Date 11th June 2010
From: mdmetro@hotmail.com
To: vkjrane1930@hotmail.com
Subject: RE: Pune Metro Rail Planning
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2010 12:04:51 +0000
No.DMRC/89/10 Dt. 8.6.2010
Dear Shri Rane,
Ref: Your mail dt. 2.6.2010 reg. Pune Metro.
We are in receipt of your above mail and furnish the point wise reply as under.
1. The alignment of metro corridors for Pune has been designed after detailed topographical survey along the proposed routes. The entire alignment has personally been seen by the undersigned and technical feasibility ascertained. However, the acquisition of structures at few difficult locations cannot be avoided for the urban project of this magnitude. The cost of the project has been worked out based on the rates accepted at Delhi for Delhi Metro lines. The cost of the project for Pune has comparatively come slightly lower due to the fact the underground alignment has been planned with NATM technique of tunneling in place of Tunnel Boring Machine (TBM) which is about one and half times costlier. The costing for the project reports of such magnitude is normally done adopting unit block cost but not on the BOQ cost basis. Hence the costing for Pune metro DPR has been done taking the unit block cost worked out based on the accepted rates for Phase-I and II of Delhi Metro.
The detailed project Report prepared by DMRC has taken all the aspects of a metro project into account and it is complete in all respects. DMRC has prepared number of Detailed project reports of metro in past which are approved by the respective Governments and the projects are under implementation. Hence, it is only your perception to term the report as Paper Project report (PPR).The observations of the core group were taken into account at the time of submission of final DPR to Pune and Pune Chinchwad Corporations in the month of July 2009.
2. Vanaz to Ramvadi corridor has been identified one of the best corridors for Phase-I of Pune metro for the following reasons.
a) M/s RITES LTD conducted the study for MRTS system for Pune and submitted the reports in 2001.The metro corridors recommended by them for implementation in various years are given in the table below
Feature Agricultural College to Telco Route Length (km) Construction Period Year of Commissioning Phasing
Line (1) Agricultural College to Varje 12.54 1999 to 2002 2002 Phase-I
Line (2) Nav Satyadri to Hadapsar 10.10 2002 to 2006 2006 Phase-II
Line (3) Agricultural College to Katraj 12.74 2008 to 2011 2011 Please-II
Line (4) Agricultural College to Lonikand 25.38 2018 to 2021 2021 Phase-III
Line (5) Agricultural College to Chinchwad 18.00 2018 to 2021 2021 Phase-III
Line (6) Agriculture College to Katraj 12.51 2013 to 2016 2016 Phase-II
The years of implementation of some of the lines recommended in RITES report are already passed. However the intention of reproducing this table in this letter, is to bring out the priority of various routes for the Pune Metro.
b) DMRC in the present study got done the traffic projections through IIT, Mumbai. Initially they recommended the corridors as below.
Corridor No. Line Details Length(km) Approx. Phasing
Corridor 1 Pimpari Chinchwad to Swargate via Agricultural College 16.5 Phase-I (2011)
Corridor 2 Aundh to Kalyani Nagar via Shivaji Nagar and Pune Station 14 Phase-I (2011)
Corridor 3 Agricultural College to J M Road, Swargate via Mhatre Bridge 9 Phase-I (2011)
Corridor 4 Extension of Corridor 1 from Chnchwad to Nigdi and Swargate to Katraj 11.5 Phase-II (2016)
Corridor 5 Extension of Corridor 2 from Aundh to Hinjewadi 13 Phase-II (2016)
Corridor 6 Extension of Corridor 3 from Swargate to Hadapsar 9 Phase-II (2016)
Corridor 7 Mhatre Bridge to Warje (Line runs from Agri. College to Warje) 4 Phase-III (2021)
From the above table, it may be seen that IIT/Mumbai in their traffic study, found that Shivaji Nagar to Kalyani Nagar (Ramvadi) corridor to be taken in Phase-I only. Accordingly, this corridor has been recommended in Phase-I of Pune Metro.
Subsequently due to importance of the area and main requirement of the city, the following corridors were found best to make phase I of Pune metro.
• Metro Line 1: From PCMC to Swargate 16.6 Kms. (Out of this approximately-5 km underground), Stations:15 (U/G:6 Nos.)
• Metro Line 2: PMC Depot (Kothrud) to Ramvadi 14.9 Kms. (complete elevated), Stations:15 (all elevated). This corridor is combination of part of Corridor 7 and part of Corridor 2 except that in place of Warje, the corridor has been recommended to be connected to Vanaz due to depot land being available at Kothrud and also traffic being same on both the roads.
The ridership of these corridors as estimated by IIT is given as under
Year PCMC-Swargate Kothrud - Ramvadi
Most Likely Optimistic Most Likely Optimistic
PHPDT Daily traffic PHPDT Daily traffic PHPDT Daily traffic PHPDT Daily traffic
2011 18110 348387 19610 480860 5817 136309 10048 289813
2021 18961 397228 19699 532281 8519 212024 18244 477399
2031 20035 443849 23387 613442 10982 290516 22414 592168
From the above table, it may be seen that the traffic figures may materialize somewhere between most likely and optimistic and it may come to breakeven point from operation point of view. However, it is to clarify that the metro projects are social projects and financial viability of these projects is normally not achieved. In fact, it is the Economic internal rate of return (EIRR) which is important for sanction of such projects. As the FIRR is low, the DPR recommends only DMRC pattern of funding where Government to form an SPV and tie for the funds and run the system with Property Development support.
Pune to Hinjewadi and Swargate to Katraj metro corridors have been recommended in DPR in second Phase as these are the lines to cover mainly the areas at outskirts or the satellite city of Pune and Pune Chinchwad.
DMRC still recommends both the corridors of Phase-I for implementation as phase I so that the major maintenance of trains of Corridor II is also taken up at the depot proposed at Agricultural University area.
As regards, the costing, it may need revision once the Government is firm on its implementation and corridors to be implemented as it will enable to know the time of completion of project which decides the completion cost.
Paras 3 to 12:
This is the old controversy Broad Gauge vs. Standard Gauge. You are perhaps under the impression that the normal Broad Gauge EMU coaches of 3.6 m. width, which are used for suburban services, can be run as metro coaches through the centre of the city. Nobody will accept this kind of trains. Metro trains have to be air-conditioned with automatic doors, must have fast acceleration and deceleration, very reliable brakes and need sophisticated signalling like Automatic Train Protection or Automatic Train Operation. The axle load has to be 15 or 16 tonnes only as against 22.5 tonnes of Broad Gauge. The width of the coaches also should be small so that the width of the overhead structures will be only 8 to 9 m. Chennai has constructed overhead suburban tracks through the city and what a mess they have created. The structures are so huge, the trains are noisy and the patronage is not even 30,000 passengers for the whole day. Do you wish to have a similar type of metro for Pune as well?
The carrying capacity of the metro line depends upon not the gauge but the number of trains and the number of coaches per train which can be run in an hour. When trains have to be run every two minutes, the capacity is enormous which can easily be handled with the coach width of 2.9 m. on Standard Gauge. Why then invest for a wide coach on Broad Gauge? If the line gets saturated after 20 or 25 years, the obvious remedy is to reduce the load on the line with parallel corridors which will be more useful to the city by having a wide spread network.
In any case, as per Government’s orders the choice of gauge is left to the State Government who has to take decision based on techno-economic considerations. If the Maharashtra Government wants Broad Gauge, let them have it and pay the price for the Broad Gauge.
All your assumptions and presumptions in regard to the cost of Broad Gauge vs. Standard Gauge are totally wrong. DMRC which has constructed and operated a Metro should have reliable cost figures.
13. DMRC has given its professional advice in regard to the funding of the metro project. It is finally for the State Government and the Central Government to decide which funding pattern is to be adopted.
14. The “Metro Railways (Amendment) Act, 2009” passed by Parliament in September, 2009 can now be used for implementation of Pune Metro.
15. No comments.
Conclusion:
The metropolis of Pune has already got a population of more than 5 million. Introduction for a Metro to the City is already badly delayed. Conflicting views and pulls in different directions, which you are attempting, will certainly derail the Metro Project in the City. Metros are now coming up in many cities of the country. Pune has to fall in line with the same technology, implementation model and funding approach. Opinions of individuals are not always in the larger interest of the city.
With regards,
Yours sincerely,
E. Sreedharan
Shri V.K.J. Rane,
Ex-MD/IRCON
Monday, June 14, 2010
Pune Metro Rail (Reply)
V. K. J. RANE – IRSE (Retd.) Ex-M.D./IRCON
Date 12th June 2010
Dear Dr. Sreedharan
(MD/DMRC)
Sub – Pune Metro Rail
Ref – Your Email No. DMRC/89/10 dated 08.06.10 in response to my e- mail dated 02.06.10
Thank you very much for your above e-mail and for your quick response for the same, clarifying issues brought out in my e-mail. I have, however, a few observations on the statements made by you, in your mail and shall be grateful, if a similar quick response is received from your end.
1 I am happy to note that the entire alignment has been personally seen by you and that the technical Feasibility has been ascertained by you. The DPR, however, does not provide the Technical Feasibility of the alignment near Paund Phata and crossing the Railway Tracks above the Pune Station and a large number of yard lines. The gradients and the track levels at these locations and a layout plan would have clarified the doubts in our minds. In addition DPR does not indicate, if any meetings were held with the Pune Railway Authorities for acceptance the alignment and its Technical Feasibility. A visual feasibility is done in a Reconnaissance Survey (PPR) and not in a DPR Survey, where the feasibility is checked at site by pegging the alignment at site.
1.1 You have stated that a Detailed Topographical Survey of the Alignment has been carried out by DMRC for Pune Metro Rail Corridors. The DPR does not show to proper scale, a Detailed Plan and Section of the alignments along these routes, indicating levels, gradients, curvature etc. These were not furnished along with the DPR copy given to us. I would be thankful, if these could be furnished for our information.
1.2 Unit Block System- This method of costing is adopted for Reconnaissance survey reports. (Paper Project Report – PPR), to decide whether further detailed investigation in necessary for preparation of a Detailed Project Report (DPR-1) and sanction to the project. There is, however, no reservation for projecting the cost on the basis of “Unit Block Cost”, provided the same is prepared on the basis of preliminary Broad Engineering Drawings, Assessment of Broad Quantities & Unit Rates and costs worked out for Block Units (per Km / per Unit). This basis of working out Unit Block Cost, is attached to the report for assurance to the Client that the costs will not very, by plus or minus 10 %. You have stated that you have worked these cost on the basis of accepted rates for Phase-I & Phase-II of the Delhi Metro Rail. As these cost were not available with us, it is difficult to conclude that they are realistic, as we notice that these costs are far lower than the accepted prices quoted for Mumbai Metro Rail One (where, I was associated in pricing and submission of the bid on behalf of MTR (Hong Kong Metro Rail Consultancy Group) and Reliance Energy Ltd (REL). Mumbai). There are a large number of items where costs have been grossly underestimated and number of items not provided which have been recommended in the DPR for provision. (Such as the Consultancy Charges of General Consultants, DMRCs Consultancy Charges, Design Charges, Proof Consultancy Charges, & Testing Charges and similar charges for other services for electrical signaling, Telecommunication and Rolling Stock etc). These charges together would work out to not less than 15% to 20% of the Project Cost. A provision of only 5% has been made in the estimate, which will cover the SPVs Management, Tender & Legal Charges etc. My assessment of cost are based on the item wise calculations presented by you in the DPR, based on my experience in preparation of project cost of Mumbai Metro Rail One, and large value complex projects executed by me in India & Internationally by participation in bidding as a contractor (IRCON).
1.3 Assuming your costs projected are realistic for sanctions of the project, can you confirm that the liability of excess costs beyond 10% of your estimate, for the same scope of the work, would be borne by DMRC?
1.4 Adoption of NATM Technique for tunneling resulting in reduced cost of the UG alignment would support the suggestion of the Pune Citizens for adoption of the entire section of the Metro Rail, as UG system for the Economic Benefits to the city, as brought out by them in their recommendations. (A copy of the accepted tendered rates received for the UG portion of Delhi Metro Rail for the Airport Line would be useful for our discussions)
1.5 Nobody disputes the capability of DMRC in preparation of Detailed Project Reports. But I wonder why the Project Cost for Mumbai Metro Rail One -Varsova-Andheri-Ghatkopar (VAG) Corridor, estimated at Rs 1500cr was accepted at Rs 2356 cr i.e. 58% higher than cost estimated by DMRC. It would be appreciated if the comparison of the estimated cost initially presented for sanction of the Govt. and the actual tendered cost finally accepted for various projects are produced. This would justify your statement made in this respect.
1.6 Paper Project Report – The reasons for stating your DPR as PPR is because of the extent of detailing which is required to be given for a DPR for sanction of the project has not been exhibited in the DPR. The guidelines laid down by the Union Ministry of Urban Development for Preparation of the DPR for Metro Rail have not been followed. Your statement to the Pune Municipal Commissioner that similar reports were prepared for sanction of the Mumbai Metro one project, does not seem to be factually correct, if the two are compared.
1.7 I further reiterate that, the adoption of the basis of accepted rates for Phase-I & II of Delhi Metro Rail for Pune Metro Rail Area is fundamentally wrong, particularly when you have the Mumbai Metro Rail costs available. Underestimation of project cost for Govt. sanctions is not in the larger interest of the Project and the Citizens.
1.8 I am not aware of the Facts and Details of the observations of the Pune Core Group, taken into account by you, for preparation of DPR for Pune & PCMC in the month of July 2009. The Pune Core Group would appreciate, if these details are communicated to us for our Professional Satisfaction.
2 Your DPR has given the following priorities of the corridors as recommended by IIT Mumbai on the basis of PHPDT, as per the table & Density Chart given below.
It is seen from the above that the traffic density priorities are as under for 2031. Selected priorities are 3,5,& 6
Priority – 1 Line No 6 32325 PPHPD Katraj
Priority – 2 Line No 5 29950 PPHPD Hinjewadi
Priority – 3 Line No 1 26750 PPHPD Nigdi
Priority – 4 Line No 3 16956 PPHPD Hadapsar
Priority – 5 Line No 4 12738 PPHPD Ramvadi – Wagoli
Priority – 6 Line No 2 9614 PPHPD Kothrud – Warje
It is seen from the above that the corridor – II selected now (Vanaz to Ramwadi) is the Least Density and the Least Revenue Corridor. Your DPR does not give satisfactory justification for adopting the Least Priority Corridor in lieu of the High Priority Corridors given in the table above (extracted from your DPR)
2.2 FUNDING – I am aware that the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) is important for sanction of the project on the basis of long term overall economic development of the city. We are concerned about the priority given to this corridor and the basis of assessment of the EIRR have not been quantified and justified in detail and have therefore, reservations regarding 18 % EIRR accessed by you. A low FIRR of 1.93% for this corridor indicates that the same is not financially remunerative being the Least Revenue Corridor as compared to other corridors, resulting in the inability of the a private sector investor for taking risk of investment without 70 to 80% of Financial Viability Gap Funding (VGF) subsidy. Your funding proposal does not indicate the calculations for the quantum of VGF amount necessary, for implementation of the project through private sector investment. Your funding proposal with heavy taxations to the public is resisted by the citizens of Pune and hence an alternative economic proposal of Broad Gauge (BG) with indigenous wider coaches should be adopted with the same standard of fixed infrastructure as proposed by you and incorporating savings in the Mobile Assets, by adopting BG with indigenous wider Rolling Stock. Adoption of BG Indigenous coaches will save around Rs 100cr / km in the project cost.
2.3 With the withdrawal of PCMC for participating with PMC in the Metro Rail Project, the PMC is recommending to go ahead with corridor 2 only, for sanction of the Govt. They should be explained that the Depot facilities and cost of corridor 2, on Stand Alone basis, will need modifications and additional cost for major maintenance of trains for corridor 2, by transferring these provisions from Corridor-1 to Corridor-2
2.4 I am glad that you agree, that the project costs need a revision. It is necessary to indicate at this stage a revised realistic cost and further update the same to 2010-11 levels, to enable the PMC & the Govt. to appreciate the extent of this revision, to enable them to give sanction to the project and that they should not be kept in the dark on this issue.
3 Paras 3 to 12 – Pune Citizens do not agree to your statement that BG indigenous coaches will not be accepted by them. For PMPML buses for Pune the citizens have accepted lower costs, non air conditioned buses on capacity considerations in preference to high cost air conditioned coaches. You should have in the DPR calculated the techno-economic merits of this alternative of BG Indigenous Coaches which have 74% more capacity and costs 70% less and provide 100 years of Capacity Life against 25 years suggested by you, for SG. Mumbai Suburban Section of the Harbor Branch Metro Railway is a BG Elevated Metro Rail running for many years in the city. Similarly Chennai BG Elevated Metro Rail, Constructed by the Indian Railways is also running successfully, Kolkata BG UG Metro Rail Constructed by the Indian Railways is being operated efficiently. Hence your statement that “these railways systems have created a mess” is DMRCs personal impression. DMRC have determined to induct SG Imported Narrow Width Coaches of Limited Capacity in the city, irrespective of the techno-economic merits in favour of BG. It is not obligatory that the Metro Trains should be air Conditioned as Air-Cooled Indigenous Coaches have recently been introduced on the Western Railways. There is no need for introducing sophisticated Signaling for running 3 min service which is being operated on Mumbai Suburban Section. Moreover, the Techno-Economic Merits of increasing Capacity by adopting wider coaches (3.66m) of BG are superior to that of SG by increasing the frequency of SG from 3min to 2min.
3.1 The Axle Load necessary for BG for carrying 500 passengers per coach will be only 18 tonnes. It is no use making economy by adopting a marginally lower Axle Load of 16 tonnes, at the cost of future limited capacity life.
3.2 The mess created by elevated Chennai BG Metro Rail is your personal perception. The citizens in Bangalore and Mumbai are agitating for the mess created by the elevated Metro in these cities. Let the citizens of Pune, for whom this Metro Rail Project is planned, decide the Type of Metro Rail they want instead of thrusting DMRCs views on them.
3.3 The carrying capacity of Metro Rail, not only depends on the number of coaches per train and the frequency but also on the capacity of each coach / train, for carrying passengers. The Pune Metro Rail corridor has been designed by you, for a 3min service with a maximum of 6 coaches per train. Increasing the frequency from 3min to 2min, will be costlier in terms of the additional number of imported SG (2.9m) coaches, required at Rs 10cr per coach and will carry less number of passengers per hour than by adoption of wider BG 3.66m coaches at 3min service and will cost less than that required for increasing the frequency to 2min for SG. This economics can be worked out and shown to you if required. I therefore, do not technically agree with your conclusions in this respect.
3.4 As a Consultant to PMC, DMRC should have worked the techno-economic merits of SG with 2.9m wide imported narrow width coaches at exorbitant cost, as against wider indigenous BG coaches, where all the technology is available. You have not done this and you can still do it. We can prove with calculations that your statement that techno-economic merits are in favour of SG is technically wrong and in not in the interest of the city and has misguided the State Govt. for taking technically and economically wrong decisions.
3.5 Regarding your statement that “my assumptions and presumptions of the cost of BG vs SG is totally wrong” need to be justified with supporting evidence and calculations. I have full details of the costs worked out by me, which are based on the accepted cost for Mumbai, Kolkata and your proposed metro rail costs. The costs worked out by me for Mumbai Metro on behalf of MTR (Hong Kong) for Reliance (REL) were accepted by MMRDA Mumbai for whom you were the Consultant.
3.6 Regarding the funding pattern, you as a consultant should have given to the State Govt. alternatives of funding on “DMRC Model”/ “PPP Model” or other alterative models. But the same was not done and you have proposed “DMRC Model” only which the citizens of Pune have reservations, particularly in the context of the recent accidents on the Delhi Metro Rail (with 87 concrete cantilevers and 18 columns severely cracked) and creating a low durability unsafe Metro Corridor. In this connection the citizens of Pune have read the CAG Report of Sept 2008 for Delhi Metro Phase-I, and would like to have DMRCs, confirmation to avoid similar shortcomings for Pune Metro Rail.
4 Legal Aspects - Metro Railways (Amendment) Act 2009 - I am not aware, if the provisions of the Constitution under Article 366/20 and Article 246 – (VIIth Schedule list – 1), have been modified by the Parliament, to change the Definitions of “Railways” to “exclude Metro Railways” and made Amendments to list one of the VIIth Schedule of Article 246, for the purpose of the Legal Jurisdictions of the States under the Constitution for Planning, Constructing, Operating & Maintaining such Metro Railway Systems. No Act will have superior a Legal Authority over the provisions of the Constitutions.
4.1 The directions issued to the State Govts. by the Union Urban Ministry under the advice of the Group of Ministers, authorizing the states to decide the issue of Gauge and Construct and Operate the Metro Systems, is not inconformity with the provisions of the constitution. The Centre has, therefore, no Legal Authority to issue such policy directions against the provisions of the Constitution and the advice and recommendations of the Indian Railways, who are the competent authority to operate the provisions of the Indian Railways Act.
4.2 DMRC has stated that Metro is “a Railway” in chapter 14 of the DPR, while the State Govt. is implementing the Project in Mumbai under the Indian Tramways act, treating the Metro Rail in one Municipal Jurisdiction as “Tramways”, though the Metro Railway is “a Railways” in “Structure and Operation”.
4.3 These Legal Jurisdictional Provisions need to be settled, once for all, at the highest Legal Authorities of the Country.
5 You have not given any comments on Para – 15, which gives a copy of the PPT presentation in defense of BG Metro Rail and the merits of UG BG vs Elevated SG with the photo of New BG coach for Mumbai Suburban Train. We, therefore, conclude that you have no valid grounds to comment on our observations. In spite of this, you want to promote, through DMRC induction of Imported Technology of SG against the wishes of the citizens and thereby promote the commercial interests of the overseas manufactures. Technology is Independent of Gauge and can be inducted progressively on BG as necessary to match the increased traffic demand. On one side you need MRTS system, because of the rapid and accelerated traffic demand for Mass Transit and at the same time you want to recommend a limited capacity imported technology on SG which does not match the future traffic demand.
6 Conclusions - I fully agree with you that the “opinions of individual are not always in the larger interest of the city” This applies to you personally, as you have determined to bring a foreign SG Metro Rail with imported coaches, supporting the commercial interest of overseas suppliers, at exorbitant cost to the exchequer, against the advice of the Indian Railways, and the Citizens of Pune, resulting in higher taxation and fare structures on the Citizens of Pune. The Pune Citizens would prefer, Not to have the Type of Metro Rail, DMRC have proposed for Pune and thrust your personal views by misguiding the Govt. on Technology Issues. We request you to have an open mind and guide the nation and the Politicians for adoption of Technology for Metro Rail in the larger interest of the Citizens, Pune City and the Nation.
7 A line in reply would be appreciated.
With warm regards
V K J Rane – IRSE (Retd)
Ex-MD/IRCON
Date 12th June 2010
Dear Dr. Sreedharan
(MD/DMRC)
Sub – Pune Metro Rail
Ref – Your Email No. DMRC/89/10 dated 08.06.10 in response to my e- mail dated 02.06.10
Thank you very much for your above e-mail and for your quick response for the same, clarifying issues brought out in my e-mail. I have, however, a few observations on the statements made by you, in your mail and shall be grateful, if a similar quick response is received from your end.
1 I am happy to note that the entire alignment has been personally seen by you and that the technical Feasibility has been ascertained by you. The DPR, however, does not provide the Technical Feasibility of the alignment near Paund Phata and crossing the Railway Tracks above the Pune Station and a large number of yard lines. The gradients and the track levels at these locations and a layout plan would have clarified the doubts in our minds. In addition DPR does not indicate, if any meetings were held with the Pune Railway Authorities for acceptance the alignment and its Technical Feasibility. A visual feasibility is done in a Reconnaissance Survey (PPR) and not in a DPR Survey, where the feasibility is checked at site by pegging the alignment at site.
1.1 You have stated that a Detailed Topographical Survey of the Alignment has been carried out by DMRC for Pune Metro Rail Corridors. The DPR does not show to proper scale, a Detailed Plan and Section of the alignments along these routes, indicating levels, gradients, curvature etc. These were not furnished along with the DPR copy given to us. I would be thankful, if these could be furnished for our information.
1.2 Unit Block System- This method of costing is adopted for Reconnaissance survey reports. (Paper Project Report – PPR), to decide whether further detailed investigation in necessary for preparation of a Detailed Project Report (DPR-1) and sanction to the project. There is, however, no reservation for projecting the cost on the basis of “Unit Block Cost”, provided the same is prepared on the basis of preliminary Broad Engineering Drawings, Assessment of Broad Quantities & Unit Rates and costs worked out for Block Units (per Km / per Unit). This basis of working out Unit Block Cost, is attached to the report for assurance to the Client that the costs will not very, by plus or minus 10 %. You have stated that you have worked these cost on the basis of accepted rates for Phase-I & Phase-II of the Delhi Metro Rail. As these cost were not available with us, it is difficult to conclude that they are realistic, as we notice that these costs are far lower than the accepted prices quoted for Mumbai Metro Rail One (where, I was associated in pricing and submission of the bid on behalf of MTR (Hong Kong Metro Rail Consultancy Group) and Reliance Energy Ltd (REL). Mumbai). There are a large number of items where costs have been grossly underestimated and number of items not provided which have been recommended in the DPR for provision. (Such as the Consultancy Charges of General Consultants, DMRCs Consultancy Charges, Design Charges, Proof Consultancy Charges, & Testing Charges and similar charges for other services for electrical signaling, Telecommunication and Rolling Stock etc). These charges together would work out to not less than 15% to 20% of the Project Cost. A provision of only 5% has been made in the estimate, which will cover the SPVs Management, Tender & Legal Charges etc. My assessment of cost are based on the item wise calculations presented by you in the DPR, based on my experience in preparation of project cost of Mumbai Metro Rail One, and large value complex projects executed by me in India & Internationally by participation in bidding as a contractor (IRCON).
1.3 Assuming your costs projected are realistic for sanctions of the project, can you confirm that the liability of excess costs beyond 10% of your estimate, for the same scope of the work, would be borne by DMRC?
1.4 Adoption of NATM Technique for tunneling resulting in reduced cost of the UG alignment would support the suggestion of the Pune Citizens for adoption of the entire section of the Metro Rail, as UG system for the Economic Benefits to the city, as brought out by them in their recommendations. (A copy of the accepted tendered rates received for the UG portion of Delhi Metro Rail for the Airport Line would be useful for our discussions)
1.5 Nobody disputes the capability of DMRC in preparation of Detailed Project Reports. But I wonder why the Project Cost for Mumbai Metro Rail One -Varsova-Andheri-Ghatkopar (VAG) Corridor, estimated at Rs 1500cr was accepted at Rs 2356 cr i.e. 58% higher than cost estimated by DMRC. It would be appreciated if the comparison of the estimated cost initially presented for sanction of the Govt. and the actual tendered cost finally accepted for various projects are produced. This would justify your statement made in this respect.
1.6 Paper Project Report – The reasons for stating your DPR as PPR is because of the extent of detailing which is required to be given for a DPR for sanction of the project has not been exhibited in the DPR. The guidelines laid down by the Union Ministry of Urban Development for Preparation of the DPR for Metro Rail have not been followed. Your statement to the Pune Municipal Commissioner that similar reports were prepared for sanction of the Mumbai Metro one project, does not seem to be factually correct, if the two are compared.
1.7 I further reiterate that, the adoption of the basis of accepted rates for Phase-I & II of Delhi Metro Rail for Pune Metro Rail Area is fundamentally wrong, particularly when you have the Mumbai Metro Rail costs available. Underestimation of project cost for Govt. sanctions is not in the larger interest of the Project and the Citizens.
1.8 I am not aware of the Facts and Details of the observations of the Pune Core Group, taken into account by you, for preparation of DPR for Pune & PCMC in the month of July 2009. The Pune Core Group would appreciate, if these details are communicated to us for our Professional Satisfaction.
2 Your DPR has given the following priorities of the corridors as recommended by IIT Mumbai on the basis of PHPDT, as per the table & Density Chart given below.
It is seen from the above that the traffic density priorities are as under for 2031. Selected priorities are 3,5,& 6
Priority – 1 Line No 6 32325 PPHPD Katraj
Priority – 2 Line No 5 29950 PPHPD Hinjewadi
Priority – 3 Line No 1 26750 PPHPD Nigdi
Priority – 4 Line No 3 16956 PPHPD Hadapsar
Priority – 5 Line No 4 12738 PPHPD Ramvadi – Wagoli
Priority – 6 Line No 2 9614 PPHPD Kothrud – Warje
It is seen from the above that the corridor – II selected now (Vanaz to Ramwadi) is the Least Density and the Least Revenue Corridor. Your DPR does not give satisfactory justification for adopting the Least Priority Corridor in lieu of the High Priority Corridors given in the table above (extracted from your DPR)
2.2 FUNDING – I am aware that the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) is important for sanction of the project on the basis of long term overall economic development of the city. We are concerned about the priority given to this corridor and the basis of assessment of the EIRR have not been quantified and justified in detail and have therefore, reservations regarding 18 % EIRR accessed by you. A low FIRR of 1.93% for this corridor indicates that the same is not financially remunerative being the Least Revenue Corridor as compared to other corridors, resulting in the inability of the a private sector investor for taking risk of investment without 70 to 80% of Financial Viability Gap Funding (VGF) subsidy. Your funding proposal does not indicate the calculations for the quantum of VGF amount necessary, for implementation of the project through private sector investment. Your funding proposal with heavy taxations to the public is resisted by the citizens of Pune and hence an alternative economic proposal of Broad Gauge (BG) with indigenous wider coaches should be adopted with the same standard of fixed infrastructure as proposed by you and incorporating savings in the Mobile Assets, by adopting BG with indigenous wider Rolling Stock. Adoption of BG Indigenous coaches will save around Rs 100cr / km in the project cost.
2.3 With the withdrawal of PCMC for participating with PMC in the Metro Rail Project, the PMC is recommending to go ahead with corridor 2 only, for sanction of the Govt. They should be explained that the Depot facilities and cost of corridor 2, on Stand Alone basis, will need modifications and additional cost for major maintenance of trains for corridor 2, by transferring these provisions from Corridor-1 to Corridor-2
2.4 I am glad that you agree, that the project costs need a revision. It is necessary to indicate at this stage a revised realistic cost and further update the same to 2010-11 levels, to enable the PMC & the Govt. to appreciate the extent of this revision, to enable them to give sanction to the project and that they should not be kept in the dark on this issue.
3 Paras 3 to 12 – Pune Citizens do not agree to your statement that BG indigenous coaches will not be accepted by them. For PMPML buses for Pune the citizens have accepted lower costs, non air conditioned buses on capacity considerations in preference to high cost air conditioned coaches. You should have in the DPR calculated the techno-economic merits of this alternative of BG Indigenous Coaches which have 74% more capacity and costs 70% less and provide 100 years of Capacity Life against 25 years suggested by you, for SG. Mumbai Suburban Section of the Harbor Branch Metro Railway is a BG Elevated Metro Rail running for many years in the city. Similarly Chennai BG Elevated Metro Rail, Constructed by the Indian Railways is also running successfully, Kolkata BG UG Metro Rail Constructed by the Indian Railways is being operated efficiently. Hence your statement that “these railways systems have created a mess” is DMRCs personal impression. DMRC have determined to induct SG Imported Narrow Width Coaches of Limited Capacity in the city, irrespective of the techno-economic merits in favour of BG. It is not obligatory that the Metro Trains should be air Conditioned as Air-Cooled Indigenous Coaches have recently been introduced on the Western Railways. There is no need for introducing sophisticated Signaling for running 3 min service which is being operated on Mumbai Suburban Section. Moreover, the Techno-Economic Merits of increasing Capacity by adopting wider coaches (3.66m) of BG are superior to that of SG by increasing the frequency of SG from 3min to 2min.
3.1 The Axle Load necessary for BG for carrying 500 passengers per coach will be only 18 tonnes. It is no use making economy by adopting a marginally lower Axle Load of 16 tonnes, at the cost of future limited capacity life.
3.2 The mess created by elevated Chennai BG Metro Rail is your personal perception. The citizens in Bangalore and Mumbai are agitating for the mess created by the elevated Metro in these cities. Let the citizens of Pune, for whom this Metro Rail Project is planned, decide the Type of Metro Rail they want instead of thrusting DMRCs views on them.
3.3 The carrying capacity of Metro Rail, not only depends on the number of coaches per train and the frequency but also on the capacity of each coach / train, for carrying passengers. The Pune Metro Rail corridor has been designed by you, for a 3min service with a maximum of 6 coaches per train. Increasing the frequency from 3min to 2min, will be costlier in terms of the additional number of imported SG (2.9m) coaches, required at Rs 10cr per coach and will carry less number of passengers per hour than by adoption of wider BG 3.66m coaches at 3min service and will cost less than that required for increasing the frequency to 2min for SG. This economics can be worked out and shown to you if required. I therefore, do not technically agree with your conclusions in this respect.
3.4 As a Consultant to PMC, DMRC should have worked the techno-economic merits of SG with 2.9m wide imported narrow width coaches at exorbitant cost, as against wider indigenous BG coaches, where all the technology is available. You have not done this and you can still do it. We can prove with calculations that your statement that techno-economic merits are in favour of SG is technically wrong and in not in the interest of the city and has misguided the State Govt. for taking technically and economically wrong decisions.
3.5 Regarding your statement that “my assumptions and presumptions of the cost of BG vs SG is totally wrong” need to be justified with supporting evidence and calculations. I have full details of the costs worked out by me, which are based on the accepted cost for Mumbai, Kolkata and your proposed metro rail costs. The costs worked out by me for Mumbai Metro on behalf of MTR (Hong Kong) for Reliance (REL) were accepted by MMRDA Mumbai for whom you were the Consultant.
3.6 Regarding the funding pattern, you as a consultant should have given to the State Govt. alternatives of funding on “DMRC Model”/ “PPP Model” or other alterative models. But the same was not done and you have proposed “DMRC Model” only which the citizens of Pune have reservations, particularly in the context of the recent accidents on the Delhi Metro Rail (with 87 concrete cantilevers and 18 columns severely cracked) and creating a low durability unsafe Metro Corridor. In this connection the citizens of Pune have read the CAG Report of Sept 2008 for Delhi Metro Phase-I, and would like to have DMRCs, confirmation to avoid similar shortcomings for Pune Metro Rail.
4 Legal Aspects - Metro Railways (Amendment) Act 2009 - I am not aware, if the provisions of the Constitution under Article 366/20 and Article 246 – (VIIth Schedule list – 1), have been modified by the Parliament, to change the Definitions of “Railways” to “exclude Metro Railways” and made Amendments to list one of the VIIth Schedule of Article 246, for the purpose of the Legal Jurisdictions of the States under the Constitution for Planning, Constructing, Operating & Maintaining such Metro Railway Systems. No Act will have superior a Legal Authority over the provisions of the Constitutions.
4.1 The directions issued to the State Govts. by the Union Urban Ministry under the advice of the Group of Ministers, authorizing the states to decide the issue of Gauge and Construct and Operate the Metro Systems, is not inconformity with the provisions of the constitution. The Centre has, therefore, no Legal Authority to issue such policy directions against the provisions of the Constitution and the advice and recommendations of the Indian Railways, who are the competent authority to operate the provisions of the Indian Railways Act.
4.2 DMRC has stated that Metro is “a Railway” in chapter 14 of the DPR, while the State Govt. is implementing the Project in Mumbai under the Indian Tramways act, treating the Metro Rail in one Municipal Jurisdiction as “Tramways”, though the Metro Railway is “a Railways” in “Structure and Operation”.
4.3 These Legal Jurisdictional Provisions need to be settled, once for all, at the highest Legal Authorities of the Country.
5 You have not given any comments on Para – 15, which gives a copy of the PPT presentation in defense of BG Metro Rail and the merits of UG BG vs Elevated SG with the photo of New BG coach for Mumbai Suburban Train. We, therefore, conclude that you have no valid grounds to comment on our observations. In spite of this, you want to promote, through DMRC induction of Imported Technology of SG against the wishes of the citizens and thereby promote the commercial interests of the overseas manufactures. Technology is Independent of Gauge and can be inducted progressively on BG as necessary to match the increased traffic demand. On one side you need MRTS system, because of the rapid and accelerated traffic demand for Mass Transit and at the same time you want to recommend a limited capacity imported technology on SG which does not match the future traffic demand.
6 Conclusions - I fully agree with you that the “opinions of individual are not always in the larger interest of the city” This applies to you personally, as you have determined to bring a foreign SG Metro Rail with imported coaches, supporting the commercial interest of overseas suppliers, at exorbitant cost to the exchequer, against the advice of the Indian Railways, and the Citizens of Pune, resulting in higher taxation and fare structures on the Citizens of Pune. The Pune Citizens would prefer, Not to have the Type of Metro Rail, DMRC have proposed for Pune and thrust your personal views by misguiding the Govt. on Technology Issues. We request you to have an open mind and guide the nation and the Politicians for adoption of Technology for Metro Rail in the larger interest of the Citizens, Pune City and the Nation.
7 A line in reply would be appreciated.
With warm regards
V K J Rane – IRSE (Retd)
Ex-MD/IRCON
Monday, March 15, 2010
Delhi: Gearing up for future Demand
V. K. J. RANE – IRSE (Retd.) Ex-M.D./IRCON
F-5, 2nd floor, 48/49 Grafikon Paradise, NIBM Road, Kondhwa Khurd, Pune - 411 048
Tel: (020) 2685 4132, Mobile: 093710 05396 Email: vkjrane1930@hotmail.com
Website: http://vkjrane1930.blogspot.com/
Date 15th March 2010
To
The Editor
Indian Express
Pune – 01
Sub - Delhi: Gearing up for future Demand
Dear Sir
Your kind attention is drawn to the press cutting published in Indian Express dated 14.03.10 at page 20 under the heading “Delhi: Gearing up for future Demand”
I would like to give the following comments on the above article pertaining to “Delhi Metro Rail”
DMRC--“Conceived with a vision to give Delhi a smart, modern and eco-friendly way to travel, the Delhi Metro has today emerged as one of the world's most effective and successful rail-based mass transport systems.”
It is presumed that the statements made in connection with Delhi Metro Rail are furnished by DMRC organization. This is a nice way of self magnification of its image which has been adversely criticized in all aspects of construction and operation by the recent CAG report of Sept 2008 for Phase-I of Delhi Metro Rail. The commuters travelling during peak hours have also adversely commented upon the limited capacity coaches with ineffective air conditioning, makes the travel most uncomfortable and prefer to adopt other modes of transport. The international standards are far different than the performance standards of Delhi Metro Rail.
DMRC--“DMRC opened its first corridor be¬tween Shahdara and Tees Hazari on the 25th of December, 2002.”
CAG has commented on the above corridor that within a period of 5 years the wheels have cracked and the flooring of the rolling stock has also shown cracks due to fatigue. One wonders whether the rolling stock procured was refurbished old coaches sold at price of new coaches. The public should go through the adverse comments of CAG on DMRC’s management of Delhi Metro Rail, Phase-I, which blows off the self inflated balloon of DMRCs image. The records of the tests carried out on the quality of concrete have been disposed off by the management for want of space, so that CAG was unable to go through such records, the standards for which were lowered for acceptability.
DMRC--In the second phase, DMRC is now constructing another 125 kilometers of Metro lines which is scheduled to be finished by October, 2010.
On the second phase under construction, 87 cantilevers of the supporting system of the Metro rail on 5 corridors of Phase-II, have been cracked before placement of live load of the train and are being repaired for opening the section to traffic in Oct 2010. According to British Specifications (BS-5400) applicable for Metro Rail Projects, the life of the substructure has to be a minimum of 120 years. With the repairs to the substructure, what would be the durability life of such metro rail piers need to be investigated. In addition 18 concrete columns of Phase-II, Metro Rail under construction have exhibited severe vertical cracks, which are now being strengthened by DMRC, and hope the public will forget about these weak supporting structures when these lines are opened to traffic for operations.
DMRC--The Delhi Metro is today rated as one of the most modern Metro systems internationally with state of the art trains and modern sig¬naling systems.
It is not known who has rated Delhi Metro Rail as the most modern Metro system Internationally? The 21st Century, the best in the world technology has been provided on BART Metro in San Francisco USA, opened to traffic in the year 2003, on Broad Gauge (BG) system. What we have adopted on Delhi Metro Rail, is the 19th & 20th Century systems on Standard Gauge (SG), by adopting a low capacity high cost system. The signaling system adopted is for 2min frequency which will not be operated for the next 30 years on Delhi Metro Rail systems. 70% of this signaling system will have to be replaced within a period of 16 years. Investment on such advance signaling system would be of the order of Rs 200cr on a 30km track system. For the standard of operation adopted for Delhi Metro Rail, which is of the order of 5 min headway between trains, normal color light signaling adopted on the Mumbai Suburban System under operation at 3min headway would have been sufficient. It is unfortunate that DMRC under the misguidance of international manufactures and consultants have fallen into their trap, to adopt an abnormally high cost low capacity imported coaches on SG, whose capacity life is restricted to 25 years only, as confirmed by DMRC, instead of adopting a low cost high capacity BG indigenous coach system available within the country and with utter disregards to the advise of Indian Railways, which has declared BG as the national gauge for all railway systems. DMRC has been successful in misguiding the bureaucracy and the politicians of the country, who have surrendered to the views of the overseas advisors activated through DMRC, without looking into the techno-economic merits as well as the advice of the Indian Railways. The urban Ministry, at the center is not willing to give reasons for adopting such a course of action by the Union Govt. even under RTI. This aspects needs to be looked into and made known to the citizens, as large amount of funds have been given for Metro Rail Constructions as subsidy to the private investor, which they have utilized for procurement of imported rolling stock and track in the form of foreign exchange. The citizens feel that this action and decision of the Central Govt. operated through DMRCs advice is not in national interest and has to be stopped forthwith by the Finance Minister, particularly in the interest of eliminating wasteful foreign exchange of the country.
DMRC--The DMRC is one of the few Metros making operational profit from the beginning with a very high rate of economic return.
The above statement is misguiding and the operational profit shown are only due to the sale of land for commercial exploitation. The actual operating performance of revenue against expenditure needs to be looked into.
DMRC has been making statements on various technical, economical and general issues without supporting evidence / justification and unfortunately such statements are accepted by the Govt. Time has come, when the activities of DMRC have to be seen by experts within the country in all aspects of construction, operation, maintenance technical feasibility and economic viability of the metro rail projects which has resulted in not only high fares to the commuters but also abnormal increase in taxation to the citizens.
With warm regards
V K J Rane – IRSE (Retd.)
Ex-MD/IRCON
F-5, 2nd floor, 48/49 Grafikon Paradise, NIBM Road, Kondhwa Khurd, Pune - 411 048
Tel: (020) 2685 4132, Mobile: 093710 05396 Email: vkjrane1930@hotmail.com
Website: http://vkjrane1930.blogspot.com/
Date 15th March 2010
To
The Editor
Indian Express
Pune – 01
Sub - Delhi: Gearing up for future Demand
Dear Sir
Your kind attention is drawn to the press cutting published in Indian Express dated 14.03.10 at page 20 under the heading “Delhi: Gearing up for future Demand”
I would like to give the following comments on the above article pertaining to “Delhi Metro Rail”
DMRC--“Conceived with a vision to give Delhi a smart, modern and eco-friendly way to travel, the Delhi Metro has today emerged as one of the world's most effective and successful rail-based mass transport systems.”
It is presumed that the statements made in connection with Delhi Metro Rail are furnished by DMRC organization. This is a nice way of self magnification of its image which has been adversely criticized in all aspects of construction and operation by the recent CAG report of Sept 2008 for Phase-I of Delhi Metro Rail. The commuters travelling during peak hours have also adversely commented upon the limited capacity coaches with ineffective air conditioning, makes the travel most uncomfortable and prefer to adopt other modes of transport. The international standards are far different than the performance standards of Delhi Metro Rail.
DMRC--“DMRC opened its first corridor be¬tween Shahdara and Tees Hazari on the 25th of December, 2002.”
CAG has commented on the above corridor that within a period of 5 years the wheels have cracked and the flooring of the rolling stock has also shown cracks due to fatigue. One wonders whether the rolling stock procured was refurbished old coaches sold at price of new coaches. The public should go through the adverse comments of CAG on DMRC’s management of Delhi Metro Rail, Phase-I, which blows off the self inflated balloon of DMRCs image. The records of the tests carried out on the quality of concrete have been disposed off by the management for want of space, so that CAG was unable to go through such records, the standards for which were lowered for acceptability.
DMRC--In the second phase, DMRC is now constructing another 125 kilometers of Metro lines which is scheduled to be finished by October, 2010.
On the second phase under construction, 87 cantilevers of the supporting system of the Metro rail on 5 corridors of Phase-II, have been cracked before placement of live load of the train and are being repaired for opening the section to traffic in Oct 2010. According to British Specifications (BS-5400) applicable for Metro Rail Projects, the life of the substructure has to be a minimum of 120 years. With the repairs to the substructure, what would be the durability life of such metro rail piers need to be investigated. In addition 18 concrete columns of Phase-II, Metro Rail under construction have exhibited severe vertical cracks, which are now being strengthened by DMRC, and hope the public will forget about these weak supporting structures when these lines are opened to traffic for operations.
DMRC--The Delhi Metro is today rated as one of the most modern Metro systems internationally with state of the art trains and modern sig¬naling systems.
It is not known who has rated Delhi Metro Rail as the most modern Metro system Internationally? The 21st Century, the best in the world technology has been provided on BART Metro in San Francisco USA, opened to traffic in the year 2003, on Broad Gauge (BG) system. What we have adopted on Delhi Metro Rail, is the 19th & 20th Century systems on Standard Gauge (SG), by adopting a low capacity high cost system. The signaling system adopted is for 2min frequency which will not be operated for the next 30 years on Delhi Metro Rail systems. 70% of this signaling system will have to be replaced within a period of 16 years. Investment on such advance signaling system would be of the order of Rs 200cr on a 30km track system. For the standard of operation adopted for Delhi Metro Rail, which is of the order of 5 min headway between trains, normal color light signaling adopted on the Mumbai Suburban System under operation at 3min headway would have been sufficient. It is unfortunate that DMRC under the misguidance of international manufactures and consultants have fallen into their trap, to adopt an abnormally high cost low capacity imported coaches on SG, whose capacity life is restricted to 25 years only, as confirmed by DMRC, instead of adopting a low cost high capacity BG indigenous coach system available within the country and with utter disregards to the advise of Indian Railways, which has declared BG as the national gauge for all railway systems. DMRC has been successful in misguiding the bureaucracy and the politicians of the country, who have surrendered to the views of the overseas advisors activated through DMRC, without looking into the techno-economic merits as well as the advice of the Indian Railways. The urban Ministry, at the center is not willing to give reasons for adopting such a course of action by the Union Govt. even under RTI. This aspects needs to be looked into and made known to the citizens, as large amount of funds have been given for Metro Rail Constructions as subsidy to the private investor, which they have utilized for procurement of imported rolling stock and track in the form of foreign exchange. The citizens feel that this action and decision of the Central Govt. operated through DMRCs advice is not in national interest and has to be stopped forthwith by the Finance Minister, particularly in the interest of eliminating wasteful foreign exchange of the country.
DMRC--The DMRC is one of the few Metros making operational profit from the beginning with a very high rate of economic return.
The above statement is misguiding and the operational profit shown are only due to the sale of land for commercial exploitation. The actual operating performance of revenue against expenditure needs to be looked into.
DMRC has been making statements on various technical, economical and general issues without supporting evidence / justification and unfortunately such statements are accepted by the Govt. Time has come, when the activities of DMRC have to be seen by experts within the country in all aspects of construction, operation, maintenance technical feasibility and economic viability of the metro rail projects which has resulted in not only high fares to the commuters but also abnormal increase in taxation to the citizens.
With warm regards
V K J Rane – IRSE (Retd.)
Ex-MD/IRCON
Thursday, March 11, 2010
WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE DPR ON PUNE METRO RAIL PLANNING
Summary of Points for Presentation to PMC after discussions during the meeting proposed on 13th Mar 10 by Janvani
Sub – WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE DPR ON PUNE METRO RAIL PLANNING
1) NARROW VISION PLANNING FOR METRO RAIL BY DMRC
BG - 5’6”
Coach Width 3.66m (12’-0”)
Capacity – 450 per coach
54000 PPHPD for 6 coach train at
3 min frequency –
Crush capacity life 100 years
Does Pune Need cracked wheels & coaches for Pune Metro Rail ?
SG - 4’-8.5”
Coach Width 2.9m (9’-6”)
Capacity – 260 per coach
31400 PPHPD for 6 coach train at
3 min frequency –
Crush capacity life 25 years
Wheels & Coach Floor cracking in 5 years Delhi Metro Phase – I
CAG Report Sept 08
2) PMC NEEDS TO EXPLAIN THE ADOPTION OF “LOW CAPACITY HIGH COST SG IMPORTED COACHES” INSTEAD OF “ A HIGH CAPACITY LOW COST BG INDIGINOUS COACHES” FOR PUNE METRO RAIL
3) PUNE METRO RAIL “DPR” IS A PAPER PROJECT REPORT “PPR”
• The Standing Committee & the General Body of the PMC have recently approved, in a “hurry” the “DPR” for the proposed Pune Metro Rail, without understanding the contents of the DPR.
• To enable members to understand the DPR, PMC may considered translation of DPR in Marathi
• The “DPR” is defective, deficient, inconsistent and is a reflection of the lack of understanding of the geography of Pune City and the need for a proper selection of Routes and Alignments.
• The technical feasibilty of the alignments on the ground has not been investigated. The alignments needs to be pegged out on the ground, showing locations of columns of the corridor.
• The Project cost has been grossly under estimated and is based on LS provisions without proper analysis. The basis of cost analysis has not been justified in the DPR.
4) TRAFFIC SURVEY
• Methodology for assessment of future traffic demand for Metro Rail, need a professional review
• Assessment of future traffic has been done only up to 2031 (i.e. for 17 years beyond 2014 – the proposed date for commissioning the project for operations) This should be done for at least 30 yaers, for an elevated corridor and for about 60 years for an underground (UG) corridor
• Identification of routes and their priorities should be based on traffic densities arrived at.
• Revenue assessment should be based on realistic assumptions and needs a review.
• The planning should intigrate with master development plan for the city keeping in view all other planned and future projects.
5) TECHNOLOGY
• DPR proposes only SG with imported coaches technology and compares the same with the bus transportation systems
• The Alternatives of BG with indiginous wider coaches from capacity and cost considirations along with alternatives of elevated / surface / fully UG corridors and other alternatives technology must be evaluated for technical feasibility, acceptability on long term needs and techno-economic merits evaluated for each alternative.
6) DUPLICATION OF ELEVATED CORRIDOR BETWEEN PMC & PCMC
• This elevated corridor proposed as priorty one should be dispensed with and the indian railwyas approached for streinghtning the existing Lonavla – Pune corridor by two separate dedicated suburban tracks between Lonavala & Pune with additional stations at about 1 km spacing and with improved frequency of trains for commuter traffic from existing 30min to 10 to 5min, depending upon the traffic demand
• Similar suburban service extension be provided for the commuteres from Pune to Daund by approaching the Indian Railways and sharing cost on 50:50 basis on line similar to that adopted for Mumbai suburban section implemented thourgh Mumbai Rail Vikas Corporation (MRVC)
• This will save Rs 1500cr for PMC & PCMC
7) PROPOSED ALIGNMENT
• The 2 corridors proposed in the DPR (Corridor-I & Corridor – II) do not have track connectivity due to partial UG alignment of corridor-I
• This has necessitated provision of 2 depots with Rs 100cr of additional investment a reflection of bad planning and 100ft depth of a common costly UG junction station at ASI
• DPR does not give details of justification for the UG portion proposed in the DPR
• DPR does not carry out the survey of the existing road width, footpath width, the distance of permenant strucutre from the center line of the road etc. It does not indicate the reduction of the road width during construction and after completion of the metro rail
• The alignment does not give details of crossing the Pavana, Mula-Mutha rivers indicating the size of the columns, number of piles and bridge spans etc. and the approach curves and gradiants
• The alignement does not list out the bottleneck areas of the alignment for project execution
• The alingment crossing the Pune Railway Station is technically not feasible and will not be acceptable to the railways. An alternative is feasible.
8) CAPACITY CONSIDIRATIONS
• Why narrow vision for adopting limited capacity corridor lasting for 25 years only
• Capcity is increased by
A) Adoption of wider coaches
B) Adoption of longer trains
C) Improvement in frequencies
• Under each of the above methods, the number of additional coaches required and the corrosponding increased capacity, will determine the economics of the above systems.
Capacity for 4 coach & 6 coach trains for different width of coaches
Gauge SG
Imported PUNE SG
Imported MUMBAI BG Local MUMBAI % increase of BG over SG of 2.9m
1 Width of coach 2.9m 3.2m 3.66m -
2 4 coaches / train-capacity 1034 1500 1800 74 %
3 6 coaches / train-capacity 1574 2250 2700 72%
CAPACITY COMPARISONS
GAUGE COACH WIDTH Coaches /
train cap. FREQ PPHPD*
SG 2.9m (9’-6”) 6 – 1574 3min 31480 **
BG 3.66m (12’-0”) 6 - 2700 3min 54000 ***
Future BG 3.66m (12’-0”) 9 - 4050 3min 81000 ****
1574 x 20 = 31480
2700 x 20 = 54000
4050 X 20 = 81000 ** CAPACITY LIFE LESS THAN 25 YRS
*** CAPACITY LIFE MORE THAN 50 YRS
**** CAPACITY LIFE MORE THAN 100 YRS
9) ROLLING STOCK
• Present Cost of 3.66m wide indigenous rolling stock for BG is Rs 2 cr per coach (non AC)
• And Rs 2.25cr per coach (Air-Cooled)
• The cost of Air-conditioned BG with all modern facilities will not exceed more than Rs 3cr per coach
• The selling price of imported SG coaches is Rs 10cr / coach
• For Pune Metro Rail planned for 6 coach train will need 288 coaches at 3min frequency on both the corridors, with an investment of Rs 288 x 10cr = Rs 2880cr
• The corresponding requirements for equal volume of traffic, for BG indigenous wider coach, would need 192 coaches for both the corridors, with an investment of 192 x 3cr = Rs 576cr at 3 min frequency, resulting in a saving of Rs 2880 – Rs 576 = Rs 2304 cr
• Due to reduction in BG train length for equal volume of traffic, there would be a further saving in platform length, platform covers, land cost for depots, reduce length of station and energy consumptions and reduction in land and O & M costs
10) The table below incorporated in the DPR for planning for coaches indicates gross calculation mistakes in the number of coaches and hence in the gross capital cost assumed for investment
PLANNING FOR COACHES IN DPR
Source: Salient Features of DPR – PMC website
Corridor year Headway (minutes) No of rakes Train composition Coaches required
1 2 3 4 5 6
Corridor 1
PCMC – Swargate 2011 4.5 22 4 car 72 x
2021 3.5 22 x 4 car 88
2031 3.5 25 4 car 88 x
Corridor II 2011 12 10 4 car 28 x
Vanaz to Ramwadi 2021 8 12 x 4 car 40 x
2031 8 20 x 4 car 40 x
• Assessment of coaches at col. 6 is = col.4 x col.5
• Figures under column 4 will depend upon headway under col. 3
• The figures under col. 4 for corridor-1, cannot be the same for col. 3 & col. 4. for 2011 & 2021
• Similarly figures at col. 4 for 2031 cannot be the same as that of 2021 for the same headway of 3.5min
• Simple arithmetic for col. 6 need rectification. Same arguments applied for corridor 2.
• The financial evaluation therefore, done on the basis of this chart for initial capital cost and subsequent capital investment are not correct. Hence FIRR and EIRR calculations need a complete review
• Similar calculations have to be done for BG indigenous wider coaches as there is huge capital cost savings hence the full review of DPR
11) SIGNALING FOR DRIVERLESS TECHNOLOGY
• For 3min service frequency / headway not required/ contemplated for 30 yrs in the DPR, there is no need for cab signaling, ATC-ATO (driverless trains), at an additional cost of around Rs 170cr as suburban trains in Mumbai are operated at 3min service with normal color light signaling
12) OVERALL COST SAVINGS FOR BG WITH WIDER COACHES
• Savings in BG coaches in lieu of SG coaches Rs 2300cr
• Replacement of UG by an elev. corridor Rs 1250cr
• Elimination of ATP, ATC & ATO signaling Rs 170cr
• Replacement of 2 depots by 1 & providing Track
• Connectivity Rs 100cr
• Elimination of imported track components Rs 50cr
• Savings in central taxes and duties Rs 300cr
========
Total Rs 4170cr
(Say Rs 4000cr)
• No reduction has been made in the standard of construction of the station buildings and provision has been made for increased cost of indigenous coaches for AC, furnishings, communication systems and other inputs, at par with those adopted for SG by DMRC.
• In addition to above there would be a cost saving of Rs 1430cr by elimination of a duplicate elevated corridor between PCMC & Range hill corridor-I
• PMC AND THE GOVT. OF MAHARASHTRA MUST LOOK INTO THE TECHNO-ECONOMIC MERITS OF GAUGE WITH WIDER INDIGENOUS BG COACHES AND COMPARE COST ON THE BASIS OF COST PER UNIT CARRYING CAPACITY. THIS WOULD BE AS PER THE DIRECTIVE OF THE GROUP OF MINISTERS IN THEIR DECISION DATED 24TH APR 2006
13) FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS- Source: Salient Features of DPR – PMC website
• Cost for Pune metro rail has been grossly underestimated and is based on adhoc basis without detailed investigation and analysis
• DPR does not indicate the time frame through a bar chart, methodology of construction and detailed analysis of cost
• The project cost is expected to be in the range of Rs 12500cr as against Rs 9514 stated in the DPR estimated for the 2 corridors of Pune Phase-I
Particulars Completion cost without taxes Completion cost with central tax only
FIRR 3.23% 1.93%
• The DPR should make an assessment of the realistic cost updated at 2011 level and work out the revised FIRR
• Based on the above, DPR should indicate the viability gap funding necessary for the project to be implemented on the PPP model. In view a very low rate of FIRR, which should be around 15% for project acceptability for the investor, the VGF would be required to the extent of 70 to 75% of the project cost
• The assessment of EIRR of 18% is based on wrong assumptions and need revision by financial expert company outside DMRC.
14) OTHER ISSUES
• The DPR does not cover the cost of station circulating area facilities required for proper integration with other moods of transport arriving and departing to & from each station
• DPR does not include the assessment of water supply requirements during construction and during operation, as this demand would be exceptionally high resulting in further shortage of water supply to the public.
• Similarly electric supply has been planned to be sourced from the existing supply. This would result in further shortage of electricity supply to the citizens
15) ALTERNATIVE - A FULLY UG CORRIDOR WITH BG WIDER COACHES
• NO LAND ACQUISITION ,
• NO CUTTING OF TREES,
• NO DEMOLITION OF BUILDINGS
• NO REMOVAL OF U/G & OH UTILITY SERVICES,
• NO REDUCTION IN ROAD WIDTHS DUE TO COLUMNS
• NO NEED FOR ROAD WIDENING
• NO CHANGE IN NOISE POLLUTION
• NO LOSS DUE TO REDUCTION OF SPEEDS OF VEHICLES
• NO IMPACT ON ENVIRONMENT
• COST OF U/G –
RS 400CR/KM SG
• SAVING DUE TO BG
(–) RS 100CR/KM
• ECONOMIC SAVINGS
–) RS 200CR/KM
• TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE WITH LONG TERM ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES
• 18 MILLION CUM ROCK EXCAVATED FROM TUNNELING TO BE USED FOR NEW ROAD
CONSTRUCTIONS
• Rs 400cr / km will be reduced by Rs 100cr/km by adoption of BG indigenous wider coaches. Though UG will cost initially more, will provide an economic savings of around Rs 200cr / km with long term economic advantages to the city.
• This alternative needs to be seriously looked into and the financial viability assessed on a long term period of at least 60 years.
16) LEGAL ISSUES
• The DPR states that “The Metro rail is a Railway and has to be implemented under the Indian Railways Act” and should therefore, follow the “Indian Railways code of practice” for preparation of DPR
• The Constitution does not provide legal jurisdiction to the State Govt. to construct a railway system. Hence, the legal aspects of this planning and execution needs to be looked into before the same is declared void under Art. 254 of the constitution
17) EXECUTION MODEL – PPP OR DMRC MODEL
• In the context of the recent failures of 87 concrete cantilevers and 18 serious cracks in columns, supporting the metro systems on 5 routes of Delhi Metro Rail – Phase-II. Pune city has to reconsider the adoption of DMRC model proposed in the DPR
• This model has also to be looked into, in the context of the CAG report of Sept 2008, for Delhi Metro Rail phase-I, which has exploded the balloon of the self magnified image of DMRC, in terms of quality of construction, application of financial prudence and the series irregularities, brought out by CAG, in the implementation of the project by DMRC.
• DMRC model does not reveal the final construction cost of the project, till its completion unlike in the PPP model where the cost is frozen at the time of award of contract. In view of the fact that we are claiming that the project cost has been grossly underestimated by DMRC, if the DMRC model is taken up for implementation as recommended by PMC, DMRC should be responsible for excess cost over the estimated one for identical scope of the work.
• I am sure this will not be acceptable to DMRC, as internally he is aware of the underestimation of the project costs.
18) BASIS UNDER ESTIMATION OF COST FOR SG
• Quantities, unit rates and cost of major item like bridges, stations, utilities etc. are based on LS basis and not on GAD drawings.
• Depot cost are not based on GAD drawings
• EM works cost are based on LS basis
• OHE cost have been grossly underestimated
• The cost of UG section highly underestimated
• Number of rolling stock and the unit cost of each grossly underestimated.
• The OH cost of the SPV Interim Consultants, the General Consultants, the Prime Consultants, thse Proof Consultants, Legal charges, the risk cost and the financial cost for securities and insurance have not been incorporated. These will total to more than 20%.
• The cost of electrical charges have been taken at concessional rates
• The cost of import duties and other charges not incorporated
19) BASIS FOR SAVINGS IN BG INDIGINOUS WIDER COACHES
(For the same standards and quality of construction as that for SG)
Reduction in the number of coaches and the unit cost of each coach from Rs 10cr to Rs 3cr including AC and furnishings
Reduction in the train length and hence the length of platform and platform covers
Reduction in land for depots due to reduction in train length for equivalent volume of traffic
Reduction in the cost of signalling – ATC &ATO etc not required upto 3min service
Reduction in the cost of indigenous track items (no import required)
Reduction in the cost of overseas supervision consultancy and training etc.
Reduction in the cost of import duties
40% reduction in BG cost will need no VGF and will reduce the cost of fares by 30%
V K J Rane – Ex-MD/IRCON
11.03.10
Sub – WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE DPR ON PUNE METRO RAIL PLANNING
1) NARROW VISION PLANNING FOR METRO RAIL BY DMRC
BG - 5’6”
Coach Width 3.66m (12’-0”)
Capacity – 450 per coach
54000 PPHPD for 6 coach train at
3 min frequency –
Crush capacity life 100 years
Does Pune Need cracked wheels & coaches for Pune Metro Rail ?
SG - 4’-8.5”
Coach Width 2.9m (9’-6”)
Capacity – 260 per coach
31400 PPHPD for 6 coach train at
3 min frequency –
Crush capacity life 25 years
Wheels & Coach Floor cracking in 5 years Delhi Metro Phase – I
CAG Report Sept 08
2) PMC NEEDS TO EXPLAIN THE ADOPTION OF “LOW CAPACITY HIGH COST SG IMPORTED COACHES” INSTEAD OF “ A HIGH CAPACITY LOW COST BG INDIGINOUS COACHES” FOR PUNE METRO RAIL
3) PUNE METRO RAIL “DPR” IS A PAPER PROJECT REPORT “PPR”
• The Standing Committee & the General Body of the PMC have recently approved, in a “hurry” the “DPR” for the proposed Pune Metro Rail, without understanding the contents of the DPR.
• To enable members to understand the DPR, PMC may considered translation of DPR in Marathi
• The “DPR” is defective, deficient, inconsistent and is a reflection of the lack of understanding of the geography of Pune City and the need for a proper selection of Routes and Alignments.
• The technical feasibilty of the alignments on the ground has not been investigated. The alignments needs to be pegged out on the ground, showing locations of columns of the corridor.
• The Project cost has been grossly under estimated and is based on LS provisions without proper analysis. The basis of cost analysis has not been justified in the DPR.
4) TRAFFIC SURVEY
• Methodology for assessment of future traffic demand for Metro Rail, need a professional review
• Assessment of future traffic has been done only up to 2031 (i.e. for 17 years beyond 2014 – the proposed date for commissioning the project for operations) This should be done for at least 30 yaers, for an elevated corridor and for about 60 years for an underground (UG) corridor
• Identification of routes and their priorities should be based on traffic densities arrived at.
• Revenue assessment should be based on realistic assumptions and needs a review.
• The planning should intigrate with master development plan for the city keeping in view all other planned and future projects.
5) TECHNOLOGY
• DPR proposes only SG with imported coaches technology and compares the same with the bus transportation systems
• The Alternatives of BG with indiginous wider coaches from capacity and cost considirations along with alternatives of elevated / surface / fully UG corridors and other alternatives technology must be evaluated for technical feasibility, acceptability on long term needs and techno-economic merits evaluated for each alternative.
6) DUPLICATION OF ELEVATED CORRIDOR BETWEEN PMC & PCMC
• This elevated corridor proposed as priorty one should be dispensed with and the indian railwyas approached for streinghtning the existing Lonavla – Pune corridor by two separate dedicated suburban tracks between Lonavala & Pune with additional stations at about 1 km spacing and with improved frequency of trains for commuter traffic from existing 30min to 10 to 5min, depending upon the traffic demand
• Similar suburban service extension be provided for the commuteres from Pune to Daund by approaching the Indian Railways and sharing cost on 50:50 basis on line similar to that adopted for Mumbai suburban section implemented thourgh Mumbai Rail Vikas Corporation (MRVC)
• This will save Rs 1500cr for PMC & PCMC
7) PROPOSED ALIGNMENT
• The 2 corridors proposed in the DPR (Corridor-I & Corridor – II) do not have track connectivity due to partial UG alignment of corridor-I
• This has necessitated provision of 2 depots with Rs 100cr of additional investment a reflection of bad planning and 100ft depth of a common costly UG junction station at ASI
• DPR does not give details of justification for the UG portion proposed in the DPR
• DPR does not carry out the survey of the existing road width, footpath width, the distance of permenant strucutre from the center line of the road etc. It does not indicate the reduction of the road width during construction and after completion of the metro rail
• The alignment does not give details of crossing the Pavana, Mula-Mutha rivers indicating the size of the columns, number of piles and bridge spans etc. and the approach curves and gradiants
• The alignement does not list out the bottleneck areas of the alignment for project execution
• The alingment crossing the Pune Railway Station is technically not feasible and will not be acceptable to the railways. An alternative is feasible.
8) CAPACITY CONSIDIRATIONS
• Why narrow vision for adopting limited capacity corridor lasting for 25 years only
• Capcity is increased by
A) Adoption of wider coaches
B) Adoption of longer trains
C) Improvement in frequencies
• Under each of the above methods, the number of additional coaches required and the corrosponding increased capacity, will determine the economics of the above systems.
Capacity for 4 coach & 6 coach trains for different width of coaches
Gauge SG
Imported PUNE SG
Imported MUMBAI BG Local MUMBAI % increase of BG over SG of 2.9m
1 Width of coach 2.9m 3.2m 3.66m -
2 4 coaches / train-capacity 1034 1500 1800 74 %
3 6 coaches / train-capacity 1574 2250 2700 72%
CAPACITY COMPARISONS
GAUGE COACH WIDTH Coaches /
train cap. FREQ PPHPD*
SG 2.9m (9’-6”) 6 – 1574 3min 31480 **
BG 3.66m (12’-0”) 6 - 2700 3min 54000 ***
Future BG 3.66m (12’-0”) 9 - 4050 3min 81000 ****
1574 x 20 = 31480
2700 x 20 = 54000
4050 X 20 = 81000 ** CAPACITY LIFE LESS THAN 25 YRS
*** CAPACITY LIFE MORE THAN 50 YRS
**** CAPACITY LIFE MORE THAN 100 YRS
9) ROLLING STOCK
• Present Cost of 3.66m wide indigenous rolling stock for BG is Rs 2 cr per coach (non AC)
• And Rs 2.25cr per coach (Air-Cooled)
• The cost of Air-conditioned BG with all modern facilities will not exceed more than Rs 3cr per coach
• The selling price of imported SG coaches is Rs 10cr / coach
• For Pune Metro Rail planned for 6 coach train will need 288 coaches at 3min frequency on both the corridors, with an investment of Rs 288 x 10cr = Rs 2880cr
• The corresponding requirements for equal volume of traffic, for BG indigenous wider coach, would need 192 coaches for both the corridors, with an investment of 192 x 3cr = Rs 576cr at 3 min frequency, resulting in a saving of Rs 2880 – Rs 576 = Rs 2304 cr
• Due to reduction in BG train length for equal volume of traffic, there would be a further saving in platform length, platform covers, land cost for depots, reduce length of station and energy consumptions and reduction in land and O & M costs
10) The table below incorporated in the DPR for planning for coaches indicates gross calculation mistakes in the number of coaches and hence in the gross capital cost assumed for investment
PLANNING FOR COACHES IN DPR
Source: Salient Features of DPR – PMC website
Corridor year Headway (minutes) No of rakes Train composition Coaches required
1 2 3 4 5 6
Corridor 1
PCMC – Swargate 2011 4.5 22 4 car 72 x
2021 3.5 22 x 4 car 88
2031 3.5 25 4 car 88 x
Corridor II 2011 12 10 4 car 28 x
Vanaz to Ramwadi 2021 8 12 x 4 car 40 x
2031 8 20 x 4 car 40 x
• Assessment of coaches at col. 6 is = col.4 x col.5
• Figures under column 4 will depend upon headway under col. 3
• The figures under col. 4 for corridor-1, cannot be the same for col. 3 & col. 4. for 2011 & 2021
• Similarly figures at col. 4 for 2031 cannot be the same as that of 2021 for the same headway of 3.5min
• Simple arithmetic for col. 6 need rectification. Same arguments applied for corridor 2.
• The financial evaluation therefore, done on the basis of this chart for initial capital cost and subsequent capital investment are not correct. Hence FIRR and EIRR calculations need a complete review
• Similar calculations have to be done for BG indigenous wider coaches as there is huge capital cost savings hence the full review of DPR
11) SIGNALING FOR DRIVERLESS TECHNOLOGY
• For 3min service frequency / headway not required/ contemplated for 30 yrs in the DPR, there is no need for cab signaling, ATC-ATO (driverless trains), at an additional cost of around Rs 170cr as suburban trains in Mumbai are operated at 3min service with normal color light signaling
12) OVERALL COST SAVINGS FOR BG WITH WIDER COACHES
• Savings in BG coaches in lieu of SG coaches Rs 2300cr
• Replacement of UG by an elev. corridor Rs 1250cr
• Elimination of ATP, ATC & ATO signaling Rs 170cr
• Replacement of 2 depots by 1 & providing Track
• Connectivity Rs 100cr
• Elimination of imported track components Rs 50cr
• Savings in central taxes and duties Rs 300cr
========
Total Rs 4170cr
(Say Rs 4000cr)
• No reduction has been made in the standard of construction of the station buildings and provision has been made for increased cost of indigenous coaches for AC, furnishings, communication systems and other inputs, at par with those adopted for SG by DMRC.
• In addition to above there would be a cost saving of Rs 1430cr by elimination of a duplicate elevated corridor between PCMC & Range hill corridor-I
• PMC AND THE GOVT. OF MAHARASHTRA MUST LOOK INTO THE TECHNO-ECONOMIC MERITS OF GAUGE WITH WIDER INDIGENOUS BG COACHES AND COMPARE COST ON THE BASIS OF COST PER UNIT CARRYING CAPACITY. THIS WOULD BE AS PER THE DIRECTIVE OF THE GROUP OF MINISTERS IN THEIR DECISION DATED 24TH APR 2006
13) FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS- Source: Salient Features of DPR – PMC website
• Cost for Pune metro rail has been grossly underestimated and is based on adhoc basis without detailed investigation and analysis
• DPR does not indicate the time frame through a bar chart, methodology of construction and detailed analysis of cost
• The project cost is expected to be in the range of Rs 12500cr as against Rs 9514 stated in the DPR estimated for the 2 corridors of Pune Phase-I
Particulars Completion cost without taxes Completion cost with central tax only
FIRR 3.23% 1.93%
• The DPR should make an assessment of the realistic cost updated at 2011 level and work out the revised FIRR
• Based on the above, DPR should indicate the viability gap funding necessary for the project to be implemented on the PPP model. In view a very low rate of FIRR, which should be around 15% for project acceptability for the investor, the VGF would be required to the extent of 70 to 75% of the project cost
• The assessment of EIRR of 18% is based on wrong assumptions and need revision by financial expert company outside DMRC.
14) OTHER ISSUES
• The DPR does not cover the cost of station circulating area facilities required for proper integration with other moods of transport arriving and departing to & from each station
• DPR does not include the assessment of water supply requirements during construction and during operation, as this demand would be exceptionally high resulting in further shortage of water supply to the public.
• Similarly electric supply has been planned to be sourced from the existing supply. This would result in further shortage of electricity supply to the citizens
15) ALTERNATIVE - A FULLY UG CORRIDOR WITH BG WIDER COACHES
• NO LAND ACQUISITION ,
• NO CUTTING OF TREES,
• NO DEMOLITION OF BUILDINGS
• NO REMOVAL OF U/G & OH UTILITY SERVICES,
• NO REDUCTION IN ROAD WIDTHS DUE TO COLUMNS
• NO NEED FOR ROAD WIDENING
• NO CHANGE IN NOISE POLLUTION
• NO LOSS DUE TO REDUCTION OF SPEEDS OF VEHICLES
• NO IMPACT ON ENVIRONMENT
• COST OF U/G –
RS 400CR/KM SG
• SAVING DUE TO BG
(–) RS 100CR/KM
• ECONOMIC SAVINGS
–) RS 200CR/KM
• TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE WITH LONG TERM ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES
• 18 MILLION CUM ROCK EXCAVATED FROM TUNNELING TO BE USED FOR NEW ROAD
CONSTRUCTIONS
• Rs 400cr / km will be reduced by Rs 100cr/km by adoption of BG indigenous wider coaches. Though UG will cost initially more, will provide an economic savings of around Rs 200cr / km with long term economic advantages to the city.
• This alternative needs to be seriously looked into and the financial viability assessed on a long term period of at least 60 years.
16) LEGAL ISSUES
• The DPR states that “The Metro rail is a Railway and has to be implemented under the Indian Railways Act” and should therefore, follow the “Indian Railways code of practice” for preparation of DPR
• The Constitution does not provide legal jurisdiction to the State Govt. to construct a railway system. Hence, the legal aspects of this planning and execution needs to be looked into before the same is declared void under Art. 254 of the constitution
17) EXECUTION MODEL – PPP OR DMRC MODEL
• In the context of the recent failures of 87 concrete cantilevers and 18 serious cracks in columns, supporting the metro systems on 5 routes of Delhi Metro Rail – Phase-II. Pune city has to reconsider the adoption of DMRC model proposed in the DPR
• This model has also to be looked into, in the context of the CAG report of Sept 2008, for Delhi Metro Rail phase-I, which has exploded the balloon of the self magnified image of DMRC, in terms of quality of construction, application of financial prudence and the series irregularities, brought out by CAG, in the implementation of the project by DMRC.
• DMRC model does not reveal the final construction cost of the project, till its completion unlike in the PPP model where the cost is frozen at the time of award of contract. In view of the fact that we are claiming that the project cost has been grossly underestimated by DMRC, if the DMRC model is taken up for implementation as recommended by PMC, DMRC should be responsible for excess cost over the estimated one for identical scope of the work.
• I am sure this will not be acceptable to DMRC, as internally he is aware of the underestimation of the project costs.
18) BASIS UNDER ESTIMATION OF COST FOR SG
• Quantities, unit rates and cost of major item like bridges, stations, utilities etc. are based on LS basis and not on GAD drawings.
• Depot cost are not based on GAD drawings
• EM works cost are based on LS basis
• OHE cost have been grossly underestimated
• The cost of UG section highly underestimated
• Number of rolling stock and the unit cost of each grossly underestimated.
• The OH cost of the SPV Interim Consultants, the General Consultants, the Prime Consultants, thse Proof Consultants, Legal charges, the risk cost and the financial cost for securities and insurance have not been incorporated. These will total to more than 20%.
• The cost of electrical charges have been taken at concessional rates
• The cost of import duties and other charges not incorporated
19) BASIS FOR SAVINGS IN BG INDIGINOUS WIDER COACHES
(For the same standards and quality of construction as that for SG)
Reduction in the number of coaches and the unit cost of each coach from Rs 10cr to Rs 3cr including AC and furnishings
Reduction in the train length and hence the length of platform and platform covers
Reduction in land for depots due to reduction in train length for equivalent volume of traffic
Reduction in the cost of signalling – ATC &ATO etc not required upto 3min service
Reduction in the cost of indigenous track items (no import required)
Reduction in the cost of overseas supervision consultancy and training etc.
Reduction in the cost of import duties
40% reduction in BG cost will need no VGF and will reduce the cost of fares by 30%
V K J Rane – Ex-MD/IRCON
11.03.10
Suggestions for Pune Metro Rail for the meeting proposed on 13th March 10 in MCCIA’s office
V. K. J. RANE – IRSE (Retd.) Ex-M.D./IRCON
F-5, 2nd floor, 48/49 Grafikon Paradise, NIBM Road, Kondhwa Khurd, Pune - 411 048
Tel: (020) 2685 4132, Mobile: 093710 05396 Email: vkjrane1930@hotmail.com
Website: http://vkjrane1930.blogspot.com/
Date – 9th March 2010
To
Mr. Kishori Gadre
Janvani / MCCIA
Pune
Sub – Suggestions for Pune Metro Rail for the meeting proposed on 13th March 10 in MCCIA’s office
I would like to make the following suggestions in connection with the presentation to the Govt. of Maharashtra regarding Pune Metro Rail Planning
1. The hurriedly approved DPR proposal for Pune Metro Rail, by the Standing Committee and the General Body of PMC & forwarded to the Govt. of Maharashtra, recommending the DPR Proposal of DMRC, should be withdrawn on priority, as the same is Defective, Deficient, Technically lacking in wisdom, logic and usefulness and did not have the approval of the citizens of Pune, who have strongly objected to the same, being not in the larger interest of the Pune Citizens, and hence needs a complete review a fresh
2. The planning of the mass transit rail based system for Pune City, should take into consideration, the Master Development Plan for future rail based (surface) connectivity along the areas developed on the out skirts of the Pune city along the proposed Ring Road System, with radial connectivity to the heart of the city, preferably underground, with a common underground centralized metro rail station at Swargate, for easy connectivity to the bus route system, terminating at Swargate on the surface.
3. PMC, in association with, ‘Janvani and MCCIA’ (newly formed platform for integrated Mass Transit System for the city) should identify a new study team (Company) for planning the above Rail based Mass Transit System, with proper integration with the surface BRTS & other surface corridors, planned for the city, by identifying detailed scope of study, with detailed terms of reference, period for preparation of DPR and the fees therefore.
4. This new company should have adequate experience of planning and construction of Rail Base Metro Rail System and should identify the members of the field team with the name of their leader in the field, as well the leader in the corporate office along with their CV exhibiting the individual’s expertise in the field.
5. This field leader should indicate the methodology of its work and the sub systems to be investigated in the preparation of the DPR and co-ordinate with the citizens represented through ‘Janvani / MCCIA’ and PMC and other experts in the relevant Govt. departments affected by the proposed planning, with record of minutes of discussions and conclusions arrived at.
6. This team should investigate the technical feasibility and the techno-economic merits of the various alternatives of Mass Transit Systems including a BG with indigenous wider coaches, with reasons for recommendations and rejections
7. The traffic study to be carried by this new team/company, should be done in consultation with the traffic experts of the city and indicate the traffic densities along various routes and decide the priorities for the various corridors of the metro rail systems proposed.
8. The metro rail system proposed should also take into consideration, the technical feasibility and the techno-economic merits of the BG system with wider indigenous coaches with improvements as necessary and planning for a maximum of 3min service with the minimum of 8 to 10 coaches train length for future expansion for 100 years capacity life requirements
9. The financial analysis of FIRR and EIRR should be based for a longer period of a least 60 years for an underground proposal which will have initial increase capital cost, but will save lot of other costs of inconvenience and demolition and bridge construction etc. for a surface corridor including absence of land acquisition and demolition of trees, diversion of existing underground and overhead utility services etc.
10. The analysis should incorporate the assessment of viability gap funding (VGF) subsidy necessary on a PPP model and should prepare a complete bar chart / CPM chart of the recommended proposal for implementation and management and operations of the system. The cost should be prepared as applicable to Pune City and based on the present cost of various items of work and with provision of standards for stations as now proposed in DMRC report with further improvements if any. The existing defects in the track layout planning of the DMRC report resulting in unsafe reverse curves on the approaches of stations should be eliminated.
11. The team should prepare the layouts of typical UG stations and the layout for circulating areas at various stations, with provisions of facilities for easy movement of commuters as well as vehicles approaching and going away from such stations, with proper integrated planning for the UG bus systems connectivity at such stations.
12. The cost of such passenger facilities in the circulating areas of the stations should be assessed and become a part of the overall project cost of the metro rail system
13. The existing proposal of a duplicate elevated rail corridor between PCMC & PMC should be eliminated and in lieu a separate proposal for a dedicated rail based suburban surface corridor between Lonavala & Pune adjoining the existing main line rail corridor with further extension of the suburban system from Pune to Daund, with future provision for a 3min headway service, should be planned, by approaching the Indian Railways and the planning, designing and the costs thereof, should be done by Indian Railways, through MRVC (Mumbai Rail Vikas Corporation) by sharing 50:50 cost with Indian Railways as is being done by Govt. of Maharashtra and Indian Railways for Mumbai Suburban Section.
14. The Monorail System, is costlier than Metro Rail system based on cost per unit carrying capacity and need to be adopted where
a. Metro rail system cannot be provided
b. For short distance non peak travel needs
c. Connectivity with areas like airport to suburban train destinations / bus terminals where luggage more than 1.5kg is required to be carried by passengers (unlike that restricted on the metro rail systems). In fact in the non peak hours for the metro rail system, this restrictions should be removed to facilitate connectivity of Monorail with Metro rail systems.
With warm regards
V K J Rane – IRSE (Retd) Ex-MD/IRCON
F-5, 2nd floor, 48/49 Grafikon Paradise, NIBM Road, Kondhwa Khurd, Pune - 411 048
Tel: (020) 2685 4132, Mobile: 093710 05396 Email: vkjrane1930@hotmail.com
Website: http://vkjrane1930.blogspot.com/
Date – 9th March 2010
To
Mr. Kishori Gadre
Janvani / MCCIA
Pune
Sub – Suggestions for Pune Metro Rail for the meeting proposed on 13th March 10 in MCCIA’s office
I would like to make the following suggestions in connection with the presentation to the Govt. of Maharashtra regarding Pune Metro Rail Planning
1. The hurriedly approved DPR proposal for Pune Metro Rail, by the Standing Committee and the General Body of PMC & forwarded to the Govt. of Maharashtra, recommending the DPR Proposal of DMRC, should be withdrawn on priority, as the same is Defective, Deficient, Technically lacking in wisdom, logic and usefulness and did not have the approval of the citizens of Pune, who have strongly objected to the same, being not in the larger interest of the Pune Citizens, and hence needs a complete review a fresh
2. The planning of the mass transit rail based system for Pune City, should take into consideration, the Master Development Plan for future rail based (surface) connectivity along the areas developed on the out skirts of the Pune city along the proposed Ring Road System, with radial connectivity to the heart of the city, preferably underground, with a common underground centralized metro rail station at Swargate, for easy connectivity to the bus route system, terminating at Swargate on the surface.
3. PMC, in association with, ‘Janvani and MCCIA’ (newly formed platform for integrated Mass Transit System for the city) should identify a new study team (Company) for planning the above Rail based Mass Transit System, with proper integration with the surface BRTS & other surface corridors, planned for the city, by identifying detailed scope of study, with detailed terms of reference, period for preparation of DPR and the fees therefore.
4. This new company should have adequate experience of planning and construction of Rail Base Metro Rail System and should identify the members of the field team with the name of their leader in the field, as well the leader in the corporate office along with their CV exhibiting the individual’s expertise in the field.
5. This field leader should indicate the methodology of its work and the sub systems to be investigated in the preparation of the DPR and co-ordinate with the citizens represented through ‘Janvani / MCCIA’ and PMC and other experts in the relevant Govt. departments affected by the proposed planning, with record of minutes of discussions and conclusions arrived at.
6. This team should investigate the technical feasibility and the techno-economic merits of the various alternatives of Mass Transit Systems including a BG with indigenous wider coaches, with reasons for recommendations and rejections
7. The traffic study to be carried by this new team/company, should be done in consultation with the traffic experts of the city and indicate the traffic densities along various routes and decide the priorities for the various corridors of the metro rail systems proposed.
8. The metro rail system proposed should also take into consideration, the technical feasibility and the techno-economic merits of the BG system with wider indigenous coaches with improvements as necessary and planning for a maximum of 3min service with the minimum of 8 to 10 coaches train length for future expansion for 100 years capacity life requirements
9. The financial analysis of FIRR and EIRR should be based for a longer period of a least 60 years for an underground proposal which will have initial increase capital cost, but will save lot of other costs of inconvenience and demolition and bridge construction etc. for a surface corridor including absence of land acquisition and demolition of trees, diversion of existing underground and overhead utility services etc.
10. The analysis should incorporate the assessment of viability gap funding (VGF) subsidy necessary on a PPP model and should prepare a complete bar chart / CPM chart of the recommended proposal for implementation and management and operations of the system. The cost should be prepared as applicable to Pune City and based on the present cost of various items of work and with provision of standards for stations as now proposed in DMRC report with further improvements if any. The existing defects in the track layout planning of the DMRC report resulting in unsafe reverse curves on the approaches of stations should be eliminated.
11. The team should prepare the layouts of typical UG stations and the layout for circulating areas at various stations, with provisions of facilities for easy movement of commuters as well as vehicles approaching and going away from such stations, with proper integrated planning for the UG bus systems connectivity at such stations.
12. The cost of such passenger facilities in the circulating areas of the stations should be assessed and become a part of the overall project cost of the metro rail system
13. The existing proposal of a duplicate elevated rail corridor between PCMC & PMC should be eliminated and in lieu a separate proposal for a dedicated rail based suburban surface corridor between Lonavala & Pune adjoining the existing main line rail corridor with further extension of the suburban system from Pune to Daund, with future provision for a 3min headway service, should be planned, by approaching the Indian Railways and the planning, designing and the costs thereof, should be done by Indian Railways, through MRVC (Mumbai Rail Vikas Corporation) by sharing 50:50 cost with Indian Railways as is being done by Govt. of Maharashtra and Indian Railways for Mumbai Suburban Section.
14. The Monorail System, is costlier than Metro Rail system based on cost per unit carrying capacity and need to be adopted where
a. Metro rail system cannot be provided
b. For short distance non peak travel needs
c. Connectivity with areas like airport to suburban train destinations / bus terminals where luggage more than 1.5kg is required to be carried by passengers (unlike that restricted on the metro rail systems). In fact in the non peak hours for the metro rail system, this restrictions should be removed to facilitate connectivity of Monorail with Metro rail systems.
With warm regards
V K J Rane – IRSE (Retd) Ex-MD/IRCON
Wednesday, March 3, 2010
CRITICAL COMMENTS ON THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY THE DETAILED PROJECT REPORT (DPR)
CRITICAL COMMENTS ON THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND
THE DETAILED PROJECT REPORT (DPR) (DATED 12TH MARCH 2009)
OF DMRC, ON THE PROPOSED PUNE METRO RAIL PROJECT
By
V K J Rane – IRSE (Retd.)
Ex-MD/IRCON
INTRODUCTION--The project report dated 12.03.09,(DPR) received by PMC from DMRC, comprise of a Foreword, Salient Features – of the Project, Executive Summery and 15 Chapters of the DPR, including A4 size plans without dimensions. Detailed drawings incorporating Index Plan and Section, layout of Depot, layout of Stations Bridges, Alignment with locations of columns and other details, in A2 size drawings, as prepared for Mumbai Metro and Hyd Metro, have not been received. Hence a detailed technical appreciation could not be made.
No reference has been made to the meaning of the Short Forms used at a large number of places. This should have been done at the beginning of the chapter 1 as these reports will be read and seen not only by experts within the country but also those at international levels. Generally all professional reports do cover such clarifications .
1) Comments on Foreword –
1.1 Terms of Reference of PMC -Foreword does not indicate, any reference in DPR to the terms of reference given by PMC to DMRC for undertaking the preparation of DPR of the project. Thought the foreword has been signed by MD / DMRC, he, nor his deputy seem to have, even glanced through the attached report before submission to PMC, as seen from the obvious inconsistencies, deficiencies, omissions, deletions of references to Ludhiana during copy pasting , and the general substandard quality of contents and presentation. This report is to be presented to the State cabinet for approval and sanctions and will be read by International experts & consultants . .
1.2 Alternative Studies - The Foreword does not make any reference to DPR regarding alternative studies of BG, with indigenous wider coaches or MG (LRT) with the indigenous technology, available within the country. The State Cabinet, before taking techno-economic decisions on this project, would have been, in a better position, to convince the citizens, the techno-economic merits of the project and safeguarding the public interest, for its implementation. The report is biased in favour of SG with imported coaches and adoption of technology not required for the performance stipulated in the report. Our detailed para wise comments on the justification for adopting SG with imported coaches, at exorbitant cost as given at para 4.3 of chapter 4 of the DPR, are given in our comments under that chapter.
2) COMMENTS ON SALIENT FEATURES & EXECUTIVE SUMMERY-
2.1 Details of the salient features - of this project as furnished in the DPR by DMRC is attached as annexure 1 to this report, for ready reference. It is seen from this annexure that the total length of these two corridors is 31.515 km with Corridor 1--PCMC to Swargate is 16.589 km and Corridor 2 --Vanaz to Ramvadi all elevated (14.925 kms). Corridor 1 is underground for a length of 5.019 kms with 6 UG stations, & balance 9 stations of Corridor 1 and 15 stations in corridor 2 are all elevated.
2.2 Track Connectivity - The salient features do not make a mention, that there is NO track connectivity between the two corridors and that the Corridor 2 crosses Corridor 1 over its UG section, at ASI station, necessitating physical interchange by commuters from 12 .5 m above the ground level to about 22m below the ground level. The salient features also do not indicate the number and locations of the river crossings and the under river crossing of the alignment for Mutha river and the railway track crossings a number of lines across the middle of station yard. These are important features deciding the technical feasibility, the period of construction and the cost of the project, and, therefore, should have been brought out in this para.
2.3 Traffic forecast upto 2031 - It is seen from salient features that the traffic forecast has been assessed for the two corridors for two decades only, upto the period 2031, The project has been planned to be commissioned in the year 2014, that is, the assessment has been done only for a period of 17 yrs after commissioning. This assessment should have been done for a period of at least 50 yrs or a minimum of 30 yrs that is up to 2045. This would have covered the life cycle period of the coaching stock.,
2.4 Contradictions in number of coaches - There is a contradiction in the figures given in the tables presented at Table 0.5 at page 15/36 under para 0.6 –TRAIN OPERATION PLAN of the Executive summery and at table 5 TRAIN OPERATION at page 2/4 of the Salient features. The number of coaches as per table 5 at salient features for Corridor –I for the year 2031 work out to 25 x 4 = 100, as against 88 mentioned for the same year in table 0.5 of the executive summery. Similar mistakes are seen for the year 2011. Similarly for Corridor 2 the number of coaches required for the year 2011 should be 40 (10x4) instead of 28 and for the year 2021 it should be 48 (12x4) instead of 40, and for the year 2031 it should be 80 (20x4) instead of 40. It is not clear on what basis the cost has been assessed for the Rolling Stock in the project estimates . There are many such contradictions and mistakes and the report need to be sent back to DMRC for corrections.
2.5 PERMANENT WAY—Justification given for adoption of SG for Metro systems in Pune is not convincing nor logical particularly in the context of capacity requirements, compatibility, connectivity and existing standards in the country including economy. Para wise comments on his justification, has been included in the appropriate chapter of our comments on the DPR. It is necessary to adopt the Track Structure for the Metro System, so as to provide connectivity with the existing BG system in Pune Rly Division, to enable commuters to travel without interchange from Lonavala to Hadapsar and back. SG Structure proposed involves importation of rails and Turn outs.
2.6 SYSTEM TRACTION—Techno-economic justification for adoption of a costly 25 KV AC overhead traction verses 750 V. DC system for such a low level of traffic has not been given in the report . Adoption of a 3-phase AC induction motors for the drive , is NO reason to opt 25 KV AC supply Single Phase as the power has to be obtained through an inverter worked from a DC supply. Features of Disc Brakes or Air Springs adopted are not required for slow speed trains on Metro as these are required and are of advantage for high speed trains. Telecommunication and Fare collection systems proposed can also be provided on BG systems and are locally available
2.7 ROLLING STOCK – It is seen from this chapter that the width of the imported rolling stock has been limited to 2.9m wide only, as against 3.2m wide for Delhi, Mumbai ,Hyd, Bangalore and other metros in the country. The axle load has also been limited to 16T. as against 17 tons for other metros. This affects advantages of economies of standardization.. There is NO provision for future adoption of wider Rolling Stock (Coaches) and increasing the capacity for future conversion to BG, to accommodate additional future traffic demand requirements beyond 25 yrs. This restricts the capacity permanently This should be known to the citizens and must be mentioned in the salient features so that the Cabinet members, are aware of the type of metro they would be approving, even though, it is against the benefits of future citizens. The justification for selection of the SG rolling stock at para f at page 7/36 of the executive summery is factually not correct and has not been proved with facts and figures. and not compared with indigenous rolling stock.
2.8 DEPOT – (MAINTENANCE FACILITIES) & ASI STATION -- The salient features must indicate, for the benefit of the knowledge of the cabinet Ministers, that there is NO rail connectivity between the two Corridors and hence between the two depots. And that certain maintenance facilities required for Corridor 2 have been made provision of, at Corridor 1 Depot, and carried out by transferring these coaches in dismantled conditions, in trailers by road. Similarly the need for physical interchange of passengers at ASI stations from elevated to UG and vice-a- versa, for a level difference of 35m ,and a costly station at ASI, due to non-connectivity of the two corridors, must be mentioned in the salient features itself.
2.9 SIGNALLING – Mumbai suburban section trains have been running at 3min headway, on automatic color light signalling, without the use of ATP, ATC ATO etc. The need for Pune metro with 3 .5 and 8min service upto the period of 2031 with adoption of cab signalling and continues automatic train control with ATP, imported at exorbitant costs, resulting in heavy fare structure, is neither appreciated nor necessary technically & operationally. It only helps the international vendors.
2.10 POWER SUPPLY— the source of power supply to the Metro system will be from the existing sources which are drastically inadequate tor the requirements of the city. Demand for Metro operations without augmenting the existing supply will create additional problems to the citizens.
2.11 COST ESTIMATES— The Executive summery, in the chapter of Capital Cost Estimates under Table 0.9 , . does NOT give the quantities and Unit rates against the various items of works mentioned there in, though these are mentioned and available in the DPR.
2. 12 –UNDER ESTIMATION OF COSTS-The project costs have been grossly under estimated to the extent of more than 25%.. There is NO provision for various consultants and other charges mentioned in the DPR .We have reviewed the item wise details of this estimate, based on costs of similar items for other METRO projects under execution in the country and item wise revised cost has been prepared and compared with DMRC project estimate. Similarly we have compared item wise costs of the project if BG wider indigenous coaches with Air Conditioning ,improved furnishings, and air conditioned Stations and other identical facilities, provided in our costs . A comparative statements of costs along with all details item wise have been enclosed in the chapter of costs of this report It is seen from this statements that the BG wider coaches, indigenously manufactured, with necessary inputs of technology and to equivalent standards of performance, and stations, will cost 30% lower, with NO need for VGF subsidy and reduced fare structure by 30% and NO long term dependence on overseas manufactures and without heavy Taxation on Pune citizens.
2.13 PARKING AREAS—Page 12/36 of the executive summery states that NO provision has been made for parking of vehicles at stations and that the integration facilities at stations, is left to the state GOVT and are NOT included in the cost of the project. This is an important aspect of the system for smooth and efficient operations and the cost of the same, whether borne by DMRC or PMC must be taken into account in assessing the viability.
2.14 LAND—Detailed assessment of land requirements has been done, but NO mention has been made regarding the assessment of the rates assumed and compensation payable for private lands, has been mentioned anywhere in the report.
2.15 CAPACITY OF TRAIN—
A 4 car train –1034 Passengers (sitting 186- Crush Standing-848) at 8 pass/Sq.M
A 6 car Train-1574 Passengers (sitting 286, Crush standing-1288)at 8 pass/sqM
For assessment of coaches a terminal reversal time has been taken as 6 min. This seem to be wrong as this will depend upon the frequency for which the assessment of coaches is done .This needs to be reviewed(Ref-page 15/36 of Exe. Summery)
For working out the project system cost for say 30 year life span of coaches ,the number of coaches should correspond to the system capacity provided by the corridors. These corridors are designed for a 6 coach planned capacity at max.of say 3min headway and at an ave. speed of 30 to 33 kmph speeds These corridors will need a max of 24 trains for each corridor , to match these capacities.. With 6 coach train capacity planning, we will need 24x6=144 coaches per corridor. The comparison of economics of the capacities for 2,9m wide SG coach and 3.66 m wide BG coach train systems has, therefore, to be based on these fundamental assumptions for techno-economic comparison of the two systems.
2.16 FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS – The financial indices of the project, based on revenue from FAR trading, indicate that the project FIRR is 1.93 % with central Taxes only, as against the requirement of , at least, 15% at the cost of funds at 12% minimum. FIIR is negative if the additional residual rental income accrued from property development is NOT considered. This is also based on 25% under estimated cost of the project This shows that the project is grossly unremunerative and would be a permanent burden on the citizens of Pune as well as the Maharashtra State and the Nation, for heavy taxation and subsidy. FOR GENERATION OF FUNDS, ADDITIONAL TAXATION ON THE CITIZENS OF PUNE ARE RECOMMENDED AS UNDER—a) Professional Tax at 1% of the salary of the employees. B) A Cess on petrol and diesel sale in the city c) Increase in FAR to 4 and its trading d) A surcharge on the property tax in the city e) A surcharge on the Motor Vehicle Tax in the city. f) An entry tax on the commercial articles entering the city. Hence alternatives appropriate technologies will have to be investigated for handling the Mass transportation problems of the city, including finding solutions for the daily inputs of additional 4 wheeler vehicles on the existing roads of this city.
2.17 FARE FOR COMMUTERS-- Fare structure for the year 2014-15 has been given at page 28/36 of the Exe. Summery. This varies from Rs 7 to Rs 24 for 2km to 30 km .For a lead of 12-15 km it is Rs 16 .This is very high as compared to Bus and Mumbai Metro Fares.
2.18 LEGAL ASPECT-At this page without giving detailed justification, the project has been recommended by DMRC for execution through the State SPV. Under the present constitution art, 366/20, States do NOT have legal Jurisdiction to construct even a tramway connecting two Municipal Corporations. This power vests with the Centre only, unless the constitution is changed to exclude Metro Rail from the definitions of a Railway
2.19 PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT—DPR at page 29/36 of Exe-Sum- state that 4Ha of depot land at Agricultural University will be commercially exploited to support this project. This land of 10.4435 Ha will be given an FAR of 4. for commercial exploitation, with a up front yield of Rs 600 Crs. And further supplemented with a lease rental to the fare box collections. PMC has confirmed additional FAR of 4 to DMRC. There is NO gazette notification on the subject and this is not yet discussed with the citizens affected by such action. If this is not accepted, the project viability will be grossly affected. FIRR without this revenue should be worked out to know the implications..
In addition to above earnings from sale of FAR along the corridor at Rs 5000 per SqM for 50% length (31.514km –including UG portion) for a width of 500 m on either side, and collected over 20 years has been assumed. The practical feasibility of these assumptions need to be debated
2.20 =PLANNING FOR IMPLEMENTATION— The DPR should be debated with the citizens group and approved by them before the same is forwarded to the State Govt, for consideration. The legal jurisdiction under the Constitution must be examined and steps taken before any approval to the project. There is no BAR CHART planning shown for the period of construction .in the DPR The quality of inputs and presentation of contents , including inconsistencies in the report and omissions on detailing etc are much below the standards stipulated in the Preliminary reports stipulated by the Indian Railway standards Engineering Codes for similar reports. This needs to be returned for resubmission on professional standards.
3.0 COMMENTS ON DPR
Sr No REFERENCE TO PARA OF DPR COMMENTS
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1 3.1.1--Para 1.1 Reference has been made in this chapter to Pune, as a birth place from Saint Tukaram to great freedom fighters like Tilak, Agarkar and Gokhale including the current scientist Mr. Narlikar. But a reference to the King of Deccan “Shivaji Maharaj” has been missed. He was a freedom creator and “Established Independence and Promoted Swadeshi pride”, and has, therefore, great significance, in the context of the recommendations of DMRC, for long term dependency on overseas manufactures and adoption of Videshi culture, at the cost of the citizens of this city and the country.
3.1.2 Para 1.1.2 LOCATION, --Details of maximum and minimum rainfall with its intensity and period including the temperature variations, have not been indicated, since they form an important part of the execution of railway project from considerations of working period, rail welding etc.
3.1.3 Para1.1.5 ROAD WORK-- “The following national highways passed through the district” - details have been omitted in the summery though indicated in the DPR
3.1.4 Para 1.1.6 – Suburban Rail Network - Rail Network does not make a mention of an important aspect of this rail network, that is, the suburban trains from Lonavala to Pune, running at present at 15min service to meet present traffic demand, with future increase to 5min service, after addition of coaches on the system. This suburban train would be extended, shortly, up to Daund, as the demand exists. Though existing suburban train pass though Shivajinagar, why efforts are not being made to provide connectivity to the proposed metro system, so that passengers can have a seemless travel (without physical interchange) from Lonavala to Hadapsar by adopting the Metro System to suite the existing system, for the benefit of the commuters . This can be achieved, indigenously, at economical costs and at reduced fares to the commuters. This aspect must be examined in the DPR in consultation with IR, C Rly Pune Rly division.
3.1.5 Para 1.4 – Typographical Mistake - Reference has been made in this para to PMC’s letter no 9002 dated 05.12.2009. This should have been 2008. Such typographical mistakes should have been avoided, as these reports will be read and seen at international levels.
2 CHAPTER 2
TRAFFIC DEMAND FORECAST
3.2.1 The priority alignments selected are
COR-I PCMC – Swargate Corridor for a length of 16.69 kms with 15 stations
COR-II Vanaz to Ramvadi Corridor for a length of 14.93 kms with 15 stations .
The key plan showing the above two corridors supposed to have been shown in annexure 0.1 is not enclosed. This should be done in the executive summary & DPR both.
3.2.2 – Population Forecast - The population forecast indicated in table 2.2 and 0.2 of Exe. Summ.(E.S.)is restricted for a period of 17 years from 2014 to 2031. For such a heavy investment for a rail corridor, the planning should have been extended at least for a period of 50 years if not for 30 years, with provision for expansion, which has not been done in this case.
3.2.3 . The figures for PHPDT in table 0.2 of E S indicate that we have to cater for the next 20 yrs hourly peak traffic of 18000 to 20000 for corridor 1 and 6000 to 10000 for corridor 2.
The above shows that corridor 1, can be catered for by BG wider coaches with a capacity of 450 per coach in a 4 coach train at 5min service giving 21600 PHPDT (450x4x60/5=21600) and
And for corridor 2, BG wider coaches with a 2 coach train will provide a capacity of 10800 PHPDT, at 5min frequency. (450x2x60/5=10800)
3.2.4 This shows that if BG with wider coaches (3.66m) is adopted, their will be heavy savings in the number of coaches and in depot length, in the platform length, station length, reduction in signalling cost, resulting heavy reduction in initial capital cost, with consequent improvement in IRR and reduction in VGF subsidy and reduced fares for the commuters.
3.2.5 The flow diagram for the Horizon year 2031- fig 2.2 at page 43/61 chapter 2 indicates that the traffic density along line number 4 from Bund Garden to Ramvadi is much less compared to the traffic densities on line no 5 & 6 towards Hinjewadi and towards Hadapsar. The selection of line 2 in priority II, doesn’t seem to be justified at this stage. This needs clarification and review.
3 CHAPTER 3
NEED FOR METRO
3.3.1 It is stated in the report, that the road mixed traffic carries 8000 PHPDT. This means as per table 0.2 of E S, there is no need for corridor II, which has PHPDT of 8500 by 2021 and 11000 by 2031. This can be achieved by improvement in the road sector by road mass transit, with dedicated corridors and by BART improvements. So far as corridor 1 is concerned, it would be prudent to consider, an elevated road corridor, along the proposed rail alignment, with 22m wide (3 lanes in each directions of 11m each) which will carry, the dedicated bus line of 2 lanes covering 7m in each direction and the remaining 4m for 4 wheelers, in each direction. This will reduce the congestion of road traffic on the existing ground level. So far as the pollution is concerned the latest technology allows pollution free road vehicle transportation systems. This will reduce considerably the capital investment, for metro rail and will take care of the daily inputs of road vehicles in the City, resulting in congestion on the existing roads.
3.3.2 In chapter 3 of the DPR – Need for Metro system - Comparison of the Dedicated Metro Rail corridor has been made with mixed bus corridor which is not correct. A dedicated bus corridor with comfortable, AC, 100% sitting capacity of 75 passengers per bus at a 30 sec frequency (headway) will carry a PHPDT of 75 x2x 60 x 60 / 30 = 18000 PHPDT which is much more than what is required for corridor 2 by 2031.
3.3.3 Para 3.2 at page 3/4 of Chapter 3 of the DPR – Limits the capacity of the LRT system up to 30000 PHPDT and states that “ in view of the present and projected PHPDT on the proposed corridors of Pune City a medium capacity metro system is considered adequate to meet the traffic demand” . The report does not state here, the year’s upto which, this demand will be met with and thereafter will need an additional parallel line beyond such limiting demands as stated in the earlier para. On the other hand it limits the capacity to 2.9m width coaches with no future provision for adoption of wider coaches beyond 2.9m. The basis of its statement in the earlier para that
3.3.4 “ beyond the traffic level of 80000 PHPDT, additional parallel line are normally planned”. The logic and the evidence of such a statement, needs clarification . Common prudence of not making any provision in the existing model for additional capacity beyond 25 yrs, in the planning stage itself, is NOT understood.
3.3.5 This chapter should have discussed the techno-economic merits of a BG wider coach as well as a MG indigenously manufactured narrow width coach which would not need importation. Metro systems on MG are in place in Japan and other countries.
4
CHAPTER 4
SYSTEM SELECTION
3.4.1 Para 4.1 of the DPR indicates – That the peak hour peak direction traffic (PHPDT) demand for corridor 1 – PCMC to Swargate varies between 18000 to 20000 for the years 2011 to 2031 and for corridor 2 between Vanaz to Ramvadi varies from 5800 to 11000 for the years 2011 to 2031. Further stated that the road based system optimally carry a maximum of 8000 PHPDT, This may be true for a mixed road base bus system but is not true for a dedicated road bus system, which not only improves the average speed from 20km to 40kms and more, but also permits headway of 10 to 15sec. A 2 lane dedicated uni-direction road corridor will also permit running of express busses, thereby further increasing the average speed and carrying capacity. The capacity of even one dedicated bus corridor would be 75 x 60 x 60 / 15 = 18000 PHPDT. Thus a single lane per direction for a bus elevated dedicated corridor will more than match the traffic demand of 11000 PHPDT by the year 2031 at a cost of less than Rs 30 cr/km. A double lane per direction, elevated dedicated bus corridor will more than match the requirements of 20000 PHPDT for corridor 1 proposed metro rail at a cost of less than Rs 40cr/km. (Excluding cost of busses)
3.4.2 DPR recommends a) A light rail metro system for a PHPDT in the range of 15000 to 30000 b) A medium capacity metro system for a PHPDT in the range of 30000 to 50000 and a Mass Rapid Transit Rail System for a PHPDT in the range of 50000 to 80000. DMRC is guided by standards probably laid down by the European countries or probably laid down by DMRC themselves, to justify imported limited capacity rail systems. For Indian conditions where the traffic demand is increasing in geometric proportion every year, and has no comparison with the population growth in India, as compared to those in European countries. The application of these standards to Indian conditions and environment, has absolutely no comparison with Indian Standards and environment, and, therefore, not applicable to Indian conditions and requirements. Hence the adoption of wider 3.66m coaches, indigenously manufactured at 1/3rd the cost, should be adopted for Indian conditions, which will not only be economical in initial and life cycle costs but will permit adoption of this elevated corridors to be economically and effectively used for more than 100 yrs without the need for laying another parallel corridor on SG on a new road to be identified for achieving equal objectives. The additional investment required for such parallel corridor needs to be taken into consideration in the techno-economic analysis for such alternatives. Unfortunately DMRC has not compared in his report, the realistic on the ground situation of indigenously manufactured wider coaches with that for imported narrow width coaches, while justifying the case for the choice of gauge.
3.4.3 a) Permanent way
(i) Choice of gauge – SG is being justified for its world wide adoption. What is good for European standards of population is not suitable for Indian standards, where the two are not comparable. The national gauge in the country exist since 1853 from its initial introduction of a railway system, from compatibility, connectivity and for economy in its expansion, construction and operation and maintenance and the available expertise within the country. There is no wisdom, nor techno-economic merits, in adoption SG for Indian Metro Systems. The justification given by DMRC, is neither valid, nor is, in the interest of the nation. Item wise comments on the justification given in the DPR for adoption of SG under the heading of Choice of gauge vide para 4.3.1, is explained below.
(ii) Track Structure – The Track structure proposed for the metro involves importation of points and crossings and head harden rails. Our existing track structure adopted on Mumbai suburban section with elastic fastenings, ballastless track and continuous welded rails, adopted on the Indian Railway systems is equally efficient and economical for adoption on the BG system. For track structure in depot, adoption of track with ballast, Indian Prestressed BG sleepers can be economically adopted in lieu of SG PRC sleepers, which will have to be imported at heavy costs, in addition to payment of royalty for design and drawings, or adoption of alternative costly systems, with imported technology. All the requirements laid down for safety, reliability etc. are available in existing BG track structure indigenously manufactured and fits well into the standards required. The requirements of maintainability of track and riding comfort are available indigenously in the design of ballastless track.
(iii) Turnouts – Adoption of SG involves importation of turnouts of different angles from those adopted on BG indigenously manufactured and adopted on Indian suburban section as well as on high speed lines. There is no need for importation of such turnouts at abnormally high costs for the benefit of the International suppliers. Introduction of scissors cross – overs on main lines, 1 in 9 type – imported, necessitating adoption of 4.5m track centers at stations approaches, as against 4m along the length, will involve introduction of reverse curves on the approaches of such scissors cross over, which is not considered good for the track layout. Thus a uniform center to center distance between the tracks of 4.76m proposed for BG will eliminate these permanent problems in the alignment, imposed by occasionally required such scissors cross overs.
(iv) Check Rails – It is stated that check rails of UIC- 33 rail section will be adopted on sharp curves to reduce wear of outer rails on curves. However, the latest design of ballastless track does not cater for provision of such checkrails on the main line.
(v) Ludhiana Metro - It is interesting to note, the reference to “LUDHIANA METRO” at para 2/43 of chapter 4 and at page 13/43 , and at many other places, reflecting, the quality of presentation of DPR adopted by “COPY PASTE” technique from other reports. . Municipal Commissioner of Pune is reminded of his high confidence in DMRC, in accepting the report without any application of mind, from his side, being ignorant on metro technology, as stated by him in our personal interview with him, and paying a very high price for such report, which probably included the “COPY PASTE” technology.
3.4.3 b) (i) Traction system – Under para 4.4 of traction system at page 14/43 reference has been made to the traffic requirements of the Pune Metro Rail having been projected in the range of 25000 PHPDT in the year 2031 by the traction expert while at table 4.1 under para 4.1 the same has been reflected to 20035 for corridor in the year 2031. This variation may also probably due to the adoption of “COPY PASTE” techniques from Ludhiana report which needs to be looked into. The typical 25KV AC category arrangement shown in fig 4.6 at page 14/43 is a photograph neither of an elevated track nor of an underground track but of a track structure of the ground level. Copied from some other report not applicable to the DPR for Pune Metro. The entire chapter 4 & 5 of the DPR gives at the bottom line the date as Feb 2009, March 2009 and also at 1st page of chapter 6. This also appears to be of victim of modern “COPY PASTE” technology.
(ii) It is seen that the project cost is based on the unit rate for power consumption assumed at a concessional rate of 2.50 to 2.75 per unit on “no profit no loss basis” to the Govt. The FIRR of 1.93 is based on these unrealistic and unaccepted figures. This should have been got confirmed from Govt. before incorporating in the report and under estimating the project cost and IRR
3.4.3 c) (i)Signalling and train control – The proposed metro system has been designed for a 3min service with initial operations at 5min service. The Mumbai suburban section of W & C Rly is being operated at 3min railway with high level safety and reliability. There is no justification therefore, to adopt an alien system and import ATP, ATS, and ATO operations even for future requirements at exorbitantly high cost. For the same operational requirements, there is NO need for paying 3 times the cost for importation of SG smaller capacity trains and imported signalling system which does not provide any specific advantage. This is a waste of money, based on the advice of overseas manufactures to export their products, at high initial and operational costs. The report does not clarify how the capacity is optimized by such imported coaches.
(ii) All these advance systems of ATP,ATC, and ATO can also be adopted on a BG system as can be seen from the provisions in the BART BG metro opened in the year 2003 with best in the world technology at San Francisco in USA. What is required to be questioned is whether such high technology at abnormally high investment is required to be provided for the level of traffic and the headway and Indian Environment, prevailing for Pune Metro Rail as assessed for a traffic level of 2031. This is being recommended by International consultants under the advice of the international manufactures to make a provision to sale their equipments at a high initial cost which will not be utilized in the next 20 yrs and will involved 70% of the parts to be replaced within a period of 16 yrs. without use.
(iii) With all the justification for a Fail Safe system of ATP, accidents have taken place in Japan, as late as in the year 2006 due to human failures, as will be seen from the photograph given below
On 25 April 2006, in Japan, a seven-car metro train derailed on a curve and smashed into a multistory apartment building.
“The derailment at the curve was allegedly caused by the 23-year-old driver’s over speed.”
(iv) Similarly the standard of signalling adopted for train depots and their operation need to be reviewed in the context of the level of traffic and the number of coaches control in such operation. The standard of signalling mentioned in table 4.2 can also be provided on a BG system but is this required for the level of traffic demand, proposed to be operated? It appears that the advice of foreign consultants / general consultant and others have been copied and inducted without application of our technical knowledge on the subject and the need for such requirements at such exorbitant cost. We have been running a high capacity heavy mass rapid transit system on the Mumbai suburban section laid on the ground as well as on an elevated corridor of the Harbour branch in the Mumbai suburban section and operated at 3min frequency with co-existence of the main line trains on the fast tracks carrying about 5000 passengers in a 9 coach train with outstanding reliability and punctuality and safety thought the year except those couple of days affected by flooding of tracks in Mumbai. When we have within the Indian railway system an operating force capable of managing such system efficiently we fail to understand why we should pay heavy price to a private sector by providing more than 25% as a viability gap subsidy who utilized this fund for payment to foreign manufactures and paying them more than 3 times price for coaches than what we are at present procuring at 1/3rd the cost through indigenous technology. Is this policy, promoted by one organization against the public interest and against the advice of Indian Railways, a rational policy promoted by the present govt. against the public interest and at heavy cost to the ex-checker.?
3.4.3 d) & e) Telecommunication / Automatic Fare Collection – The telecommunication system proposed in the report can be provided indigenously by Indian Engineers on BG coaches also and there is no need for international consultant for such systems.
3.4.3 f) Rolling stock – (i) The BG rolling stock can also be provided, based on the criteria indicated in the report. The BG rolling stock costs less and will have the added advantage of capacity and flexibility, to meet increased traffic demand, which is not available in the proposed SG rolling stock, and which reaches its limiting crush capacity in less than 25 yrs. and in view of the closed door systems and the narrow width of the coaches, 3 to 4 pushers per door will have to be engaged for peak hours of morning and evening, to push the commuters in the compartments within 20 to 30sec dwelling time at stations, without which the doors cannot be closed and the train cannot be started.
(ii) It is further seen that the width of the coach proposed for SG is 2.9m against 3.66m for BG. This further limits the passenger carrying capacity of such corridor. The design further indicates that the center to center distance of the tracks has been kept at 4m which will not allow future increase in width of the coaches, if needed to meet traffic demand. This planning is not in the interest of the Pune citizens nor the nation. All the features indicated in this paragraph can also be provided BG with wider coaches. The higher level of acceleration and deceleration are not required for such corridors having lower speed less than 100kmph and where inter station distances are around 1km. The analysis of lower cost of service has not been proved by calculations. For equivalent volume of traffic the operating cost of BG wider coaches will be much less due to reduction in train length. The capital cost of SG coaches increases almost 3 times due to imports and manufactured by overseas companies, and the depot area for such train will be much more, resulting in higher cost of land acquisition for depot as well the depot cost. I would emphasize that the life cycle cost of BG indigenous wider coaches will be much less than these imported narrow width coaches, thereby resulting in elimination of VGF subsidy and reduction in fares. The basis of indicating the “optimum” size of the coaches has not been justified by calculations for alternative adoption specially for BG coaches.
(iii) Carrying capacity and axle load for design of the corridor and system- Para 4.8.4 at page 31/43 of chapter 4 indicates that for the purpose of calculation of the maximum axle load, the system is designed for a weight of 65kg per person. In earlier reports for Mumbai, it was assumed at 60kg per person (probably this is based on the average weight of people in Ludhiana as compared to those in Mumbai),In both these cases the average weight per person has been under estimated and as per Codal standards including international standards, the weight has to be taken at 68 kg per person. (This will also be seen as exhibited in the lifts used in buildings). Based on the axle load calculations given in table 4.8 at page 33/43 under para 4.8., the axel load has been calculated at a crush capacity of 8 person per sqm of standing area, which is equivalent to 343 passengers per coach. Based on an average of 343/8 = 42.87 sqm. Designing the structural units for 8/sqm is an under estimation as during emergencies it is feasible to accommodate an over crush capacity of 10 to12 passengers / sqm. Revising this at 10 passengers / sqm (adopted for design of mechanical systems as per annexure 1 at page 40/43 of chapter 4 of the DPR) on an area of 42.87 sqm the total number of passengers for live load would be 42.87 x 10 = 428.7 say 430 passengers calculating the total live load / coach as 68 kg/ person the total weight would be 430 x 68 = 29.24 T adding to this the tare weight of 39T (which is not justified by calculations), the total load would be 39+29.24 = 68.24. This is equal to an axle load of 17.06 T under static conditions. Keeping a margin of additional load for dynamic conditions, additional forces on curves and other factors the system should be designed for at least 18T axle load for the design of the RCC corridor, which is supposed to have a life of 120yrs as per British Code BS 5400.
(iii) Specific attention is drawn at page 43/43 of chapter 4 of the DPR vide item 34 it is stated the average cost per coach exclusive of taxes and duties and Oct 2008 price level is Rs 10cr while the estimate for the project for corridor 1 and corridor 2 provides for a price of Rs 7.81cr as seen from page 4/26 of chapter 11 cost estimates at Sept 2008 prices for corridor 1 & the same rate adopted for corridor 2 as seen at page 6/26 of chapter 11
5 CHAPTER 5
CIVIL ENGINEERING
3.5.1 Geometric Design Norms – It is stated in the report that the design parameters have been worked out based on detailed evaluation, experience and internationally accepted practices. It is commented that, international practices and experience does not necessarily suite Indian conditions, environment and requirements. What is “best suited” for them, is not, necessarily, best for Pune.
3.5.2 The horizontal curves for elevated section has been limited to 120m. The same limitation can also be negotiated by BG alignment. The maximum permissible cant (Ca) of 125mm and Cant Deficiency (Cd) of 100mm, for SG, limits the speeds on curves. Higher cant and cant deficiencies are permissible on BG with resultant increase in maximum permissible speeds. This would reduce the turn round time of the train and therefore, requiring less number of coaches. A computer simulation analysis will give the realistic figures.
3.5.3 Elevated Section - The track centers for elevated section has been limited 4.0m through out the length of the corridor, this will restrict future provision of wider coaches even beyond 2.9m width. For BG wider coaches this should be 4.76m. This planning is against the future increase in capacity and is not in public interest
3.5.4 Underground Section – The location, the approach gradient, the depth of the rail level, the diameter of tunnel, has not been mentioned, in sufficient details. The justification for adoption of underground alignment in this location has not been mentioned. This portion increases the cost of the corridor exorbitantly and therefore, should have been given adequate importance for describing in details in the summery, for proper appreciation by the citizens. In the absence of the plan, to a bigger scale the exact route followed by the underground alignment is not understood. Adequate justification, bringing out the road width above and the adjoining areas occupied by the buildings, their types etc and inability to widen the road width in this stretch, to provide an elevated alignment in this portion, should have been given in the DPR.. The details of the location of the commencement and exit points of the underground section gradients, the problems of land acquisition in this area and other technical details have not been mentioned at all.
3.5.5 River Crossings – The corridor 1 alignment crosses rivers at two locations, one near Mula & Pauna confluence between Dapodi & Khadki and later Mutha river between Shivajinagar and Swargate. This means the underground alignment crosses the river below its bed. The adequacy of the depth for underground portion need to be justified. The details of bridge crossings across the Mula river in terms of length, spans etc. have not been mentioned. These details are of great importance for the construction, as well as, for the cost of the alignment. Unfortunately, the DPR does not make any mention of the same.
3.5.6 Design Speed – The maximum sections speed of 80kmph can also be adopted for BG and has been adopted on Mumbai Suburban section. It is necessary to carry out simulation studies to work out the limiting frequency of train permissible for adoption on these corridors, with such limiting grades, curves etc. of the alignment. This will bring out the limitations of the capacity of the alignment for future improvements. The rolling stock need not be designed for 95kmph. To attend a speed of 80kmph for commercial operation, the design of the rolling stock can be based on a max. speed of 90kmph. The unnecessary increase in cost to design the rolling stock for 95kmph can be eliminated.
3.5.7 Route Alignment - The alignment is underground for length of 5 kms with both Shivajinagar and Swargate station underground. The underground station have island platforms through out while elevated section have side platforms. The merits of provision of island platform for underground alignment have not been discussed. The width of platform on elevated and underground portion have not been indicated. The radius of curvatures on reverse curves with straight in between, in the graded portion from elevated to underground, have not been indicated, even though these are important aspects of safety. Similarly for UG corridor the approaches at all UG stations will have reverse curves due to change in center to center distance for island platforms. The locations of open foundations and the pile foundations and the depth of the piles assumed at various locations have not been mentioned. This is an important factor affecting cost of the project. The section/profile of viaduct structure proposed for the elevated portion has not been shown anywhere though this is an important factor in cost, safety and period of construction.
3.5.8 The index plan and section need to be furnished at a bigger scale and the location of various columns for the way structure indicating their spans, the number and size of piles and the depth of piles should be indicated. The GAD showing the bridge elevation and cross section for each bridge crossing should be shown to a bigger scale, indicating the rail level existing adjoining road level, the height of piers the level of pile caps and the depth and diameter of piles and spans proposed, including the geotechnical details based on borehole data collected and the approach curves and levels for the bridge and its distance upstream of downstream from the existing bridge across these rivers should be indicated and I presume the cost estimate have been separately evaluated for each bridge, based on the quantities so assessed and the rates adopted, should be exhibited separately.
3.5.9 The DPR does not indicate a typical plan of a station premises with elevation, and longitudinal section, with dimensions thereon. This should be shown on a bigger scale plans. It is interesting to note that no parking areas for private vehicles have been proposed due to scarcity of land along the alignment. In such a case how do you expect the road vehicle traffic be transferred to LRT. This is important function of the planning for integrating the facilities at metro stations and feeder road traffic. This needs to be incorporated.
3.5.10 Geotechnical Investigations – It is stated that 44 boreholes were drilled for geotechnical investigations up to a depth of 30m. It is seen that the location and the details of the borehole data has been incorporated in the detailed project report.
3.5.11 Utilities – It is stated that the detailed study of the underground and overhead utilities has been carried out along the alignment. It is seen that the details of these utilities indicating the type, the size, the depth and their alignments have not been shown in a detailed plan and the cost of relocating these utilities have not been taken into account in consultation with the concerned authorities and provided in the detailed report in the cost estimates of the project on a realistic basis. As this is a time consuming work, affecting the period of construction of the project, it is presumed that the detailed time schedule for relocation and their planning has been done in consultation with the concerned authorities and the concerned data received from such authorities regarding the cost and period of diversion of such utilities have not been incorporated in the detailed project report for future reference during implementation.
3.5.12 Land requirement – It is seen from table 0.5, indicating summery of permanent land requirement that the total land requirement for both corridors is 32.27Ha (Govt.) + 12.48 Ha (Pvt.) = 44.75 Ha. This equals approximately 112 acers. Out of the above, the major portion is a govt. land with 8.38 Ha, is commercial costly land with major portion falling in corridor 1.
3.5.13 It is mentioned in the DPR at page 3/97 under chapter 5 that the track centers on the elevated corridor is kept at 4.1m while in the summery the same is mentioned at 4.0m at page 9/36 of executive summery. The location of corridor 2 alignment crossing the railway track seem to be the most difficult for execution crossing large number of tracks at the stations. It is presumed that the railway authorities have been consulted to cross the alignment at this location. The location of the alignment crossing Mutha river down stream of Yerwada bridge need to be exhibited to a bigger scale to appreciate the alignment location from the at the existing bridge. The proposal of the state govt. for a road bridge planned at this location has, we presume, been taken into account.
3.5.14 It is seen from the DPR that the platform width for elevated corridor is 4.5m wide side platforms, and for the UG portion it is 10m wide with island platform (ref page 33/97 para 5.10.4 – Platforms of chapter 5) while the executive summary at page 9/36 indicates 12m wide island platform for UG section. This needs to be reconciled. The requirements of platform width staircases escalators and lifts, ticketing gates etc are required to be justified with calculations regarding the assumptions made. It is seen from para 5.10.2 of the DPR that the above facilities have been provided for the passenger forecast for the horizon year 2031, to compute the maximum design capacity with no provision for increasing in future. This means that after opening the corridor for 2014, the corridor capacity will reach the maximum limits in a period of 17 yrs with no provision for expansion. This is not the way railway corridors involving heavy initial expenditure are planned. The structural designs of the elevated corridor are planned for 120 yrs of life while the passenger amenities have been limited to 17 yrs with no feasibility for future expansions. This planning needs to be reviewed on top priority.
3.5.15 --5.11 of the “Traffic Integration of the DPR refers the corridors as Mass Rapid Transit System (MRTS) – while the classification indicated in chapter 4.1 of the DPR, planned for the year 2031 falls under the category of Light Rail Transit (LRT) which limits the capacity to 30000 PHPDT. By merely planning of platforms for running 6 coach train in place of 4 coach train in LRT the corridor doesn’t become MRTS, as the other requirements of passenger movement planning width of platforms staircases, escalators lifts etc. will also have to be made a provision for, to meet the capacity levels of 30 000 to 50000 PHPDT specified for MRTS. The entire planning needs are based on in consistencies of assumptions and standards and need to be completely reviewed at the PMC’s level and the entire DPR modified with corresponding changes in costs, FIRR, EIRR, and conclusions and recommendations .
3.5.16 Park and ride facilities – Para 5.11.2 of DPR page 34/97 on traffic integration facilities recommend the use of park and ride commuters. However, the metro system does not provide any parking places or car parking buildings due to limited availability of land and leaves it to the State Govt. to decide this issue. The planning and the financial implication of this corridor has assumed that private car owners will patronize this LRTS and analysis based on this assumptions, which is inconsistent with the planning.
3.5.17 Para 5.12 Civil structures of DPR page 34/97 – This deals with UG construction and UG stations. This does not indicate the volume of earth work taken out by the Tunnel Boring machines (TBM) and by cut and cover methods and the location at which the same will be dumped and the lead involved thereon. In the absence of the bar chart and the CPM chart for such an important project, the timing of these activities of the construction of the UG section simultaneously with other sections, have not been co related. The presentation of the planning of this project in the DPR which is going to the cabinet for approval has been done with the most unprofessional manner in spite of heavy fees charged for its preparation.
A priority works in the cut and cover method for the UG section is a diversion of UG utilities. Layout plan with quantum of work methodology for execution and time period required, has not been indicated nor a BAR chart for these activities have drawn to enable the public to appreciate the road diversion plans in these heavily crowded areas. The environmental impact of this major activity affecting the citizens of this city should have been given adequate importance in the planning of this activity of this corridor.
3.5.18 Supporting walls for cut and cover method – The report indicates the theoretical methods to be adopted for different conditions of soil. Based on the geotechnical investigation carried out, the DMRC engineers should have indicated the locations where alternative methods of support walls such as RCC diaphragm, sheet piles etc. as specified in the report at pages 36/97 &37/97, should have been shown in drawings and explained in the report to asses the realistic time schedules and performing costs for these activities of these report.
3.5.19 Para 5.12.4 Elevated section & para 5.13 Construction Methodology page 38/97 of DPR - This para describes different types of precast segmental construction and their advantages and disadvantages including construction methodology and the area of land required of about 2.5 to 3 Ha for each precast construction yard. What is more important to be indicated is which segmental method is proposed to be adopted for working out the cost of the project and the quantum of work involved, the time schedule for precasting, transportation and erection should have been worked out and reflected in a bar chart, to enable the work to be completed for this activity within the overall framework of time required for the completion of the entire project. This is essential as the volume of work, the time frame mentioned and the cost assessed in the estimate chapter would be more realistic for appreciation by the cabinet for sanctioning this project. The launching scheme paragraph does not indicate the methodology proposed, the quantum of work, the time schedule for each span and the overall project, should have been given in more details with sketches etc. The extra time required for launching of girders across the railway tracks at Pune Rly station and the safety precautions to be taken for temporary supports if any and the spans proposed at this locations and the traffic block required during launching operations due to electrified section should have been covered more in details with necessary drawings. The technical Report of the DPR appears to be superficial generalized and not specific to this project and complied with “copy paste” technology from other projects. Similarly details of spans proposed to be adopted for the various bridge crossings and have not been detailed out nor planned as specifically applicable to the bridge site.
3.5.20 Substructure and Foundations – The details and sizes and the type of foundations piles / wells proposed to be adopted for the river crossings the difficulties anticipated and the span proposed have not been detailed out nor the time and cost assessment done, to these items of the work.
3.5.21 Construction of stations para 5.16 page 46/97 of DPR – Typical station layout do not indicate the spans for the station area accept indicating the use of a single viaduct column along the alignment in the station area. A dimension plan for the station area for structural arrangement should have been given for better appreciation of the project planning in this DPR.
3.5.22 Para 5.16.3 – Road width required during construction page 47/97 of DPR – It is indicated that a width of about 9m would be barricaded during construction by either widening the roads or by introducing one way traffic. The detail planning of this area of activity has been left to the SPV by DMRC by appointment of consultant for project management and another consultant for proof checking. Simultaneously SPV will have to take action for detailed structural designs of elevated corridor, every professional consultant appointed for preparation of DPR has to base his costs on a general planning of the various structure location, widening areas required and one way traffic to be planned. The detailed cost of this planning will depend upon an overall broad planning of these sub activities by proper coordination with the counter part of the Municipal Corporation and involvement of police transport department and overall broad plan of such planning and recording minutes of discussion with the various local authorities shall form the basis of the broad planning in the right direction and the cost estimates based on such planning. In this report of DMRC such professional method of planning the corridor activities and sub activities and preparation of plan thereon and working out the cost thereof, have been missing in this report.
3.5.23 --5.17 – Geotechnical investigation page 48/97 of DPR – This report deals with the Bore Hole details their location and depth below ground level and the test carried out by the specialized agency with their recommendations has been covered. A location plan showing the chainages of these Bore Holes including locations of these Bore Holes below the river beds crossed by the alignment, should have been given for better appreciation and presentation.
3.5.24 --5.19 Utilities and service page 52/97 -This chapter is also based on “copy paste” technology from the report for “Ludhiana”. The report says that the provision has been made in the project cost estimate towards diversion of utility service line as these services would be diverted by concerned department. The basis of incorporating the project cost has not been indicated nor the split up of the cost for each of 7 departments mentioned at table 5.16 at 52/97 of the DPR, has not been indicated. It is further stated, that “the details would be furnished in the final report”. This means that the present report is not final for providing approval and sanctions by the cabinet. Such sanctions cannot be given on preliminary under estimated and unrealistic report of DMRC. PMC need to specifically look into this aspect.
3.5.25 Land for corridor para 5.20 page 54/97 The normal width of the viaduct structure of the elevated metro is 10m edge to edge wide, for reasons of safety and margins 5m width on either side is provided as a no structure zone. In special cases this width of 5m is reduced to 3.5m on either side. For Switchover Ramps approaches to UG section a width of 11m including protection works has been proposed, with the alignment gradient of 3 to 4%. The area of land required for stations and traffic integration has been made at selected locations were land is available. Details of land required of 24282 sqm for stations and traffic integration has been given in table 5.18 land for traffic integration will be paid by the State Govt.
3.5.26 The depot land of 11.51 Ha at Hill Range station has been identified for full fledged maintenance depot at corridor 1. This depot needs earth filling being a low line area. The land required for corridor 2 at Katchara Depot at Kothrud is 12.11 Ha. Making a total depot land of 23.62 Ha. All these land is a govt. land. The DPR gives under table 5.21, land requirements for running section the details of land whether Govt. of Pvt., whether residential commercial, or offices etc. have been given in extensive details at pages 60/97 to 66/97 of DPR chapter 5 for both the corridors, totaling 25319.5 sqm. It would have been better appreciated, if these figures in tables were also represented on a plan showing their locations. 4 pockets of land two on each corridor, total area of 9.5 Ha have been identified for temporary acquisition for construction. This covers private land of 9 ha for corridor 1 and only 0.5 ha for corridor 2. It is considered desirable to locate to some are in corridor 2 in the section ASI to Vanaz to reduce transportation lead and costs. The land required for property development by builders or developer has been assessed at 64435 sqm most of these land is privately owned and has been shown at table 5.23. Major part of this area is at Wadgaon Sheri and Swargate. A location plan of this land and the present price of land for development should have been indicated . Details of permanent land required for this project totaling to about 45.75 ha for both the corridors has been indicated in table 5.24 at page 69/97 of the DPR.
3.5.27 The copies of the sketches furnished from page 70/97 under chapter 5 of the DPR upto pages 97/97 are not legible, nor in sufficient details, being furnished in a smaller scale and cannot be appreciated nor commented upon.
6
CHAPTER 6
TRAIN OPERATION PLAN
3.6.1 It is seen from this chapter that the average speed for corridor 1, has been taken at 33kmph for corridor and 31kmph for corridor 2. The basis of arriving at these figures should be furnished as no reference to the basis of these figures have been indicated in the detailed report. This is an important factor as the total turn round time of the trains and the number of trains and coaches required at different frequency (headway) will be dependent on these factors. It is desirable to make a simulation analysis taking into consideration, the station locations, the stoppage time, the speed restriction on curves, gradients, and the reversal time at terminals, to arrive at these figures. The details of this simulation analysis should be provided as annexure to the detailed project report.
3.6.2 Four car & Six rakes - It is further stated in the summery report that “the possibility of running trains with composition of 4 car and 6 car trains, with different headways of 2.5min to 15min has been examined. The methodology adopted for arriving at such composition will depend upon the hourly traffic data As stated earlier the simulation analysis should be done to assess the limiting frequency at which the corridor is capable of running the trains based on the alignment and other factors. The composition of cars namely 4 car and 6 car trains for corridor 1 and corridor 2 respectively would also be during the non peak period and the adjustment is done by changing the frequency. It would be desirable to compare the traffic hourly demand in each corridor and the frequency to be adopted to ensure optimum utilization of assets for operational efficiency and operating economy. This should be given in the detailed project report to reflect a professional approach in preparation of DPR. A comparison of the above has to be made if BG wider coaches of 3.66m and SG wider coaches of 3.2m are adopted on these corridors to assess the efficiency and economy in adopting the size of the coaches and the train composition.
3.6.3 Coach composition – A 4 car train will have a capacity of 1034 passengers (sitting 186, crush standing 848) ,.and for a 6 car train 1574 passengers (sitting 286 and crush standing 1288). It is seen from the above that the ratio of standing to sitting works out to a) for 4 car train 848 / 186 = 4.55 and b) for 6 car train the ratio of standing to sitting works out to 1288 / 286 = 4.50.
3.6.4 Requirement of Coaches – Table 0.5 at page 15 of the summery indicates the requirement of coaches for different years for different headways. It is seen that the requirement of coaches for both the corridors upto the year 2031 is based on the requirement of 4 car trains at 3.5min headway for corridor 1 and 8min headway for corridor 2.
3.6.5 A comparison and economics of assessment of coaches with 3.2m wide to SG and 3.66m wide for BG should also be done to get of the techno-economic merits of the other alternatives. Similarly assessment of demand for the next 30 years should also be done to cater for future increase in capacity. For corridor 2 it may be worthwhile to assess the requirement of coaches with 3-4min headway so that the same can be better patronized by the commuters. The entire planning seems to have been aimed at providing more imported coaches at abnormally high costs to suite the overseas suppliers.
3.6.6 IT is seen that the number of coaches assessed at 88 nos for corridor 1 and 48 nos for corridor 2, is based on the requirements of the traffic demand for the year 2031 only. That is for a period 17 yrs after commissioning the corridors in 2014. This is not the correct way of assessment of the number of coaches, as the corridor has to be fit to meet the traffic demand 30 yrs at least, with provision for future improvement in PHPDT.
3.6.7 It is seen from annexure 5 at page 19/22 of chapter 5 that for corridor 2 for the year 2031, the 48 coaches have been assessed on the basis of headway of 6.5 min, while at page 9/22 of the report for corridor 2 vide item ‘c’ a headway of 8min have been mentioned. This may be reconciled. Similarly at page 10/22 vide para 6.5 of chapter 6 the number of rakes assessed for corridor 2 for the year 2031 has been shown as 10 nos instead of 12 nos and the number of coaches should 48 instead of 40 nos.
3.6.8 At page 10/22 under the heading assumptions vide item vii the total turn round time is taken as 6min at terminal stations. This will very for each corridor and will be equal to the frequency that is 3.5min for corridor 1 at each end and 8min for corridor 2.
7
CHAPTER 7
POWER REQUIREMENTS
3.7.1 The traction power at 25KV AC (single phase) is suitable and economical for mainline long distance trains. There is hardly any advantage for utilizing this traction, for a localized system like the metro rail, Such high voltage transmission entails more equipment items on the motor coach, such as, pantograph, air blast circuit breaker, step down transformers, tap changer, rectifier for DC supply etc. thereby making the motor coaches heavy and costly. When the final voltage for the traction motors is going to be DC 600V – 750V or so, it is better to use say 900V DC for traction power to be drawn from the third rail. This will render the motor coach design simpler and economical. This has been done for Kolkata Metro and is being adopted by Hyd metro. This also eliminates the need for overhead catenaries and the masts along side track, thereby saving in capital cost of the project. The merits of DC vs 25KV AC supply and its economics have not been discussed in the report.
3.7.2 Even if the traction motor drives is 3 phase AC, that power shall have to obtained through an inverter worked from the DC supply. The use of 3 Phase AC induction motors for the drive cannot therefore be any reason to opt for 25KV AC single phase supply as a traction power. The only justification for 25KV would be to provide compatibility for the existing Lonavala – Pune Suburban trains which are running under 25KV AC supply. As the project does not envisaged compatibility with the suburban section of the central railway. The Merits of adoption of 25KV as applicable to Pune, needs to be further analyzed in terms of techno economic advantages.
3.7.3 Incidentally a number of EMU formations running on Mumbai sub. System (using 1500 V DC for traction), are running on 3 phase AC drive on power supplied through IGBT inverters which has been talked about in the DPR. This formations have been supplied by ICF / Madras.
3.7.4 Rolling Stock Chapter 4.8 at page 30/43 System selection in table 4.8 (page 32/43) shows the tare weight (max.39T.) With all the above mentioned equipments on the motor coach, its tare weights, the basis of arriving at the tare weight of the coach at 39T has not been explained in the DPR. This is important as it has a relation with the axle load for which the system has been designed.
3.7.5 The acceleration is achieved by the number of motor coaches adopted in a train set and has nothing to do with Rolling Stock technology. It however increases the cost of the 4 car and 6 car units considerably.
3.7.6 The features like disc brakes or air springs were introduced in the bogie design by the western countries and Japan, for their long distance high speed trains like the ICE (inter City Express) or TEE (Trans European Express) trains which run at 160 to 200kmph. As the metro trains do not exceed 80 / 90kmph, there is no justification in providing these at exorbitantly high cost. This is probably on the advice of overseas consultants to promote international business at our cost.
3.7.7 The velocity time operation curve shown at page 33/43 of chapter 4 does not mention the length of the section. Ruff assessment indicates a length of around 1.8km. As the inter station distance of metro rail is generally at 1km or even less the scope for coasting or regenerative breaking doesn’t exist on these corridors. The DPR should have carried out a section by section exercise to identify whether the scope for regenerative is at all applicable and necessary for the metro. Regenerative breaking is generally useful for long stretches of level / falling gradients and for high speed trains.
3.7.8 Considerable advantages would be available by making the metro rolling stock similar to 100s of EMU coaches already running in the suburban areas of the country. Wheels, axles, couplers, Roller Bearings, Motors, gears, wheels and many such components are vital for effective maintenance of the rolling stock and the more of them can be made inter changeable, the greater shall be the economies of maintenance. Para 4.8.6 at page 33/43 talks about “Low Life Cycle Cost” and the most effective way of achieving it by ensuring a policy of interchangeability with existing stock and the maximum use of unit replacement maintenance policy. The large number of railway workshops can be effectively used for optimal maintenance of metro rail rolling stock.
3.7.9 Para 4.8.6 at page 33/43 of chapter 4 – also talks of “ aesthetically pleasing interior and exterior”. This apparently a useful thin end of the wedge to facilitate improving coaches at exorbitant cost. This matter is highly subjective. But we have manufactured the “Palace on Wheels” which shows the level of “aesthetically pleasing interior” which we can attend if demanded and specified. Stainless steel sheets would be at least 10 times more costly than the normal deep drawing quality mild steel sheets used by indigenous coach builders. There is no difficulty in indigenously providing stainless steel sheets coaches if demanded by the citizens at exorbitantly high prices and necessitating higher fare rates to the commuters.
3.7.10-- Air Conditioning – During peak hours with a crush capacity of 260 to 300 passengers packed with doors closed and windows sealed, on the narrow width 2.9m coaches, the space envelope may not be able to handle the removal of return air and effective addition of cooled fresh air into the coach. in summer time with out side ambient temperature as high as, 40 degree C of so, the air conditioning may posed a formidable problem. This is seen from the press reports in Hindustan Times, that the commuters a suffocated during peak hours and the air conditioning is ineffective in Delhi Metro.
3.7.11 At page 11/16 para 7.12 of chapter 7 Electric power tariff is based on in the range of Rs 2.5 to 2.75/unit propose at a concessional rate of Govt. Maharashtra on no profit no loss basis. This would be a gross under estimation of costs and the financial implications shall be based on the market rates which should be obtained from Pune Electricity Board.
3.7.12 The assessment of total traction and auxiliary power requirements of 34.2 MVA for corridor 1 and 15.9MVA for corridor 2 as indicated in annexure 7.1 &7.2 of chapter 7 at pages 12/16 and 13/16 need to be reviewed for the years beyond 2031. There is no uniformity in assessment of passenger weight in different subsystems of this report as have been assumed at 67.2kg / person in chapter 7 while 65kg in other chapters. With the existing power shortage, this demand cannot be met with .
8 CHAPTER 8
VENTILATION AND AC
3.8.1 It is added here that Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, energy saving majors, ventilation and AC systems can also be adopted on BG system with equal efficiency. Assessment of tunnel ventilation fans requirements and other allied tunnel ventilation system requirement need to be supported with detailed calculation for adequacy of provisions and to confirm to CODES and Standards. Similarly, mechanically ventilated or AC equipment assessment should be supported by calculations so that at a later stage, the costs are not exceeded. Station AC, tunnel ventilation system and space requirement for VAC systems and control and monitoring facilities can also be provided on BG systems.
9 CHAPTER 9
DEPOT MAINTENANCE
3.9.1 Two depots cum workshop have been proposed - near Hill Range station for corridor 1 and the other near Kothrud at Vanaz station (smaller in size) for corridor 2. It is indicated in the report that the depot inspection and workshop sheds are being constructed for 6 car formation and the station platforms are also being planned for 6 car formation, while the traffic demand and coach assessment has been done on the 4 car requirements till 2031. This is an in consistency in planning and investment which could be made provision for, without capital investment initially for 6 car formation. The estimate for costs do not provide details of actual provisions and gives LS costs. It is not possible to appreciate what exactly has been provided in the costing exercise.
10 CHAPTER 10
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT
3.10.1 Under the funding pattern specified in chapter 0.13 – Property Development is suggested that 500m on either side of the alignment should be developed by providing 4 FSI and demolishing the existing buildings. The social and environmental impact of the same should also be incorporated in the DPR . Environmental impact of earth excavation for tunneling and cut& cover method should be reflected.
11 CHAPTER 11
COST ESTIMATES
3.11.1 The capital cost estimates provided in the executive summery are scanty and provides LS amounts against the various items, without providing quantities and rates for assessment of detailed cost. A brief note, need be given, explaining the basis of the rates and quantities, so as to arrive at a realistic cost estimate of the project, at Sept 2008 prices. The details of the items and sub items must be shown separately for items for elevated and underground portions. The basis of P-way and ballasted and ballastless tracks indicating the types of sleepers proposed for ballasted tracks and the quantities of ballast thereof. The details regarding the provision of check rails on sharp curves need to be indicated. The station building cost should be furnished more in details separately for platform and platform covers, width of the platforms adopted both for side elevated platform and island underground platforms. The rolling stock cost should be based on the assessment of rolling stock for required for 30 yrs period (the life of such stock). Separate signalling cost for ATC, ATP and ATO should be indicated. The depot cost should be worked out in more details.
3.11.2 Under estimation of Cost - It should be realized that this is a detailed project report and the cost should be worked out in as much detail, as possible, based on general arrangement drawings for the entire corridor and quantities assessed and the unit rates provided, based on the price structure for Pune. It is seen that the cost of the head quarter office Over Heads of the SPV, interim consultant, the general consultants and the detailed designed consultant, the proof consultant and the prime consultant for PMC who would oversee the work of the general consultants and contractors, need to be separately indicated as they form a heavy element of the total costs. The cost of land and the rate assessed, including that for compensation payable, should be separately assessed and incorporated in the summery, so that adequacy of such provisions will ensure the proper final project costs. The details of imports and custom duties and taxes etc. should be separately worked out and shown in an annexure and provided for the total costs. The financial charges of insurance, bid bonds, BG, risks factors etc. which are generally provided for by contractors in their bid prices, should be assessed and provided for. The provision should also be made for price escalation and expected arbitration claims which are inevitable in such complex constructions. Interest during construction should also be provided for and shown separately on the basis of the annual cash flow. A detailed cash flow plan should be worked out to assess the overdraft necessary for the contractors and the interest thereon, so that the bid prices and estimates match reasonably. The detailed cost for rehabilitation of existing structures and commercial units should be assessed in detail instead of providing as a LS item. The details of cost of underground portion should be indicated separately to assess its impact over and above the elevated portion. As the 500m width of adjoining area of the alignment is being provided for an FSI of 4. a detailed drawing showing the layout of the alignment with structures required to be dismantled be shown and their cost implications worked out. The elevated alternative, in lieu of this underground alignment, showing existing width of road, adjoining area of development and the additional width, if any, required for widening the road to provide for an elevated alignment with additional cost of land for widening and expenses for compensation for adjoining area be worked out, so as to compare the techno-economic feasibility of alternative elevated alignment on this stretch.
3.11.3 Separate cost of operation and maintenance for period of say 30 yrs after completion, with specific reference to the staff costs for operation, the training of staff initial and regular, infrastructure for the same, energy consumption cost, replacement cost, repairs and maintenance cost and additional water requirement cost during construction & operation both and any other costs required, should be worked out to get a realistic assessment of the life cycle cost and the internal rate of return
The cost of SG has been under estimated and need s to be reviewed. The cost of BG wider coaches has also been worked out. All the working sheet of the comparative costs of BG with wider coaches, SG revised cost and the cost as worked out by DMRC is attached as annexure to this report and the summery of comparison is given below
3.11.4 SUMMERY OF COMPARATIVE COSTS OF SG & BG
DMRC Estimate – SG (As per DPR) Core Group Estimate
SG (Rev.) Core Group Estimate
BG
Cost Cost/km Cost Cost/km % Change Cost Cost/
km %change from
core group SG
Corridor I 4930 297 6186 373 24 5089 307 (-) 21 (373-307/307)
L= 16.589
Corridor II 2217 148.5 2841 190 27 2104 141 (-) 34 (190-141/141)
L=14.925
Total I+II 7147 227 9027 286 25 7193 228 (-) 25 (286-228/228)
L=31.511
DMRC cost under estimated by 25% (286-227=59/227=25)
CHAPTER 12
FINANCIAL VIABILITY AND FARE STRUCTURE AND FINANCING
3.12.1 It is seen that FIRR works out to 3.23% without taxes and 1.93 with taxes. This is further based on under estimated cost of the project & at a concessional rate of power tariff of Rs 2 to 2.5 per unit. This shows that the project is financially not remunerative and is a burden on the citizens by generating funds by heavy taxation on the citizens of Pune. The fare structure as indicated also is abnormally high compared to the one adopted for metro one Mumbai. Which is Rs 8/- for 3-8 km corridor and Rs 10/- beyond it. While the fare proposed in the year 2014-15 for 6-9 kms is Rs 14/-. Compared to the bus this is abnormally high and needs a second look, regarding the need for such construction and to find alternatives.
3.12.2 The proposal for acquiring 500m Radius land on either side of the corridor with an FSI of 4 will not be accepted by public, at it involves heavy demolition of buildings. Without actually assessing the areas with minimum inconvenience to commercial traders and residents of these areas, the planning of the corridor is incomplete and will result in agitation by the public. The Mumbai is already facing similar problems for Charkop-Bandra, Chembur-Mankhurd areas, where heavy agitation by public is being faced by MMRDA.
3.12.3 In view of the above it is felt that instead of an elevated metro rail corridor, the alternative of an elevated road based corridor, of 3 lanes in each directions, with entry exit points at major inter sections be considered as an alternative, all along this route, by provision of a double lane in each direction for a dedicated bus corridor which will enable running of express buses and can provide, in addition, one lane in each direction , for car and other vehicular traffic. This will also meet the requirements of additional road width necessary for the daily inputs of cars in the city and cannot be provided at the ground level. This will also improve the average speed of busses and provide adequate space for pedestrian to walk on the existing roads and reduce traffic density of vehicles on the existing roads underneath and later, if at all metro system is justified, the same can be provided underground as the width for the rail system is much less than that for road system, and would be more economical for underground than that for a road system. This alternative needs to be given a thought and the proposed metro rail corridor should be stopped forthwith. Alternatively as LRT is proposed, an indigenous MG Metro system may be investigated and compared with BG indigenous wider coach Metro rail analyzed.
13 CHAPTER 13
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
3.13.1 The EIRR of 18% assessed needs to be investigated in more details as the assumptions made, appear to be theoretical and the financial experts need to look into this subject.
14
CHAPTER 14
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
3.14.1The so called DPR has not been prepared in detailed to cover the standards laid down by the Ministry of Urban Development for preparation of such DPR’s and Govt. of India and need to be revised so as to work out the cost in sufficient details, based on the general arrangement drawings for various subsystems and assessment of realistic quantities and performing rates for Pune, so as to get an idea of the total final costs and its implications for generation of funds, to enable to Govt. to decide whether the project is to be taken up and recommended for construction.
3.14.2 Before the PMC & PCMC submit the report to Maharashtra State Cabinet, the citizens approval should be taken on priority and their observation should be recorded and furnished to the State Govt. for the information of the cabinet so that there is a minimum disturbance after sanction of the project.
3.14.3 The methodology of financing the project must be debated with the citizens group before forwarding to Urban Ministry.
3.14.4 The legal provisions under the present constitution regarding the jurisdiction of the state to connect two Municipal jurisdiction – PMC & PCMC by a metro rail or even by tramway needs to be approved by the law Ministry of the Center as it is not in conformity with the constitution article 366/20, article 246 VIIth schedule List –I, Indian Railways 1989 act and the Indian Tramways act. 1886.Unless proper legal cover for construction, operation and maintenance of the metro rails are enacted in advance by modification of the constitution, the same should not be taken up, as the same would be declared void under art. 254 of the constitution.
3.14.5 We are glad to note that the report at page 33 states that “metro comes under definition of railways under the railways act 1989”. The State Govt. has declared that the metro rail within one municipal jurisdiction can be enacted under the Indian Tramways act needs to be further debated under the constitutional provision.
3.14.6 Your attention is drawn to the last sentence of legal cover for Pune metro rail at page 33 “when this act is processed and enacted, it will give the required legal cover for operations and maintenance of Ludhiana metro” This indicates that the DPR is based on “copy paste” of document prepared for Ludhiana metro. This is an unfortunate part when PMC commissioner states that they have paid heavy fees in crore of Rupees to DMRC for preparation of such a report. And that they will accept their recommendations as they do NOT understand this subject
15 CHAPTER 15
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
3.15.1 From the traffic data and the financial implication furnished, it is seen that the project, as proposed, is not financially remunerative and is not justified for taking up by heavy imposition of taxes on the citizens of this city and country.
3.15.2 FOR GENERATION OF FUNDS, ADDITIONAL TAXATION ON THE CITIZENS OF PUNE ARE RECOMMENDED AS UNDER—a) Professional Tax at 1% of the salary of the employees. B) A Cess on petrol and diesel sale in the city c) Increase in FAR to 4 and its trading d) A surcharge on the property tax in the city e) A surcharge on the Motor Vehicle Tax in the city. f) An entry tax on the commercial articles entering the city. THESE WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTBLE TO PUNE CITIZENS
3.15.3 The limited capacity of 2.9m wide imported coaches (as against 3.2m wide for Mumbai metro one and for other States) on SG at exorbitant costs, with no future provision for increasing its width, and having a limited capacity life of less than 25yrs, is against the national interest.
3.15.4 If at all a rail corridor is required it must be on BG with provision for wider indigenous coaches of 3.66m wide, with the necessary technological inputs and can be constructed in less than 30% of the above cost without the need for VGF subsidy and at reduced fare structure acceptable to the citizens and would provide compatibility and connectivity with the existing rail system and will be in line with the national policy of the country on rail gauge issue. If BG is not justified on traffic demand , a MG (1m) corridor with indigenous appropriate technology with indigenously manufactured coaches by ICF, as adopted on Kolkata Metro should be explored with provision for future expansion to BG with wider coaches as the traffic increases after 30 to 50yrs. and feasibility of elevated corridor in lieu of under ground should be investigated.
3.15.5 Calculations of EIRR needs to be reviewed by experts.
3.15.6 The alternative of an elevated dedicated road alignment in lieu of elevated metro rail may be more economical and will be able to provide a dedicated elevated bus corridor and in addition cater for the provision for additional road width for heavy inputs of 4 wheelers in the city.
3.15.7 The DPR must be discussed by PMC with the core committee of senior railway experts and their views, on behalf of the citizens, must be taken into consideration, before the clearance of this project by PMC and PCMC for forwarding it to the state govt.
3.15.8 This project report is not only defective and deficient in many major aspects but is biased in favour of SG with imported coaches on the advice of international consultants and vendors and with complete disregard to the techno economic merits, resulting in heavy financial burden on the citizens of this city and is being adopted against the recommendations of the Ministry of Railways, who have the legal jurisdiction under the constitution for deciding this issue.
V K J Rane – IRSE (Retd.)
Ex-MD/IRCON
Vkjrane1930@hotmail.com
Te.(020) 2685 4132,Cell-93710 05396
Dated 28th April 2009
THE DETAILED PROJECT REPORT (DPR) (DATED 12TH MARCH 2009)
OF DMRC, ON THE PROPOSED PUNE METRO RAIL PROJECT
By
V K J Rane – IRSE (Retd.)
Ex-MD/IRCON
INTRODUCTION--The project report dated 12.03.09,(DPR) received by PMC from DMRC, comprise of a Foreword, Salient Features – of the Project, Executive Summery and 15 Chapters of the DPR, including A4 size plans without dimensions. Detailed drawings incorporating Index Plan and Section, layout of Depot, layout of Stations Bridges, Alignment with locations of columns and other details, in A2 size drawings, as prepared for Mumbai Metro and Hyd Metro, have not been received. Hence a detailed technical appreciation could not be made.
No reference has been made to the meaning of the Short Forms used at a large number of places. This should have been done at the beginning of the chapter 1 as these reports will be read and seen not only by experts within the country but also those at international levels. Generally all professional reports do cover such clarifications .
1) Comments on Foreword –
1.1 Terms of Reference of PMC -Foreword does not indicate, any reference in DPR to the terms of reference given by PMC to DMRC for undertaking the preparation of DPR of the project. Thought the foreword has been signed by MD / DMRC, he, nor his deputy seem to have, even glanced through the attached report before submission to PMC, as seen from the obvious inconsistencies, deficiencies, omissions, deletions of references to Ludhiana during copy pasting , and the general substandard quality of contents and presentation. This report is to be presented to the State cabinet for approval and sanctions and will be read by International experts & consultants . .
1.2 Alternative Studies - The Foreword does not make any reference to DPR regarding alternative studies of BG, with indigenous wider coaches or MG (LRT) with the indigenous technology, available within the country. The State Cabinet, before taking techno-economic decisions on this project, would have been, in a better position, to convince the citizens, the techno-economic merits of the project and safeguarding the public interest, for its implementation. The report is biased in favour of SG with imported coaches and adoption of technology not required for the performance stipulated in the report. Our detailed para wise comments on the justification for adopting SG with imported coaches, at exorbitant cost as given at para 4.3 of chapter 4 of the DPR, are given in our comments under that chapter.
2) COMMENTS ON SALIENT FEATURES & EXECUTIVE SUMMERY-
2.1 Details of the salient features - of this project as furnished in the DPR by DMRC is attached as annexure 1 to this report, for ready reference. It is seen from this annexure that the total length of these two corridors is 31.515 km with Corridor 1--PCMC to Swargate is 16.589 km and Corridor 2 --Vanaz to Ramvadi all elevated (14.925 kms). Corridor 1 is underground for a length of 5.019 kms with 6 UG stations, & balance 9 stations of Corridor 1 and 15 stations in corridor 2 are all elevated.
2.2 Track Connectivity - The salient features do not make a mention, that there is NO track connectivity between the two corridors and that the Corridor 2 crosses Corridor 1 over its UG section, at ASI station, necessitating physical interchange by commuters from 12 .5 m above the ground level to about 22m below the ground level. The salient features also do not indicate the number and locations of the river crossings and the under river crossing of the alignment for Mutha river and the railway track crossings a number of lines across the middle of station yard. These are important features deciding the technical feasibility, the period of construction and the cost of the project, and, therefore, should have been brought out in this para.
2.3 Traffic forecast upto 2031 - It is seen from salient features that the traffic forecast has been assessed for the two corridors for two decades only, upto the period 2031, The project has been planned to be commissioned in the year 2014, that is, the assessment has been done only for a period of 17 yrs after commissioning. This assessment should have been done for a period of at least 50 yrs or a minimum of 30 yrs that is up to 2045. This would have covered the life cycle period of the coaching stock.,
2.4 Contradictions in number of coaches - There is a contradiction in the figures given in the tables presented at Table 0.5 at page 15/36 under para 0.6 –TRAIN OPERATION PLAN of the Executive summery and at table 5 TRAIN OPERATION at page 2/4 of the Salient features. The number of coaches as per table 5 at salient features for Corridor –I for the year 2031 work out to 25 x 4 = 100, as against 88 mentioned for the same year in table 0.5 of the executive summery. Similar mistakes are seen for the year 2011. Similarly for Corridor 2 the number of coaches required for the year 2011 should be 40 (10x4) instead of 28 and for the year 2021 it should be 48 (12x4) instead of 40, and for the year 2031 it should be 80 (20x4) instead of 40. It is not clear on what basis the cost has been assessed for the Rolling Stock in the project estimates . There are many such contradictions and mistakes and the report need to be sent back to DMRC for corrections.
2.5 PERMANENT WAY—Justification given for adoption of SG for Metro systems in Pune is not convincing nor logical particularly in the context of capacity requirements, compatibility, connectivity and existing standards in the country including economy. Para wise comments on his justification, has been included in the appropriate chapter of our comments on the DPR. It is necessary to adopt the Track Structure for the Metro System, so as to provide connectivity with the existing BG system in Pune Rly Division, to enable commuters to travel without interchange from Lonavala to Hadapsar and back. SG Structure proposed involves importation of rails and Turn outs.
2.6 SYSTEM TRACTION—Techno-economic justification for adoption of a costly 25 KV AC overhead traction verses 750 V. DC system for such a low level of traffic has not been given in the report . Adoption of a 3-phase AC induction motors for the drive , is NO reason to opt 25 KV AC supply Single Phase as the power has to be obtained through an inverter worked from a DC supply. Features of Disc Brakes or Air Springs adopted are not required for slow speed trains on Metro as these are required and are of advantage for high speed trains. Telecommunication and Fare collection systems proposed can also be provided on BG systems and are locally available
2.7 ROLLING STOCK – It is seen from this chapter that the width of the imported rolling stock has been limited to 2.9m wide only, as against 3.2m wide for Delhi, Mumbai ,Hyd, Bangalore and other metros in the country. The axle load has also been limited to 16T. as against 17 tons for other metros. This affects advantages of economies of standardization.. There is NO provision for future adoption of wider Rolling Stock (Coaches) and increasing the capacity for future conversion to BG, to accommodate additional future traffic demand requirements beyond 25 yrs. This restricts the capacity permanently This should be known to the citizens and must be mentioned in the salient features so that the Cabinet members, are aware of the type of metro they would be approving, even though, it is against the benefits of future citizens. The justification for selection of the SG rolling stock at para f at page 7/36 of the executive summery is factually not correct and has not been proved with facts and figures. and not compared with indigenous rolling stock.
2.8 DEPOT – (MAINTENANCE FACILITIES) & ASI STATION -- The salient features must indicate, for the benefit of the knowledge of the cabinet Ministers, that there is NO rail connectivity between the two Corridors and hence between the two depots. And that certain maintenance facilities required for Corridor 2 have been made provision of, at Corridor 1 Depot, and carried out by transferring these coaches in dismantled conditions, in trailers by road. Similarly the need for physical interchange of passengers at ASI stations from elevated to UG and vice-a- versa, for a level difference of 35m ,and a costly station at ASI, due to non-connectivity of the two corridors, must be mentioned in the salient features itself.
2.9 SIGNALLING – Mumbai suburban section trains have been running at 3min headway, on automatic color light signalling, without the use of ATP, ATC ATO etc. The need for Pune metro with 3 .5 and 8min service upto the period of 2031 with adoption of cab signalling and continues automatic train control with ATP, imported at exorbitant costs, resulting in heavy fare structure, is neither appreciated nor necessary technically & operationally. It only helps the international vendors.
2.10 POWER SUPPLY— the source of power supply to the Metro system will be from the existing sources which are drastically inadequate tor the requirements of the city. Demand for Metro operations without augmenting the existing supply will create additional problems to the citizens.
2.11 COST ESTIMATES— The Executive summery, in the chapter of Capital Cost Estimates under Table 0.9 , . does NOT give the quantities and Unit rates against the various items of works mentioned there in, though these are mentioned and available in the DPR.
2. 12 –UNDER ESTIMATION OF COSTS-The project costs have been grossly under estimated to the extent of more than 25%.. There is NO provision for various consultants and other charges mentioned in the DPR .We have reviewed the item wise details of this estimate, based on costs of similar items for other METRO projects under execution in the country and item wise revised cost has been prepared and compared with DMRC project estimate. Similarly we have compared item wise costs of the project if BG wider indigenous coaches with Air Conditioning ,improved furnishings, and air conditioned Stations and other identical facilities, provided in our costs . A comparative statements of costs along with all details item wise have been enclosed in the chapter of costs of this report It is seen from this statements that the BG wider coaches, indigenously manufactured, with necessary inputs of technology and to equivalent standards of performance, and stations, will cost 30% lower, with NO need for VGF subsidy and reduced fare structure by 30% and NO long term dependence on overseas manufactures and without heavy Taxation on Pune citizens.
2.13 PARKING AREAS—Page 12/36 of the executive summery states that NO provision has been made for parking of vehicles at stations and that the integration facilities at stations, is left to the state GOVT and are NOT included in the cost of the project. This is an important aspect of the system for smooth and efficient operations and the cost of the same, whether borne by DMRC or PMC must be taken into account in assessing the viability.
2.14 LAND—Detailed assessment of land requirements has been done, but NO mention has been made regarding the assessment of the rates assumed and compensation payable for private lands, has been mentioned anywhere in the report.
2.15 CAPACITY OF TRAIN—
A 4 car train –1034 Passengers (sitting 186- Crush Standing-848) at 8 pass/Sq.M
A 6 car Train-1574 Passengers (sitting 286, Crush standing-1288)at 8 pass/sqM
For assessment of coaches a terminal reversal time has been taken as 6 min. This seem to be wrong as this will depend upon the frequency for which the assessment of coaches is done .This needs to be reviewed(Ref-page 15/36 of Exe. Summery)
For working out the project system cost for say 30 year life span of coaches ,the number of coaches should correspond to the system capacity provided by the corridors. These corridors are designed for a 6 coach planned capacity at max.of say 3min headway and at an ave. speed of 30 to 33 kmph speeds These corridors will need a max of 24 trains for each corridor , to match these capacities.. With 6 coach train capacity planning, we will need 24x6=144 coaches per corridor. The comparison of economics of the capacities for 2,9m wide SG coach and 3.66 m wide BG coach train systems has, therefore, to be based on these fundamental assumptions for techno-economic comparison of the two systems.
2.16 FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS – The financial indices of the project, based on revenue from FAR trading, indicate that the project FIRR is 1.93 % with central Taxes only, as against the requirement of , at least, 15% at the cost of funds at 12% minimum. FIIR is negative if the additional residual rental income accrued from property development is NOT considered. This is also based on 25% under estimated cost of the project This shows that the project is grossly unremunerative and would be a permanent burden on the citizens of Pune as well as the Maharashtra State and the Nation, for heavy taxation and subsidy. FOR GENERATION OF FUNDS, ADDITIONAL TAXATION ON THE CITIZENS OF PUNE ARE RECOMMENDED AS UNDER—a) Professional Tax at 1% of the salary of the employees. B) A Cess on petrol and diesel sale in the city c) Increase in FAR to 4 and its trading d) A surcharge on the property tax in the city e) A surcharge on the Motor Vehicle Tax in the city. f) An entry tax on the commercial articles entering the city. Hence alternatives appropriate technologies will have to be investigated for handling the Mass transportation problems of the city, including finding solutions for the daily inputs of additional 4 wheeler vehicles on the existing roads of this city.
2.17 FARE FOR COMMUTERS-- Fare structure for the year 2014-15 has been given at page 28/36 of the Exe. Summery. This varies from Rs 7 to Rs 24 for 2km to 30 km .For a lead of 12-15 km it is Rs 16 .This is very high as compared to Bus and Mumbai Metro Fares.
2.18 LEGAL ASPECT-At this page without giving detailed justification, the project has been recommended by DMRC for execution through the State SPV. Under the present constitution art, 366/20, States do NOT have legal Jurisdiction to construct even a tramway connecting two Municipal Corporations. This power vests with the Centre only, unless the constitution is changed to exclude Metro Rail from the definitions of a Railway
2.19 PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT—DPR at page 29/36 of Exe-Sum- state that 4Ha of depot land at Agricultural University will be commercially exploited to support this project. This land of 10.4435 Ha will be given an FAR of 4. for commercial exploitation, with a up front yield of Rs 600 Crs. And further supplemented with a lease rental to the fare box collections. PMC has confirmed additional FAR of 4 to DMRC. There is NO gazette notification on the subject and this is not yet discussed with the citizens affected by such action. If this is not accepted, the project viability will be grossly affected. FIRR without this revenue should be worked out to know the implications..
In addition to above earnings from sale of FAR along the corridor at Rs 5000 per SqM for 50% length (31.514km –including UG portion) for a width of 500 m on either side, and collected over 20 years has been assumed. The practical feasibility of these assumptions need to be debated
2.20 =PLANNING FOR IMPLEMENTATION— The DPR should be debated with the citizens group and approved by them before the same is forwarded to the State Govt, for consideration. The legal jurisdiction under the Constitution must be examined and steps taken before any approval to the project. There is no BAR CHART planning shown for the period of construction .in the DPR The quality of inputs and presentation of contents , including inconsistencies in the report and omissions on detailing etc are much below the standards stipulated in the Preliminary reports stipulated by the Indian Railway standards Engineering Codes for similar reports. This needs to be returned for resubmission on professional standards.
3.0 COMMENTS ON DPR
Sr No REFERENCE TO PARA OF DPR COMMENTS
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1 3.1.1--Para 1.1 Reference has been made in this chapter to Pune, as a birth place from Saint Tukaram to great freedom fighters like Tilak, Agarkar and Gokhale including the current scientist Mr. Narlikar. But a reference to the King of Deccan “Shivaji Maharaj” has been missed. He was a freedom creator and “Established Independence and Promoted Swadeshi pride”, and has, therefore, great significance, in the context of the recommendations of DMRC, for long term dependency on overseas manufactures and adoption of Videshi culture, at the cost of the citizens of this city and the country.
3.1.2 Para 1.1.2 LOCATION, --Details of maximum and minimum rainfall with its intensity and period including the temperature variations, have not been indicated, since they form an important part of the execution of railway project from considerations of working period, rail welding etc.
3.1.3 Para1.1.5 ROAD WORK-- “The following national highways passed through the district” - details have been omitted in the summery though indicated in the DPR
3.1.4 Para 1.1.6 – Suburban Rail Network - Rail Network does not make a mention of an important aspect of this rail network, that is, the suburban trains from Lonavala to Pune, running at present at 15min service to meet present traffic demand, with future increase to 5min service, after addition of coaches on the system. This suburban train would be extended, shortly, up to Daund, as the demand exists. Though existing suburban train pass though Shivajinagar, why efforts are not being made to provide connectivity to the proposed metro system, so that passengers can have a seemless travel (without physical interchange) from Lonavala to Hadapsar by adopting the Metro System to suite the existing system, for the benefit of the commuters . This can be achieved, indigenously, at economical costs and at reduced fares to the commuters. This aspect must be examined in the DPR in consultation with IR, C Rly Pune Rly division.
3.1.5 Para 1.4 – Typographical Mistake - Reference has been made in this para to PMC’s letter no 9002 dated 05.12.2009. This should have been 2008. Such typographical mistakes should have been avoided, as these reports will be read and seen at international levels.
2 CHAPTER 2
TRAFFIC DEMAND FORECAST
3.2.1 The priority alignments selected are
COR-I PCMC – Swargate Corridor for a length of 16.69 kms with 15 stations
COR-II Vanaz to Ramvadi Corridor for a length of 14.93 kms with 15 stations .
The key plan showing the above two corridors supposed to have been shown in annexure 0.1 is not enclosed. This should be done in the executive summary & DPR both.
3.2.2 – Population Forecast - The population forecast indicated in table 2.2 and 0.2 of Exe. Summ.(E.S.)is restricted for a period of 17 years from 2014 to 2031. For such a heavy investment for a rail corridor, the planning should have been extended at least for a period of 50 years if not for 30 years, with provision for expansion, which has not been done in this case.
3.2.3 . The figures for PHPDT in table 0.2 of E S indicate that we have to cater for the next 20 yrs hourly peak traffic of 18000 to 20000 for corridor 1 and 6000 to 10000 for corridor 2.
The above shows that corridor 1, can be catered for by BG wider coaches with a capacity of 450 per coach in a 4 coach train at 5min service giving 21600 PHPDT (450x4x60/5=21600) and
And for corridor 2, BG wider coaches with a 2 coach train will provide a capacity of 10800 PHPDT, at 5min frequency. (450x2x60/5=10800)
3.2.4 This shows that if BG with wider coaches (3.66m) is adopted, their will be heavy savings in the number of coaches and in depot length, in the platform length, station length, reduction in signalling cost, resulting heavy reduction in initial capital cost, with consequent improvement in IRR and reduction in VGF subsidy and reduced fares for the commuters.
3.2.5 The flow diagram for the Horizon year 2031- fig 2.2 at page 43/61 chapter 2 indicates that the traffic density along line number 4 from Bund Garden to Ramvadi is much less compared to the traffic densities on line no 5 & 6 towards Hinjewadi and towards Hadapsar. The selection of line 2 in priority II, doesn’t seem to be justified at this stage. This needs clarification and review.
3 CHAPTER 3
NEED FOR METRO
3.3.1 It is stated in the report, that the road mixed traffic carries 8000 PHPDT. This means as per table 0.2 of E S, there is no need for corridor II, which has PHPDT of 8500 by 2021 and 11000 by 2031. This can be achieved by improvement in the road sector by road mass transit, with dedicated corridors and by BART improvements. So far as corridor 1 is concerned, it would be prudent to consider, an elevated road corridor, along the proposed rail alignment, with 22m wide (3 lanes in each directions of 11m each) which will carry, the dedicated bus line of 2 lanes covering 7m in each direction and the remaining 4m for 4 wheelers, in each direction. This will reduce the congestion of road traffic on the existing ground level. So far as the pollution is concerned the latest technology allows pollution free road vehicle transportation systems. This will reduce considerably the capital investment, for metro rail and will take care of the daily inputs of road vehicles in the City, resulting in congestion on the existing roads.
3.3.2 In chapter 3 of the DPR – Need for Metro system - Comparison of the Dedicated Metro Rail corridor has been made with mixed bus corridor which is not correct. A dedicated bus corridor with comfortable, AC, 100% sitting capacity of 75 passengers per bus at a 30 sec frequency (headway) will carry a PHPDT of 75 x2x 60 x 60 / 30 = 18000 PHPDT which is much more than what is required for corridor 2 by 2031.
3.3.3 Para 3.2 at page 3/4 of Chapter 3 of the DPR – Limits the capacity of the LRT system up to 30000 PHPDT and states that “ in view of the present and projected PHPDT on the proposed corridors of Pune City a medium capacity metro system is considered adequate to meet the traffic demand” . The report does not state here, the year’s upto which, this demand will be met with and thereafter will need an additional parallel line beyond such limiting demands as stated in the earlier para. On the other hand it limits the capacity to 2.9m width coaches with no future provision for adoption of wider coaches beyond 2.9m. The basis of its statement in the earlier para that
3.3.4 “ beyond the traffic level of 80000 PHPDT, additional parallel line are normally planned”. The logic and the evidence of such a statement, needs clarification . Common prudence of not making any provision in the existing model for additional capacity beyond 25 yrs, in the planning stage itself, is NOT understood.
3.3.5 This chapter should have discussed the techno-economic merits of a BG wider coach as well as a MG indigenously manufactured narrow width coach which would not need importation. Metro systems on MG are in place in Japan and other countries.
4
CHAPTER 4
SYSTEM SELECTION
3.4.1 Para 4.1 of the DPR indicates – That the peak hour peak direction traffic (PHPDT) demand for corridor 1 – PCMC to Swargate varies between 18000 to 20000 for the years 2011 to 2031 and for corridor 2 between Vanaz to Ramvadi varies from 5800 to 11000 for the years 2011 to 2031. Further stated that the road based system optimally carry a maximum of 8000 PHPDT, This may be true for a mixed road base bus system but is not true for a dedicated road bus system, which not only improves the average speed from 20km to 40kms and more, but also permits headway of 10 to 15sec. A 2 lane dedicated uni-direction road corridor will also permit running of express busses, thereby further increasing the average speed and carrying capacity. The capacity of even one dedicated bus corridor would be 75 x 60 x 60 / 15 = 18000 PHPDT. Thus a single lane per direction for a bus elevated dedicated corridor will more than match the traffic demand of 11000 PHPDT by the year 2031 at a cost of less than Rs 30 cr/km. A double lane per direction, elevated dedicated bus corridor will more than match the requirements of 20000 PHPDT for corridor 1 proposed metro rail at a cost of less than Rs 40cr/km. (Excluding cost of busses)
3.4.2 DPR recommends a) A light rail metro system for a PHPDT in the range of 15000 to 30000 b) A medium capacity metro system for a PHPDT in the range of 30000 to 50000 and a Mass Rapid Transit Rail System for a PHPDT in the range of 50000 to 80000. DMRC is guided by standards probably laid down by the European countries or probably laid down by DMRC themselves, to justify imported limited capacity rail systems. For Indian conditions where the traffic demand is increasing in geometric proportion every year, and has no comparison with the population growth in India, as compared to those in European countries. The application of these standards to Indian conditions and environment, has absolutely no comparison with Indian Standards and environment, and, therefore, not applicable to Indian conditions and requirements. Hence the adoption of wider 3.66m coaches, indigenously manufactured at 1/3rd the cost, should be adopted for Indian conditions, which will not only be economical in initial and life cycle costs but will permit adoption of this elevated corridors to be economically and effectively used for more than 100 yrs without the need for laying another parallel corridor on SG on a new road to be identified for achieving equal objectives. The additional investment required for such parallel corridor needs to be taken into consideration in the techno-economic analysis for such alternatives. Unfortunately DMRC has not compared in his report, the realistic on the ground situation of indigenously manufactured wider coaches with that for imported narrow width coaches, while justifying the case for the choice of gauge.
3.4.3 a) Permanent way
(i) Choice of gauge – SG is being justified for its world wide adoption. What is good for European standards of population is not suitable for Indian standards, where the two are not comparable. The national gauge in the country exist since 1853 from its initial introduction of a railway system, from compatibility, connectivity and for economy in its expansion, construction and operation and maintenance and the available expertise within the country. There is no wisdom, nor techno-economic merits, in adoption SG for Indian Metro Systems. The justification given by DMRC, is neither valid, nor is, in the interest of the nation. Item wise comments on the justification given in the DPR for adoption of SG under the heading of Choice of gauge vide para 4.3.1, is explained below.
(ii) Track Structure – The Track structure proposed for the metro involves importation of points and crossings and head harden rails. Our existing track structure adopted on Mumbai suburban section with elastic fastenings, ballastless track and continuous welded rails, adopted on the Indian Railway systems is equally efficient and economical for adoption on the BG system. For track structure in depot, adoption of track with ballast, Indian Prestressed BG sleepers can be economically adopted in lieu of SG PRC sleepers, which will have to be imported at heavy costs, in addition to payment of royalty for design and drawings, or adoption of alternative costly systems, with imported technology. All the requirements laid down for safety, reliability etc. are available in existing BG track structure indigenously manufactured and fits well into the standards required. The requirements of maintainability of track and riding comfort are available indigenously in the design of ballastless track.
(iii) Turnouts – Adoption of SG involves importation of turnouts of different angles from those adopted on BG indigenously manufactured and adopted on Indian suburban section as well as on high speed lines. There is no need for importation of such turnouts at abnormally high costs for the benefit of the International suppliers. Introduction of scissors cross – overs on main lines, 1 in 9 type – imported, necessitating adoption of 4.5m track centers at stations approaches, as against 4m along the length, will involve introduction of reverse curves on the approaches of such scissors cross over, which is not considered good for the track layout. Thus a uniform center to center distance between the tracks of 4.76m proposed for BG will eliminate these permanent problems in the alignment, imposed by occasionally required such scissors cross overs.
(iv) Check Rails – It is stated that check rails of UIC- 33 rail section will be adopted on sharp curves to reduce wear of outer rails on curves. However, the latest design of ballastless track does not cater for provision of such checkrails on the main line.
(v) Ludhiana Metro - It is interesting to note, the reference to “LUDHIANA METRO” at para 2/43 of chapter 4 and at page 13/43 , and at many other places, reflecting, the quality of presentation of DPR adopted by “COPY PASTE” technique from other reports. . Municipal Commissioner of Pune is reminded of his high confidence in DMRC, in accepting the report without any application of mind, from his side, being ignorant on metro technology, as stated by him in our personal interview with him, and paying a very high price for such report, which probably included the “COPY PASTE” technology.
3.4.3 b) (i) Traction system – Under para 4.4 of traction system at page 14/43 reference has been made to the traffic requirements of the Pune Metro Rail having been projected in the range of 25000 PHPDT in the year 2031 by the traction expert while at table 4.1 under para 4.1 the same has been reflected to 20035 for corridor in the year 2031. This variation may also probably due to the adoption of “COPY PASTE” techniques from Ludhiana report which needs to be looked into. The typical 25KV AC category arrangement shown in fig 4.6 at page 14/43 is a photograph neither of an elevated track nor of an underground track but of a track structure of the ground level. Copied from some other report not applicable to the DPR for Pune Metro. The entire chapter 4 & 5 of the DPR gives at the bottom line the date as Feb 2009, March 2009 and also at 1st page of chapter 6. This also appears to be of victim of modern “COPY PASTE” technology.
(ii) It is seen that the project cost is based on the unit rate for power consumption assumed at a concessional rate of 2.50 to 2.75 per unit on “no profit no loss basis” to the Govt. The FIRR of 1.93 is based on these unrealistic and unaccepted figures. This should have been got confirmed from Govt. before incorporating in the report and under estimating the project cost and IRR
3.4.3 c) (i)Signalling and train control – The proposed metro system has been designed for a 3min service with initial operations at 5min service. The Mumbai suburban section of W & C Rly is being operated at 3min railway with high level safety and reliability. There is no justification therefore, to adopt an alien system and import ATP, ATS, and ATO operations even for future requirements at exorbitantly high cost. For the same operational requirements, there is NO need for paying 3 times the cost for importation of SG smaller capacity trains and imported signalling system which does not provide any specific advantage. This is a waste of money, based on the advice of overseas manufactures to export their products, at high initial and operational costs. The report does not clarify how the capacity is optimized by such imported coaches.
(ii) All these advance systems of ATP,ATC, and ATO can also be adopted on a BG system as can be seen from the provisions in the BART BG metro opened in the year 2003 with best in the world technology at San Francisco in USA. What is required to be questioned is whether such high technology at abnormally high investment is required to be provided for the level of traffic and the headway and Indian Environment, prevailing for Pune Metro Rail as assessed for a traffic level of 2031. This is being recommended by International consultants under the advice of the international manufactures to make a provision to sale their equipments at a high initial cost which will not be utilized in the next 20 yrs and will involved 70% of the parts to be replaced within a period of 16 yrs. without use.
(iii) With all the justification for a Fail Safe system of ATP, accidents have taken place in Japan, as late as in the year 2006 due to human failures, as will be seen from the photograph given below
On 25 April 2006, in Japan, a seven-car metro train derailed on a curve and smashed into a multistory apartment building.
“The derailment at the curve was allegedly caused by the 23-year-old driver’s over speed.”
(iv) Similarly the standard of signalling adopted for train depots and their operation need to be reviewed in the context of the level of traffic and the number of coaches control in such operation. The standard of signalling mentioned in table 4.2 can also be provided on a BG system but is this required for the level of traffic demand, proposed to be operated? It appears that the advice of foreign consultants / general consultant and others have been copied and inducted without application of our technical knowledge on the subject and the need for such requirements at such exorbitant cost. We have been running a high capacity heavy mass rapid transit system on the Mumbai suburban section laid on the ground as well as on an elevated corridor of the Harbour branch in the Mumbai suburban section and operated at 3min frequency with co-existence of the main line trains on the fast tracks carrying about 5000 passengers in a 9 coach train with outstanding reliability and punctuality and safety thought the year except those couple of days affected by flooding of tracks in Mumbai. When we have within the Indian railway system an operating force capable of managing such system efficiently we fail to understand why we should pay heavy price to a private sector by providing more than 25% as a viability gap subsidy who utilized this fund for payment to foreign manufactures and paying them more than 3 times price for coaches than what we are at present procuring at 1/3rd the cost through indigenous technology. Is this policy, promoted by one organization against the public interest and against the advice of Indian Railways, a rational policy promoted by the present govt. against the public interest and at heavy cost to the ex-checker.?
3.4.3 d) & e) Telecommunication / Automatic Fare Collection – The telecommunication system proposed in the report can be provided indigenously by Indian Engineers on BG coaches also and there is no need for international consultant for such systems.
3.4.3 f) Rolling stock – (i) The BG rolling stock can also be provided, based on the criteria indicated in the report. The BG rolling stock costs less and will have the added advantage of capacity and flexibility, to meet increased traffic demand, which is not available in the proposed SG rolling stock, and which reaches its limiting crush capacity in less than 25 yrs. and in view of the closed door systems and the narrow width of the coaches, 3 to 4 pushers per door will have to be engaged for peak hours of morning and evening, to push the commuters in the compartments within 20 to 30sec dwelling time at stations, without which the doors cannot be closed and the train cannot be started.
(ii) It is further seen that the width of the coach proposed for SG is 2.9m against 3.66m for BG. This further limits the passenger carrying capacity of such corridor. The design further indicates that the center to center distance of the tracks has been kept at 4m which will not allow future increase in width of the coaches, if needed to meet traffic demand. This planning is not in the interest of the Pune citizens nor the nation. All the features indicated in this paragraph can also be provided BG with wider coaches. The higher level of acceleration and deceleration are not required for such corridors having lower speed less than 100kmph and where inter station distances are around 1km. The analysis of lower cost of service has not been proved by calculations. For equivalent volume of traffic the operating cost of BG wider coaches will be much less due to reduction in train length. The capital cost of SG coaches increases almost 3 times due to imports and manufactured by overseas companies, and the depot area for such train will be much more, resulting in higher cost of land acquisition for depot as well the depot cost. I would emphasize that the life cycle cost of BG indigenous wider coaches will be much less than these imported narrow width coaches, thereby resulting in elimination of VGF subsidy and reduction in fares. The basis of indicating the “optimum” size of the coaches has not been justified by calculations for alternative adoption specially for BG coaches.
(iii) Carrying capacity and axle load for design of the corridor and system- Para 4.8.4 at page 31/43 of chapter 4 indicates that for the purpose of calculation of the maximum axle load, the system is designed for a weight of 65kg per person. In earlier reports for Mumbai, it was assumed at 60kg per person (probably this is based on the average weight of people in Ludhiana as compared to those in Mumbai),In both these cases the average weight per person has been under estimated and as per Codal standards including international standards, the weight has to be taken at 68 kg per person. (This will also be seen as exhibited in the lifts used in buildings). Based on the axle load calculations given in table 4.8 at page 33/43 under para 4.8., the axel load has been calculated at a crush capacity of 8 person per sqm of standing area, which is equivalent to 343 passengers per coach. Based on an average of 343/8 = 42.87 sqm. Designing the structural units for 8/sqm is an under estimation as during emergencies it is feasible to accommodate an over crush capacity of 10 to12 passengers / sqm. Revising this at 10 passengers / sqm (adopted for design of mechanical systems as per annexure 1 at page 40/43 of chapter 4 of the DPR) on an area of 42.87 sqm the total number of passengers for live load would be 42.87 x 10 = 428.7 say 430 passengers calculating the total live load / coach as 68 kg/ person the total weight would be 430 x 68 = 29.24 T adding to this the tare weight of 39T (which is not justified by calculations), the total load would be 39+29.24 = 68.24. This is equal to an axle load of 17.06 T under static conditions. Keeping a margin of additional load for dynamic conditions, additional forces on curves and other factors the system should be designed for at least 18T axle load for the design of the RCC corridor, which is supposed to have a life of 120yrs as per British Code BS 5400.
(iii) Specific attention is drawn at page 43/43 of chapter 4 of the DPR vide item 34 it is stated the average cost per coach exclusive of taxes and duties and Oct 2008 price level is Rs 10cr while the estimate for the project for corridor 1 and corridor 2 provides for a price of Rs 7.81cr as seen from page 4/26 of chapter 11 cost estimates at Sept 2008 prices for corridor 1 & the same rate adopted for corridor 2 as seen at page 6/26 of chapter 11
5 CHAPTER 5
CIVIL ENGINEERING
3.5.1 Geometric Design Norms – It is stated in the report that the design parameters have been worked out based on detailed evaluation, experience and internationally accepted practices. It is commented that, international practices and experience does not necessarily suite Indian conditions, environment and requirements. What is “best suited” for them, is not, necessarily, best for Pune.
3.5.2 The horizontal curves for elevated section has been limited to 120m. The same limitation can also be negotiated by BG alignment. The maximum permissible cant (Ca) of 125mm and Cant Deficiency (Cd) of 100mm, for SG, limits the speeds on curves. Higher cant and cant deficiencies are permissible on BG with resultant increase in maximum permissible speeds. This would reduce the turn round time of the train and therefore, requiring less number of coaches. A computer simulation analysis will give the realistic figures.
3.5.3 Elevated Section - The track centers for elevated section has been limited 4.0m through out the length of the corridor, this will restrict future provision of wider coaches even beyond 2.9m width. For BG wider coaches this should be 4.76m. This planning is against the future increase in capacity and is not in public interest
3.5.4 Underground Section – The location, the approach gradient, the depth of the rail level, the diameter of tunnel, has not been mentioned, in sufficient details. The justification for adoption of underground alignment in this location has not been mentioned. This portion increases the cost of the corridor exorbitantly and therefore, should have been given adequate importance for describing in details in the summery, for proper appreciation by the citizens. In the absence of the plan, to a bigger scale the exact route followed by the underground alignment is not understood. Adequate justification, bringing out the road width above and the adjoining areas occupied by the buildings, their types etc and inability to widen the road width in this stretch, to provide an elevated alignment in this portion, should have been given in the DPR.. The details of the location of the commencement and exit points of the underground section gradients, the problems of land acquisition in this area and other technical details have not been mentioned at all.
3.5.5 River Crossings – The corridor 1 alignment crosses rivers at two locations, one near Mula & Pauna confluence between Dapodi & Khadki and later Mutha river between Shivajinagar and Swargate. This means the underground alignment crosses the river below its bed. The adequacy of the depth for underground portion need to be justified. The details of bridge crossings across the Mula river in terms of length, spans etc. have not been mentioned. These details are of great importance for the construction, as well as, for the cost of the alignment. Unfortunately, the DPR does not make any mention of the same.
3.5.6 Design Speed – The maximum sections speed of 80kmph can also be adopted for BG and has been adopted on Mumbai Suburban section. It is necessary to carry out simulation studies to work out the limiting frequency of train permissible for adoption on these corridors, with such limiting grades, curves etc. of the alignment. This will bring out the limitations of the capacity of the alignment for future improvements. The rolling stock need not be designed for 95kmph. To attend a speed of 80kmph for commercial operation, the design of the rolling stock can be based on a max. speed of 90kmph. The unnecessary increase in cost to design the rolling stock for 95kmph can be eliminated.
3.5.7 Route Alignment - The alignment is underground for length of 5 kms with both Shivajinagar and Swargate station underground. The underground station have island platforms through out while elevated section have side platforms. The merits of provision of island platform for underground alignment have not been discussed. The width of platform on elevated and underground portion have not been indicated. The radius of curvatures on reverse curves with straight in between, in the graded portion from elevated to underground, have not been indicated, even though these are important aspects of safety. Similarly for UG corridor the approaches at all UG stations will have reverse curves due to change in center to center distance for island platforms. The locations of open foundations and the pile foundations and the depth of the piles assumed at various locations have not been mentioned. This is an important factor affecting cost of the project. The section/profile of viaduct structure proposed for the elevated portion has not been shown anywhere though this is an important factor in cost, safety and period of construction.
3.5.8 The index plan and section need to be furnished at a bigger scale and the location of various columns for the way structure indicating their spans, the number and size of piles and the depth of piles should be indicated. The GAD showing the bridge elevation and cross section for each bridge crossing should be shown to a bigger scale, indicating the rail level existing adjoining road level, the height of piers the level of pile caps and the depth and diameter of piles and spans proposed, including the geotechnical details based on borehole data collected and the approach curves and levels for the bridge and its distance upstream of downstream from the existing bridge across these rivers should be indicated and I presume the cost estimate have been separately evaluated for each bridge, based on the quantities so assessed and the rates adopted, should be exhibited separately.
3.5.9 The DPR does not indicate a typical plan of a station premises with elevation, and longitudinal section, with dimensions thereon. This should be shown on a bigger scale plans. It is interesting to note that no parking areas for private vehicles have been proposed due to scarcity of land along the alignment. In such a case how do you expect the road vehicle traffic be transferred to LRT. This is important function of the planning for integrating the facilities at metro stations and feeder road traffic. This needs to be incorporated.
3.5.10 Geotechnical Investigations – It is stated that 44 boreholes were drilled for geotechnical investigations up to a depth of 30m. It is seen that the location and the details of the borehole data has been incorporated in the detailed project report.
3.5.11 Utilities – It is stated that the detailed study of the underground and overhead utilities has been carried out along the alignment. It is seen that the details of these utilities indicating the type, the size, the depth and their alignments have not been shown in a detailed plan and the cost of relocating these utilities have not been taken into account in consultation with the concerned authorities and provided in the detailed report in the cost estimates of the project on a realistic basis. As this is a time consuming work, affecting the period of construction of the project, it is presumed that the detailed time schedule for relocation and their planning has been done in consultation with the concerned authorities and the concerned data received from such authorities regarding the cost and period of diversion of such utilities have not been incorporated in the detailed project report for future reference during implementation.
3.5.12 Land requirement – It is seen from table 0.5, indicating summery of permanent land requirement that the total land requirement for both corridors is 32.27Ha (Govt.) + 12.48 Ha (Pvt.) = 44.75 Ha. This equals approximately 112 acers. Out of the above, the major portion is a govt. land with 8.38 Ha, is commercial costly land with major portion falling in corridor 1.
3.5.13 It is mentioned in the DPR at page 3/97 under chapter 5 that the track centers on the elevated corridor is kept at 4.1m while in the summery the same is mentioned at 4.0m at page 9/36 of executive summery. The location of corridor 2 alignment crossing the railway track seem to be the most difficult for execution crossing large number of tracks at the stations. It is presumed that the railway authorities have been consulted to cross the alignment at this location. The location of the alignment crossing Mutha river down stream of Yerwada bridge need to be exhibited to a bigger scale to appreciate the alignment location from the at the existing bridge. The proposal of the state govt. for a road bridge planned at this location has, we presume, been taken into account.
3.5.14 It is seen from the DPR that the platform width for elevated corridor is 4.5m wide side platforms, and for the UG portion it is 10m wide with island platform (ref page 33/97 para 5.10.4 – Platforms of chapter 5) while the executive summary at page 9/36 indicates 12m wide island platform for UG section. This needs to be reconciled. The requirements of platform width staircases escalators and lifts, ticketing gates etc are required to be justified with calculations regarding the assumptions made. It is seen from para 5.10.2 of the DPR that the above facilities have been provided for the passenger forecast for the horizon year 2031, to compute the maximum design capacity with no provision for increasing in future. This means that after opening the corridor for 2014, the corridor capacity will reach the maximum limits in a period of 17 yrs with no provision for expansion. This is not the way railway corridors involving heavy initial expenditure are planned. The structural designs of the elevated corridor are planned for 120 yrs of life while the passenger amenities have been limited to 17 yrs with no feasibility for future expansions. This planning needs to be reviewed on top priority.
3.5.15 --5.11 of the “Traffic Integration of the DPR refers the corridors as Mass Rapid Transit System (MRTS) – while the classification indicated in chapter 4.1 of the DPR, planned for the year 2031 falls under the category of Light Rail Transit (LRT) which limits the capacity to 30000 PHPDT. By merely planning of platforms for running 6 coach train in place of 4 coach train in LRT the corridor doesn’t become MRTS, as the other requirements of passenger movement planning width of platforms staircases, escalators lifts etc. will also have to be made a provision for, to meet the capacity levels of 30 000 to 50000 PHPDT specified for MRTS. The entire planning needs are based on in consistencies of assumptions and standards and need to be completely reviewed at the PMC’s level and the entire DPR modified with corresponding changes in costs, FIRR, EIRR, and conclusions and recommendations .
3.5.16 Park and ride facilities – Para 5.11.2 of DPR page 34/97 on traffic integration facilities recommend the use of park and ride commuters. However, the metro system does not provide any parking places or car parking buildings due to limited availability of land and leaves it to the State Govt. to decide this issue. The planning and the financial implication of this corridor has assumed that private car owners will patronize this LRTS and analysis based on this assumptions, which is inconsistent with the planning.
3.5.17 Para 5.12 Civil structures of DPR page 34/97 – This deals with UG construction and UG stations. This does not indicate the volume of earth work taken out by the Tunnel Boring machines (TBM) and by cut and cover methods and the location at which the same will be dumped and the lead involved thereon. In the absence of the bar chart and the CPM chart for such an important project, the timing of these activities of the construction of the UG section simultaneously with other sections, have not been co related. The presentation of the planning of this project in the DPR which is going to the cabinet for approval has been done with the most unprofessional manner in spite of heavy fees charged for its preparation.
A priority works in the cut and cover method for the UG section is a diversion of UG utilities. Layout plan with quantum of work methodology for execution and time period required, has not been indicated nor a BAR chart for these activities have drawn to enable the public to appreciate the road diversion plans in these heavily crowded areas. The environmental impact of this major activity affecting the citizens of this city should have been given adequate importance in the planning of this activity of this corridor.
3.5.18 Supporting walls for cut and cover method – The report indicates the theoretical methods to be adopted for different conditions of soil. Based on the geotechnical investigation carried out, the DMRC engineers should have indicated the locations where alternative methods of support walls such as RCC diaphragm, sheet piles etc. as specified in the report at pages 36/97 &37/97, should have been shown in drawings and explained in the report to asses the realistic time schedules and performing costs for these activities of these report.
3.5.19 Para 5.12.4 Elevated section & para 5.13 Construction Methodology page 38/97 of DPR - This para describes different types of precast segmental construction and their advantages and disadvantages including construction methodology and the area of land required of about 2.5 to 3 Ha for each precast construction yard. What is more important to be indicated is which segmental method is proposed to be adopted for working out the cost of the project and the quantum of work involved, the time schedule for precasting, transportation and erection should have been worked out and reflected in a bar chart, to enable the work to be completed for this activity within the overall framework of time required for the completion of the entire project. This is essential as the volume of work, the time frame mentioned and the cost assessed in the estimate chapter would be more realistic for appreciation by the cabinet for sanctioning this project. The launching scheme paragraph does not indicate the methodology proposed, the quantum of work, the time schedule for each span and the overall project, should have been given in more details with sketches etc. The extra time required for launching of girders across the railway tracks at Pune Rly station and the safety precautions to be taken for temporary supports if any and the spans proposed at this locations and the traffic block required during launching operations due to electrified section should have been covered more in details with necessary drawings. The technical Report of the DPR appears to be superficial generalized and not specific to this project and complied with “copy paste” technology from other projects. Similarly details of spans proposed to be adopted for the various bridge crossings and have not been detailed out nor planned as specifically applicable to the bridge site.
3.5.20 Substructure and Foundations – The details and sizes and the type of foundations piles / wells proposed to be adopted for the river crossings the difficulties anticipated and the span proposed have not been detailed out nor the time and cost assessment done, to these items of the work.
3.5.21 Construction of stations para 5.16 page 46/97 of DPR – Typical station layout do not indicate the spans for the station area accept indicating the use of a single viaduct column along the alignment in the station area. A dimension plan for the station area for structural arrangement should have been given for better appreciation of the project planning in this DPR.
3.5.22 Para 5.16.3 – Road width required during construction page 47/97 of DPR – It is indicated that a width of about 9m would be barricaded during construction by either widening the roads or by introducing one way traffic. The detail planning of this area of activity has been left to the SPV by DMRC by appointment of consultant for project management and another consultant for proof checking. Simultaneously SPV will have to take action for detailed structural designs of elevated corridor, every professional consultant appointed for preparation of DPR has to base his costs on a general planning of the various structure location, widening areas required and one way traffic to be planned. The detailed cost of this planning will depend upon an overall broad planning of these sub activities by proper coordination with the counter part of the Municipal Corporation and involvement of police transport department and overall broad plan of such planning and recording minutes of discussion with the various local authorities shall form the basis of the broad planning in the right direction and the cost estimates based on such planning. In this report of DMRC such professional method of planning the corridor activities and sub activities and preparation of plan thereon and working out the cost thereof, have been missing in this report.
3.5.23 --5.17 – Geotechnical investigation page 48/97 of DPR – This report deals with the Bore Hole details their location and depth below ground level and the test carried out by the specialized agency with their recommendations has been covered. A location plan showing the chainages of these Bore Holes including locations of these Bore Holes below the river beds crossed by the alignment, should have been given for better appreciation and presentation.
3.5.24 --5.19 Utilities and service page 52/97 -This chapter is also based on “copy paste” technology from the report for “Ludhiana”. The report says that the provision has been made in the project cost estimate towards diversion of utility service line as these services would be diverted by concerned department. The basis of incorporating the project cost has not been indicated nor the split up of the cost for each of 7 departments mentioned at table 5.16 at 52/97 of the DPR, has not been indicated. It is further stated, that “the details would be furnished in the final report”. This means that the present report is not final for providing approval and sanctions by the cabinet. Such sanctions cannot be given on preliminary under estimated and unrealistic report of DMRC. PMC need to specifically look into this aspect.
3.5.25 Land for corridor para 5.20 page 54/97 The normal width of the viaduct structure of the elevated metro is 10m edge to edge wide, for reasons of safety and margins 5m width on either side is provided as a no structure zone. In special cases this width of 5m is reduced to 3.5m on either side. For Switchover Ramps approaches to UG section a width of 11m including protection works has been proposed, with the alignment gradient of 3 to 4%. The area of land required for stations and traffic integration has been made at selected locations were land is available. Details of land required of 24282 sqm for stations and traffic integration has been given in table 5.18 land for traffic integration will be paid by the State Govt.
3.5.26 The depot land of 11.51 Ha at Hill Range station has been identified for full fledged maintenance depot at corridor 1. This depot needs earth filling being a low line area. The land required for corridor 2 at Katchara Depot at Kothrud is 12.11 Ha. Making a total depot land of 23.62 Ha. All these land is a govt. land. The DPR gives under table 5.21, land requirements for running section the details of land whether Govt. of Pvt., whether residential commercial, or offices etc. have been given in extensive details at pages 60/97 to 66/97 of DPR chapter 5 for both the corridors, totaling 25319.5 sqm. It would have been better appreciated, if these figures in tables were also represented on a plan showing their locations. 4 pockets of land two on each corridor, total area of 9.5 Ha have been identified for temporary acquisition for construction. This covers private land of 9 ha for corridor 1 and only 0.5 ha for corridor 2. It is considered desirable to locate to some are in corridor 2 in the section ASI to Vanaz to reduce transportation lead and costs. The land required for property development by builders or developer has been assessed at 64435 sqm most of these land is privately owned and has been shown at table 5.23. Major part of this area is at Wadgaon Sheri and Swargate. A location plan of this land and the present price of land for development should have been indicated . Details of permanent land required for this project totaling to about 45.75 ha for both the corridors has been indicated in table 5.24 at page 69/97 of the DPR.
3.5.27 The copies of the sketches furnished from page 70/97 under chapter 5 of the DPR upto pages 97/97 are not legible, nor in sufficient details, being furnished in a smaller scale and cannot be appreciated nor commented upon.
6
CHAPTER 6
TRAIN OPERATION PLAN
3.6.1 It is seen from this chapter that the average speed for corridor 1, has been taken at 33kmph for corridor and 31kmph for corridor 2. The basis of arriving at these figures should be furnished as no reference to the basis of these figures have been indicated in the detailed report. This is an important factor as the total turn round time of the trains and the number of trains and coaches required at different frequency (headway) will be dependent on these factors. It is desirable to make a simulation analysis taking into consideration, the station locations, the stoppage time, the speed restriction on curves, gradients, and the reversal time at terminals, to arrive at these figures. The details of this simulation analysis should be provided as annexure to the detailed project report.
3.6.2 Four car & Six rakes - It is further stated in the summery report that “the possibility of running trains with composition of 4 car and 6 car trains, with different headways of 2.5min to 15min has been examined. The methodology adopted for arriving at such composition will depend upon the hourly traffic data As stated earlier the simulation analysis should be done to assess the limiting frequency at which the corridor is capable of running the trains based on the alignment and other factors. The composition of cars namely 4 car and 6 car trains for corridor 1 and corridor 2 respectively would also be during the non peak period and the adjustment is done by changing the frequency. It would be desirable to compare the traffic hourly demand in each corridor and the frequency to be adopted to ensure optimum utilization of assets for operational efficiency and operating economy. This should be given in the detailed project report to reflect a professional approach in preparation of DPR. A comparison of the above has to be made if BG wider coaches of 3.66m and SG wider coaches of 3.2m are adopted on these corridors to assess the efficiency and economy in adopting the size of the coaches and the train composition.
3.6.3 Coach composition – A 4 car train will have a capacity of 1034 passengers (sitting 186, crush standing 848) ,.and for a 6 car train 1574 passengers (sitting 286 and crush standing 1288). It is seen from the above that the ratio of standing to sitting works out to a) for 4 car train 848 / 186 = 4.55 and b) for 6 car train the ratio of standing to sitting works out to 1288 / 286 = 4.50.
3.6.4 Requirement of Coaches – Table 0.5 at page 15 of the summery indicates the requirement of coaches for different years for different headways. It is seen that the requirement of coaches for both the corridors upto the year 2031 is based on the requirement of 4 car trains at 3.5min headway for corridor 1 and 8min headway for corridor 2.
3.6.5 A comparison and economics of assessment of coaches with 3.2m wide to SG and 3.66m wide for BG should also be done to get of the techno-economic merits of the other alternatives. Similarly assessment of demand for the next 30 years should also be done to cater for future increase in capacity. For corridor 2 it may be worthwhile to assess the requirement of coaches with 3-4min headway so that the same can be better patronized by the commuters. The entire planning seems to have been aimed at providing more imported coaches at abnormally high costs to suite the overseas suppliers.
3.6.6 IT is seen that the number of coaches assessed at 88 nos for corridor 1 and 48 nos for corridor 2, is based on the requirements of the traffic demand for the year 2031 only. That is for a period 17 yrs after commissioning the corridors in 2014. This is not the correct way of assessment of the number of coaches, as the corridor has to be fit to meet the traffic demand 30 yrs at least, with provision for future improvement in PHPDT.
3.6.7 It is seen from annexure 5 at page 19/22 of chapter 5 that for corridor 2 for the year 2031, the 48 coaches have been assessed on the basis of headway of 6.5 min, while at page 9/22 of the report for corridor 2 vide item ‘c’ a headway of 8min have been mentioned. This may be reconciled. Similarly at page 10/22 vide para 6.5 of chapter 6 the number of rakes assessed for corridor 2 for the year 2031 has been shown as 10 nos instead of 12 nos and the number of coaches should 48 instead of 40 nos.
3.6.8 At page 10/22 under the heading assumptions vide item vii the total turn round time is taken as 6min at terminal stations. This will very for each corridor and will be equal to the frequency that is 3.5min for corridor 1 at each end and 8min for corridor 2.
7
CHAPTER 7
POWER REQUIREMENTS
3.7.1 The traction power at 25KV AC (single phase) is suitable and economical for mainline long distance trains. There is hardly any advantage for utilizing this traction, for a localized system like the metro rail, Such high voltage transmission entails more equipment items on the motor coach, such as, pantograph, air blast circuit breaker, step down transformers, tap changer, rectifier for DC supply etc. thereby making the motor coaches heavy and costly. When the final voltage for the traction motors is going to be DC 600V – 750V or so, it is better to use say 900V DC for traction power to be drawn from the third rail. This will render the motor coach design simpler and economical. This has been done for Kolkata Metro and is being adopted by Hyd metro. This also eliminates the need for overhead catenaries and the masts along side track, thereby saving in capital cost of the project. The merits of DC vs 25KV AC supply and its economics have not been discussed in the report.
3.7.2 Even if the traction motor drives is 3 phase AC, that power shall have to obtained through an inverter worked from the DC supply. The use of 3 Phase AC induction motors for the drive cannot therefore be any reason to opt for 25KV AC single phase supply as a traction power. The only justification for 25KV would be to provide compatibility for the existing Lonavala – Pune Suburban trains which are running under 25KV AC supply. As the project does not envisaged compatibility with the suburban section of the central railway. The Merits of adoption of 25KV as applicable to Pune, needs to be further analyzed in terms of techno economic advantages.
3.7.3 Incidentally a number of EMU formations running on Mumbai sub. System (using 1500 V DC for traction), are running on 3 phase AC drive on power supplied through IGBT inverters which has been talked about in the DPR. This formations have been supplied by ICF / Madras.
3.7.4 Rolling Stock Chapter 4.8 at page 30/43 System selection in table 4.8 (page 32/43) shows the tare weight (max.39T.) With all the above mentioned equipments on the motor coach, its tare weights, the basis of arriving at the tare weight of the coach at 39T has not been explained in the DPR. This is important as it has a relation with the axle load for which the system has been designed.
3.7.5 The acceleration is achieved by the number of motor coaches adopted in a train set and has nothing to do with Rolling Stock technology. It however increases the cost of the 4 car and 6 car units considerably.
3.7.6 The features like disc brakes or air springs were introduced in the bogie design by the western countries and Japan, for their long distance high speed trains like the ICE (inter City Express) or TEE (Trans European Express) trains which run at 160 to 200kmph. As the metro trains do not exceed 80 / 90kmph, there is no justification in providing these at exorbitantly high cost. This is probably on the advice of overseas consultants to promote international business at our cost.
3.7.7 The velocity time operation curve shown at page 33/43 of chapter 4 does not mention the length of the section. Ruff assessment indicates a length of around 1.8km. As the inter station distance of metro rail is generally at 1km or even less the scope for coasting or regenerative breaking doesn’t exist on these corridors. The DPR should have carried out a section by section exercise to identify whether the scope for regenerative is at all applicable and necessary for the metro. Regenerative breaking is generally useful for long stretches of level / falling gradients and for high speed trains.
3.7.8 Considerable advantages would be available by making the metro rolling stock similar to 100s of EMU coaches already running in the suburban areas of the country. Wheels, axles, couplers, Roller Bearings, Motors, gears, wheels and many such components are vital for effective maintenance of the rolling stock and the more of them can be made inter changeable, the greater shall be the economies of maintenance. Para 4.8.6 at page 33/43 talks about “Low Life Cycle Cost” and the most effective way of achieving it by ensuring a policy of interchangeability with existing stock and the maximum use of unit replacement maintenance policy. The large number of railway workshops can be effectively used for optimal maintenance of metro rail rolling stock.
3.7.9 Para 4.8.6 at page 33/43 of chapter 4 – also talks of “ aesthetically pleasing interior and exterior”. This apparently a useful thin end of the wedge to facilitate improving coaches at exorbitant cost. This matter is highly subjective. But we have manufactured the “Palace on Wheels” which shows the level of “aesthetically pleasing interior” which we can attend if demanded and specified. Stainless steel sheets would be at least 10 times more costly than the normal deep drawing quality mild steel sheets used by indigenous coach builders. There is no difficulty in indigenously providing stainless steel sheets coaches if demanded by the citizens at exorbitantly high prices and necessitating higher fare rates to the commuters.
3.7.10-- Air Conditioning – During peak hours with a crush capacity of 260 to 300 passengers packed with doors closed and windows sealed, on the narrow width 2.9m coaches, the space envelope may not be able to handle the removal of return air and effective addition of cooled fresh air into the coach. in summer time with out side ambient temperature as high as, 40 degree C of so, the air conditioning may posed a formidable problem. This is seen from the press reports in Hindustan Times, that the commuters a suffocated during peak hours and the air conditioning is ineffective in Delhi Metro.
3.7.11 At page 11/16 para 7.12 of chapter 7 Electric power tariff is based on in the range of Rs 2.5 to 2.75/unit propose at a concessional rate of Govt. Maharashtra on no profit no loss basis. This would be a gross under estimation of costs and the financial implications shall be based on the market rates which should be obtained from Pune Electricity Board.
3.7.12 The assessment of total traction and auxiliary power requirements of 34.2 MVA for corridor 1 and 15.9MVA for corridor 2 as indicated in annexure 7.1 &7.2 of chapter 7 at pages 12/16 and 13/16 need to be reviewed for the years beyond 2031. There is no uniformity in assessment of passenger weight in different subsystems of this report as have been assumed at 67.2kg / person in chapter 7 while 65kg in other chapters. With the existing power shortage, this demand cannot be met with .
8 CHAPTER 8
VENTILATION AND AC
3.8.1 It is added here that Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, energy saving majors, ventilation and AC systems can also be adopted on BG system with equal efficiency. Assessment of tunnel ventilation fans requirements and other allied tunnel ventilation system requirement need to be supported with detailed calculation for adequacy of provisions and to confirm to CODES and Standards. Similarly, mechanically ventilated or AC equipment assessment should be supported by calculations so that at a later stage, the costs are not exceeded. Station AC, tunnel ventilation system and space requirement for VAC systems and control and monitoring facilities can also be provided on BG systems.
9 CHAPTER 9
DEPOT MAINTENANCE
3.9.1 Two depots cum workshop have been proposed - near Hill Range station for corridor 1 and the other near Kothrud at Vanaz station (smaller in size) for corridor 2. It is indicated in the report that the depot inspection and workshop sheds are being constructed for 6 car formation and the station platforms are also being planned for 6 car formation, while the traffic demand and coach assessment has been done on the 4 car requirements till 2031. This is an in consistency in planning and investment which could be made provision for, without capital investment initially for 6 car formation. The estimate for costs do not provide details of actual provisions and gives LS costs. It is not possible to appreciate what exactly has been provided in the costing exercise.
10 CHAPTER 10
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT
3.10.1 Under the funding pattern specified in chapter 0.13 – Property Development is suggested that 500m on either side of the alignment should be developed by providing 4 FSI and demolishing the existing buildings. The social and environmental impact of the same should also be incorporated in the DPR . Environmental impact of earth excavation for tunneling and cut& cover method should be reflected.
11 CHAPTER 11
COST ESTIMATES
3.11.1 The capital cost estimates provided in the executive summery are scanty and provides LS amounts against the various items, without providing quantities and rates for assessment of detailed cost. A brief note, need be given, explaining the basis of the rates and quantities, so as to arrive at a realistic cost estimate of the project, at Sept 2008 prices. The details of the items and sub items must be shown separately for items for elevated and underground portions. The basis of P-way and ballasted and ballastless tracks indicating the types of sleepers proposed for ballasted tracks and the quantities of ballast thereof. The details regarding the provision of check rails on sharp curves need to be indicated. The station building cost should be furnished more in details separately for platform and platform covers, width of the platforms adopted both for side elevated platform and island underground platforms. The rolling stock cost should be based on the assessment of rolling stock for required for 30 yrs period (the life of such stock). Separate signalling cost for ATC, ATP and ATO should be indicated. The depot cost should be worked out in more details.
3.11.2 Under estimation of Cost - It should be realized that this is a detailed project report and the cost should be worked out in as much detail, as possible, based on general arrangement drawings for the entire corridor and quantities assessed and the unit rates provided, based on the price structure for Pune. It is seen that the cost of the head quarter office Over Heads of the SPV, interim consultant, the general consultants and the detailed designed consultant, the proof consultant and the prime consultant for PMC who would oversee the work of the general consultants and contractors, need to be separately indicated as they form a heavy element of the total costs. The cost of land and the rate assessed, including that for compensation payable, should be separately assessed and incorporated in the summery, so that adequacy of such provisions will ensure the proper final project costs. The details of imports and custom duties and taxes etc. should be separately worked out and shown in an annexure and provided for the total costs. The financial charges of insurance, bid bonds, BG, risks factors etc. which are generally provided for by contractors in their bid prices, should be assessed and provided for. The provision should also be made for price escalation and expected arbitration claims which are inevitable in such complex constructions. Interest during construction should also be provided for and shown separately on the basis of the annual cash flow. A detailed cash flow plan should be worked out to assess the overdraft necessary for the contractors and the interest thereon, so that the bid prices and estimates match reasonably. The detailed cost for rehabilitation of existing structures and commercial units should be assessed in detail instead of providing as a LS item. The details of cost of underground portion should be indicated separately to assess its impact over and above the elevated portion. As the 500m width of adjoining area of the alignment is being provided for an FSI of 4. a detailed drawing showing the layout of the alignment with structures required to be dismantled be shown and their cost implications worked out. The elevated alternative, in lieu of this underground alignment, showing existing width of road, adjoining area of development and the additional width, if any, required for widening the road to provide for an elevated alignment with additional cost of land for widening and expenses for compensation for adjoining area be worked out, so as to compare the techno-economic feasibility of alternative elevated alignment on this stretch.
3.11.3 Separate cost of operation and maintenance for period of say 30 yrs after completion, with specific reference to the staff costs for operation, the training of staff initial and regular, infrastructure for the same, energy consumption cost, replacement cost, repairs and maintenance cost and additional water requirement cost during construction & operation both and any other costs required, should be worked out to get a realistic assessment of the life cycle cost and the internal rate of return
The cost of SG has been under estimated and need s to be reviewed. The cost of BG wider coaches has also been worked out. All the working sheet of the comparative costs of BG with wider coaches, SG revised cost and the cost as worked out by DMRC is attached as annexure to this report and the summery of comparison is given below
3.11.4 SUMMERY OF COMPARATIVE COSTS OF SG & BG
DMRC Estimate – SG (As per DPR) Core Group Estimate
SG (Rev.) Core Group Estimate
BG
Cost Cost/km Cost Cost/km % Change Cost Cost/
km %change from
core group SG
Corridor I 4930 297 6186 373 24 5089 307 (-) 21 (373-307/307)
L= 16.589
Corridor II 2217 148.5 2841 190 27 2104 141 (-) 34 (190-141/141)
L=14.925
Total I+II 7147 227 9027 286 25 7193 228 (-) 25 (286-228/228)
L=31.511
DMRC cost under estimated by 25% (286-227=59/227=25)
CHAPTER 12
FINANCIAL VIABILITY AND FARE STRUCTURE AND FINANCING
3.12.1 It is seen that FIRR works out to 3.23% without taxes and 1.93 with taxes. This is further based on under estimated cost of the project & at a concessional rate of power tariff of Rs 2 to 2.5 per unit. This shows that the project is financially not remunerative and is a burden on the citizens by generating funds by heavy taxation on the citizens of Pune. The fare structure as indicated also is abnormally high compared to the one adopted for metro one Mumbai. Which is Rs 8/- for 3-8 km corridor and Rs 10/- beyond it. While the fare proposed in the year 2014-15 for 6-9 kms is Rs 14/-. Compared to the bus this is abnormally high and needs a second look, regarding the need for such construction and to find alternatives.
3.12.2 The proposal for acquiring 500m Radius land on either side of the corridor with an FSI of 4 will not be accepted by public, at it involves heavy demolition of buildings. Without actually assessing the areas with minimum inconvenience to commercial traders and residents of these areas, the planning of the corridor is incomplete and will result in agitation by the public. The Mumbai is already facing similar problems for Charkop-Bandra, Chembur-Mankhurd areas, where heavy agitation by public is being faced by MMRDA.
3.12.3 In view of the above it is felt that instead of an elevated metro rail corridor, the alternative of an elevated road based corridor, of 3 lanes in each directions, with entry exit points at major inter sections be considered as an alternative, all along this route, by provision of a double lane in each direction for a dedicated bus corridor which will enable running of express buses and can provide, in addition, one lane in each direction , for car and other vehicular traffic. This will also meet the requirements of additional road width necessary for the daily inputs of cars in the city and cannot be provided at the ground level. This will also improve the average speed of busses and provide adequate space for pedestrian to walk on the existing roads and reduce traffic density of vehicles on the existing roads underneath and later, if at all metro system is justified, the same can be provided underground as the width for the rail system is much less than that for road system, and would be more economical for underground than that for a road system. This alternative needs to be given a thought and the proposed metro rail corridor should be stopped forthwith. Alternatively as LRT is proposed, an indigenous MG Metro system may be investigated and compared with BG indigenous wider coach Metro rail analyzed.
13 CHAPTER 13
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
3.13.1 The EIRR of 18% assessed needs to be investigated in more details as the assumptions made, appear to be theoretical and the financial experts need to look into this subject.
14
CHAPTER 14
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
3.14.1The so called DPR has not been prepared in detailed to cover the standards laid down by the Ministry of Urban Development for preparation of such DPR’s and Govt. of India and need to be revised so as to work out the cost in sufficient details, based on the general arrangement drawings for various subsystems and assessment of realistic quantities and performing rates for Pune, so as to get an idea of the total final costs and its implications for generation of funds, to enable to Govt. to decide whether the project is to be taken up and recommended for construction.
3.14.2 Before the PMC & PCMC submit the report to Maharashtra State Cabinet, the citizens approval should be taken on priority and their observation should be recorded and furnished to the State Govt. for the information of the cabinet so that there is a minimum disturbance after sanction of the project.
3.14.3 The methodology of financing the project must be debated with the citizens group before forwarding to Urban Ministry.
3.14.4 The legal provisions under the present constitution regarding the jurisdiction of the state to connect two Municipal jurisdiction – PMC & PCMC by a metro rail or even by tramway needs to be approved by the law Ministry of the Center as it is not in conformity with the constitution article 366/20, article 246 VIIth schedule List –I, Indian Railways 1989 act and the Indian Tramways act. 1886.Unless proper legal cover for construction, operation and maintenance of the metro rails are enacted in advance by modification of the constitution, the same should not be taken up, as the same would be declared void under art. 254 of the constitution.
3.14.5 We are glad to note that the report at page 33 states that “metro comes under definition of railways under the railways act 1989”. The State Govt. has declared that the metro rail within one municipal jurisdiction can be enacted under the Indian Tramways act needs to be further debated under the constitutional provision.
3.14.6 Your attention is drawn to the last sentence of legal cover for Pune metro rail at page 33 “when this act is processed and enacted, it will give the required legal cover for operations and maintenance of Ludhiana metro” This indicates that the DPR is based on “copy paste” of document prepared for Ludhiana metro. This is an unfortunate part when PMC commissioner states that they have paid heavy fees in crore of Rupees to DMRC for preparation of such a report. And that they will accept their recommendations as they do NOT understand this subject
15 CHAPTER 15
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
3.15.1 From the traffic data and the financial implication furnished, it is seen that the project, as proposed, is not financially remunerative and is not justified for taking up by heavy imposition of taxes on the citizens of this city and country.
3.15.2 FOR GENERATION OF FUNDS, ADDITIONAL TAXATION ON THE CITIZENS OF PUNE ARE RECOMMENDED AS UNDER—a) Professional Tax at 1% of the salary of the employees. B) A Cess on petrol and diesel sale in the city c) Increase in FAR to 4 and its trading d) A surcharge on the property tax in the city e) A surcharge on the Motor Vehicle Tax in the city. f) An entry tax on the commercial articles entering the city. THESE WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTBLE TO PUNE CITIZENS
3.15.3 The limited capacity of 2.9m wide imported coaches (as against 3.2m wide for Mumbai metro one and for other States) on SG at exorbitant costs, with no future provision for increasing its width, and having a limited capacity life of less than 25yrs, is against the national interest.
3.15.4 If at all a rail corridor is required it must be on BG with provision for wider indigenous coaches of 3.66m wide, with the necessary technological inputs and can be constructed in less than 30% of the above cost without the need for VGF subsidy and at reduced fare structure acceptable to the citizens and would provide compatibility and connectivity with the existing rail system and will be in line with the national policy of the country on rail gauge issue. If BG is not justified on traffic demand , a MG (1m) corridor with indigenous appropriate technology with indigenously manufactured coaches by ICF, as adopted on Kolkata Metro should be explored with provision for future expansion to BG with wider coaches as the traffic increases after 30 to 50yrs. and feasibility of elevated corridor in lieu of under ground should be investigated.
3.15.5 Calculations of EIRR needs to be reviewed by experts.
3.15.6 The alternative of an elevated dedicated road alignment in lieu of elevated metro rail may be more economical and will be able to provide a dedicated elevated bus corridor and in addition cater for the provision for additional road width for heavy inputs of 4 wheelers in the city.
3.15.7 The DPR must be discussed by PMC with the core committee of senior railway experts and their views, on behalf of the citizens, must be taken into consideration, before the clearance of this project by PMC and PCMC for forwarding it to the state govt.
3.15.8 This project report is not only defective and deficient in many major aspects but is biased in favour of SG with imported coaches on the advice of international consultants and vendors and with complete disregard to the techno economic merits, resulting in heavy financial burden on the citizens of this city and is being adopted against the recommendations of the Ministry of Railways, who have the legal jurisdiction under the constitution for deciding this issue.
V K J Rane – IRSE (Retd.)
Ex-MD/IRCON
Vkjrane1930@hotmail.com
Te.(020) 2685 4132,Cell-93710 05396
Dated 28th April 2009
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