14.3 The methodology of financing the project must be debated with the citizens group before forwarding to Urban Ministry.
3.14.4 The legal provisions under the present constitution regarding the jurisdiction of the state to connect two Municipal jurisdiction – PMC & PCMC by a metro rail or even by tramway needs to be approved by the law Ministry of the Center as it is not in conformity with the constitution article 366/20, article 246 VIIth schedule List –I, Indian Railways 1989 act and the Indian Tramways act. 1886.Unless proper legal cover for construction, operation and maintenance of the metro rails are enacted in advance by modification of the constitution, the same should not be taken up, as the same would be declared void under art. 254 of the constitution.
3.14.5 We are glad to note that the report at page 33 states that “metro comes under definition of railways under the railways act 1989”. The State Govt. has declared that the metro rail within one municipal jurisdiction can be enacted under the Indian Tramways act needs to be further debated under the constitutional provision.
3.14.6 Your attention is drawn to the last sentence of legal cover for Pune metro rail at page 33 “when this act is processed and enacted, it will give the required legal cover for operations and maintenance of Ludhiana metro” This indicates that the DPR is based on “copy paste” of document prepared for Ludhiana metro. This is an unfortunate part when PMC commissioner states that they have paid heavy fees in crore of Rupees to DMRC for preparation of such a report. And that they will accept their recommendations as they do NOT understand this subject
15 CHAPTER 15
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
3.15.1 From the traffic data and the financial implication furnished, it is seen that the project, as proposed, is not financially remunerative and is not justified for taking up by heavy imposition of taxes on the citizens of this city and country.
3.15.2 FOR GENERATION OF FUNDS, ADDITIONAL TAXATION ON THE CITIZENS OF PUNE ARE RECOMMENDED AS UNDER—a) Professional Tax at 1% of the salary of the employees. B) A Cess on petrol and diesel sale in the city c) Increase in FAR to 4 and its trading d) A surcharge on the property tax in the city e) A surcharge on the Motor Vehicle Tax in the city. f) An entry tax on the commercial articles entering the city. THESE WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTBLE TO PUNE CITIZENS
3.15.3 The limited capacity of 2.9m wide imported coaches (as against 3.2m wide for Mumbai metro one and for other States) on SG at exorbitant costs, with no future provision for increasing its width, and having a limited capacity life of less than 25yrs, is against the national interest.
3.15.4 If at all a rail corridor is required it must be on BG with provision for wider indigenous coaches of 3.66m wide, with the necessary technological inputs and can be constructed in less than 30% of the above cost without the need for VGF subsidy and at reduced fare structure acceptable to the citizens and would provide compatibility and connectivity with the existing rail system and will be in line with the national policy of the country on rail gauge issue. If BG is not justified on traffic demand , a MG (1m) corridor with indigenous appropriate technology with indigenously manufactured coaches by ICF, as adopted on Kolkata Metro should be explored with provision for future expansion to BG with wider coaches as the traffic increases after 30 to 50yrs. and feasibility of elevated corridor in lieu of under ground should be investigated.
3.15.5 Calculations of EIRR needs to be reviewed by experts.
3.15.6 The alternative of an elevated dedicated road alignment in lieu of elevated metro rail may be more economical and will be able to provide a dedicated elevated bus corridor and in addition cater for the provision for additional road width for heavy inputs of 4 wheelers in the city.
3.15.7 The DPR must be discussed by PMC with the core committee of senior railway experts and their views, on behalf of the citizens, must be taken into consideration, before the clearance of this project by PMC and PCMC for forwarding it to the state govt.
3.15.8 This project report is not only defective and deficient in many major aspects but is biased in favour of SG with imported coaches on the advice of international consultants and vendors and with complete disregard to the techno economic merits, resulting in heavy financial burden on the citizens of this city and is being adopted against the recommendations of the Ministry of Railways, who have the legal jurisdiction under the constitution for deciding this issue.
V K J Rane – IRSE (Retd.)
Ex-MD/IRCON
Vkjrane1930@hotmail.com
Te.(020) 2685 4132,Cell-93710 05396
Dated 28th April 2009
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