V. K. J. RANE – IRSE (Retd.) Ex-M.D./IRCON
F-5, 2nd floor, 48/49 Grafikon Paradise, NIBM Road, Kondhwa Khurd, Pune - 411 048
Tel: (020) 2685 4132, Mobile: 093710 05396 Email: vkjrane1930@hotmail.com
F-5, 2nd floor, 48/49 Grafikon Paradise, NIBM Road, Kondhwa Khurd, Pune - 411 048
Tel: (020) 2685 4132, Mobile: 093710 05396 Email: vkjrane1930@hotmail.com
Date 17th Aug 2009
Shri Ashok Chavanji
Hon’ble Chief Minister of Maharashtra
Sub – Pune Metro Rail Planning
Dear Sir,
We have been reading through the press reports, regarding the initiative taken by the State Govt., for implementation of Pune Metro Rail Project on priority, on the basis the recommendations made by DMRC in the DPR presented by them to PMC, as their technical consultant cum advisor for Planning and Implementation of the Pune Metro Rail Project. Though we are happy to learn that the metro rail project is being taken on priority, we would like to bring to your notice the defects, deficiency in transportation and technical planning and the substandard quality of the DPR presented by DMRC recently (March 2009). The Technical Core Committee of Pune, Experts in the Metro Rail Project, have submitted a detailed critical appreciation of the DPR presented by DMRC to PMC and had requested the PMC commissioner to receive a presentation on the subject from our Technical Expert Group. Accordingly PMC commissioner requested us to be present during the presentation made by MD/DMRC to PMC on 9th June 09. Thereupon we were requested by him to make our presentation in presence of MD/DMRC. The Congress Party representative, however, were not willing to allow us to make the presentation on the subject. Thereafter the Municipal Commissioner and Mayor of Pune promised that, we would allowed to make a separate presentation within a week’s time. More than 2 months has passed, this promise has not been kept and the subject is being taken at the State Level to approve the project for its implementation. It is unfortunate that technology is being politicized against the interest of the citizens of Pune under your leadership and support.
I would request you to call for a copy of the detailed para wise comments made by us on the Pune Metro Rail project DPR. This DPR, apart from its substandard quality in contents and presentation, the same has not been adequately scrutinized in the field, to check up the technical feasibility of the alignment proposed, nor have discussed the various techno-economic alternatives and merits of the systems, to enable the State Govt. to take decisions on approving the project. Group of Ministers had directed, in the year 2006, to the State Govt. that they should take the decision, on the techno-economic merits, for deciding the gauge for the Metro Rail Projects. I am sorry to say that the DPR submitted by DMRC in March 09 is NOT a Detailed Project Report, but is a Paper Project Report (PPR) and the alignment has not been pegged out nor checked up for its feasibility in the field. This would result in, large scale modifications during implementation, resulting in increased cost and technical feasibility for its implementation.
A brief summary of our comments is given below, for your understanding and our Technical Core Group of Pune headed Ex-Chairman Railway Board, Additional Member Railway Board, Ex-GM/ICF, Ex-GM/Kolkata Metro, Ex-MD/KRCL, Ex-GMs in electrification and signalling and management of Metro Projects have put their expertise together to make this presentation.
We would be happy to give a presentation to you and your team of experts on the Pune Metro Rail Planning. Our brief comments cover
Deficient, Transportation planning
Defective technical planning
Limited Capacity Planning
Techno-economic issues of gauge
Other Technical issues
Cost and financial implications
Legal issues
Adoption of DMRC model for Pune, in the context of CAG report 2008 and recent construction failures and cracks in concrete and in wheels and flooring of Rolling Stock.
A) DEFICIENT TRANSPORTATION PLANNING
i. Traffic forecast has been limited up to 2031 for a period of 17 years after proposed opening of the corridor in 2014 instead of at least upto 30 years i.e. 2044
ii. The priorities of the corridor proposed for phase-I are not in accordance with the Traffic densities (PPHPD) indicated in the project report and least priority corridors have been given the first priority, resulting in the financial viability being seriously affected
iii. The Techno-economic merits of various alternatives have not been discussed to enable the govt. to take rational and logical decisions in public interest
B) DEFECTIVE TECHNICAL PLANNING
i. A proposal of 5km of UG corridor –I, between Hill Range to Swargate is without technical justification and necessity resulting in abnormally high cost of the project.
ii. The corridor-I & II proposed have no track connectivity necessitating costly UG station (100ft deep) (additional Rs 50cr) and has further necessitated the need for 2 independent depots for coach maintenance resulting in additional cost of Rs 100cr
iii. The UG corridor proposed under the Mutha River has not been technically investigated in detail, regarding the nature of the subsoil and its safety during construction and operations. It is feasible to provide an alternative elevated corridor for the same resulting in a saving of Rs 1250cr for 5km length.
iv. The DPR does not indicate the location for transportation of 30 lac cum of earth work removed from the UG tunnel and the lead involved therefore.
v. The technical feasibility of crossing Pavana – Mula river, Mula-Mutha river near Bund Garden and Mutha River near the High court has not been detailed in the project report indicating spans, depth of foundations, type of foundations, height of piers and the type of superstructure etc. The cost of bridges across these rivers is based on Lump sum adhoc basis.
vi. Instead of having a common UG station at ASI it is desirable and feasible to have a central elevated common junction station at ASI with 2 to 3 basement levels for parking, 2 levels for stations above ground and a multistoried commercial complex above this central station. This will provide track connectivity for all the routes.
vii. The proposed location of the alignment crossing Pune Railway station is technically not suitable and it is feasible to explore the alternative, ensuring the crossing of the minimum number of railway tracks.
C) LIMITED CAPACITY PLANNING
i. The DPR recommends the adoption of 2.9m (9’-6”) wide coaches on SG for Pune Metro Rail as against 3.2m (10’-6”) proposed for Mumbai Metro SG and 3.66m (12’-0”) wide operating on the Mumbai Suburban BG system. This results in the reduction of the capacity of SG coach and train by 70 to 75% over that of BG systems
ii. Adoption of wider coaches would enable the length of the trains to be reduced for BG to 4 coaches/train as against 6 coaches/train for the proposed SG with narrow width coaches, thereby reducing the total number of coaches required to be purchased for a given volume of traffic to be carried. This would save Rs 2300cr in the capital cost of the coaches itself. This would further reduced the operating cost of electrical consumption and also the land cost required for depots and stabling sidings for equivalent volume of traffic. This would also reduce the initial capital investment for station platforms and platform covers due to reduction in the train length
iii. By adoption of narrow width coaches on SG with no provision for future increase in capacity by use of wider coaches on BG to meet the increase traffic demand beyond 25 years, the entire way structure for the corridors will have to be dismantled to convert the section to BG and adopt wider coaches to meet the future increased demand of traffic. There is no logic nor techno-economic merits, in providing a crush capacity life for the above corridor, limited to 25 years. The solution proposed by MMRDA & DMRC is to provide an alternative route for another elevated corridor after 25 years. Is this is in Public Interest?
iv. AFTER 25 YEARS WHAT ?
PRESENT CONDITIONS ON JAPANIES METRO WITH NARROW WIDTH COACHES
You need 3 pushers per door. With 4 doors per coach and with 6 coach train, you will need 3x4x6 = 72 pushers per train, to ensure closing of doors in 20sec, to start the train, for ensuring 2min service during peak hours.
v. The present corridor has been planned for a limiting frequency / headway of 4.5min for corridor –I and 3.5min for corridor – II in the year 2031. Mumbai suburban section is being operation at 3min service with present color light signalling system. Hence there is no need to adopt advance signalling ATC & ATO (driverless Operations) at an exorbitant initial signalling cost of Rs 170cr (70% of the parts will have to be replaced after 16 years)
vi. The capacity increase from 3min to 2min frequency, which can also be provided on BG system, will need extra cost of Rs 1000cr for additional imported SG Rolling stock, in addition to Rs 170cr for advance signalling. The additional capacity increased by this method on SG narrow width coaches would be 15740 PPHPD as against 27000 PPHPD for BG wider coaches.
D) TECHNO-ECONOMIC ISSUES OF GAUGE
i. BG is superior to SG in terms of
a. Capacity – 70 to 75% more – life more than 100 yrs
b. Cost – 40% less – Economy 30% less coaches / train for equal traffic
c. O & M – Reduction in cost
d. Land – Reduction in depot land and station platform land for equal traffic,
e. Compatibility - No duplication of infrastructure
f. Connectivity – ensures seamless travel
g. Comfort – More comfort for equivalent traffic
h. Safety – Improved safety on curves against over turning and permits higher speeds on curves than on SG
i. Expertise – Indigenous / RDSO/ICF/IR
j. Imports –No imports – saves foreign exchange
k. Technology – Available within the country for construction, manufacture, O&M and training. Best in the world technology – Implemented in San Francisco in the year 2003 ( Technology is independent of Gauge)
l. VGF subsidy – nil for BG with indigenous wider coaches
m. Fares – 30% reduction in commuter fares
ii. So why adopt SG and import limited capacity narrow width coaches at exorbitant cost (Rs 2300cr extra) at tax payers money?
The 21st century “best in the world” technology has been adopted on BG, since 2003, by BART metro at San-Francisco USA, though they have SG system for their existing lines.
Further extensions are also being done on BG.
• NO Need to purchase & import the entire asset for induction of technology
• IMPORTATION OF TECHNOLOGY IS INDEPENDENT OF GAUGE.
E) OTHER TECHNICAL ISSUES
• INTEGRATION WITH ROAD TRAFFIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE AT STATION
• IMPORTED TURNOUTS
• DEFECTIVE TRACK LAYOUT 4m & 4.5m
• DEFECTIVE TRACK LAYOUT FOR UG SECTION (9m island platform and 4.5m track approaches)
• POWER SUPPLY AND TRACTION
• WATER SUPPLY ASSESSMENT
• ENVIRONMENT – Dumping ground for 30 lacs cum of earth from tunnels
• DIVERSION OF UTILITILTIES
• Signalling – ATC & ATO not required as accidents cannot be avoided (Location of Ghatkopar Station is not free from disaster in case of a train overshooting will fall across the railway track on the suburban section of the Central Rly near Ghatkopar. This was advised by MTR to MMRDA through REL metro one project developers.
§ BEST IN THE WORLD TECHNOLOGY DOES NOT ELIMINATE ACCIDENTS
On 25 April 2006, in Japan, a seven-car metro train derailed on a curve and smashed into a multistory apartment building.
“The derailment at the curve was allegedly caused by the 23-year-old driver’s over speed.”
F) COST AND FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS
§ Cost for Pune metro rail has been grossly underestimated and is based on adhoc basis without detailed investigation and analysis
§ DPR does not indicate the time frame through a bar chart, methodology of construction and detailed analysis of cost
§ The project cost is expected to be in the range of Rs 12500cr as against Rs 7000 to 8000cr estimated for the 2 corridors of Pune Phase-I
§ The FIRR even at lower cost works out to 1.98% indicating abnormally low financial viability necessitating a high percentage of VGF subsidy (30% of Project cost)
§ The EIRR of 18% has been grossly inflated to justify the project on economic consideration and needs to be investigated by independent third party financial experts
§ The proposed financial resources assumed by commercial development of land is not acceptable to the public for acquisition of 500m radius land along the route and by giving an FSI of 4
§ Generating resources by imposing additional taxes on the citizens of Pune by way of 1% professional tax on salaries, cess on petrol and diesel sales in the city, a surcharge on motor vehicle tax in the city, and an entry tax on the commercial articles entering in the city are not acceptable to the citizens of Pune
§ Hence the adoption of BG wider indigenous coaches, resulting in saving Rs 4000cr in the project cost in addition to the savings in operation and maintenance cost, will obviate the need for imposing these taxes, the need for VGF subsidy and will ensure 30 to 40% reduction in fares to the commuters
Our proposal for BG with indigenous wide coaches (12’6”) in lieu of imported narrow width (9’-6”) SG coaches will save cost as under:
Savings in BG coaches in lieu of SG coaches Rs 2300cr
Replacement of UG by an elev. corridor Rs 1250cr
Elimination of ATP, ATC & ATO signalling Rs 170cr
Replacement of 2 depots by 1 & providing Track
Connectivity Rs 100cr
Elimination of imported track components Rs 50cr
Savings in central taxes and duties Rs 300cr
========
Total Rs 4170cr
(Say Rs 4000cr)
• No reduction has been made in the standard of construction of the station buildings and provision has been made for increased cost of indigenous coaches for AC, furnishings, communication systems and other inputs, at par with those adopted for SG by DMRC.
§ (In addition to above replacement of 11km of elevated corridor between PCMC to Range Hills by dedicated surface corridor adjoining to the existing Lonavala Pune Section would result in saving Rs 1430cr (11km x Rs 150cr/km = Rs 1650cr minus 11km x Rs 20cr/km = Rs 220cr. Rs 1650cr minus Rs 220cr = Rs 1430cr)
§ Hence acceptance of our proposal would save Rs 4170cr + Rs 1430cr Rs 5600cr to the exchequer.
§ Should not the Govt. of Maharashtra look into the techno-economic merits of gauge as director by the Group of Ministers in the decision of 24th Apr 2006
G) LEGAL ISSUES
§ Under the present constitution, vide Art, 366/20, and article 246, VIIth schedule List I, State Govts. do NOT have a legal Jurisdiction to construct even a tramway connecting two Municipal Corporations.
§ This power vests with the Centre only,
§ Art. 366/20 defines that - “railway” does not include
§ “a) A tramway wholly within a Municipal area or
§ b) Any other line of communication wholly situated in one state and declared by parliament by law not to be a railway.”
§ Unless the constitution is changed to exclude Metro Rail from the definitions of a Railway, the construction of metro connecting PMC & PCMC would be void under the constitution under Art. 254 of the constitution.
i) METRO RAIL IS A RAILWAY
§ The DPR states that “The Metro rail is a Railway and has to be implemented under the Indian Railways Act”
§ But has not followed the standards laid down in the Indian Railways engineering code for preparation of DPR for getting sanction and financial approval of the project for its implementation.
§ Indian Railway code further specifies that “any deviation from this code prior permission of the Railway Board, is necessary giving reasons for such deviations”
§ DMRC has also not followed the DPR regulations laid down the MOUD – The Ministry under which DMRC is working
§ The Advocate General, in his opinion, has expressed that “ if Metro Railway is confined to Municipal Area, the State Legislature will have legislative competence under Entry 13 of List II, otherwise the competence would rest with parliament in view of Entry 22 of List I, unless parliament passes a law to the effect that Metro Railway even beyond Municipal limit is not a railway. Therefore, I agree with the view of Ministry of Law and Justice Department of Legal Affairs”
§ This clearly shows that connecting PMC & PCMC by metro rail needs approval of the parliament to change the constitutional provision under Art 366/20 and Art. 246, VIIth schedule Entry 22 List I.
H.) Adoption of DMRC model in the context of CAG report 2008
i. DMRC in their presentation to PMC on 9th June 09 recommends adoption of DMRC model for Pune Metro Rail project
ii. The latest report (2008) of Controller and Auditor General (CAG) of India on DMRC need to be studied specially in the background of the latest accident on 12th & 13th July 09.
iii. Should Pune adopt DMRC model in the context of the above report?
I) Some of the critical comments of CAG are as under
i. No policy directives nor management monitoring/controls by Administrative Ministry
ii. No system of recording minutes for major joint technical and other management decisions by the company.
iii. No appointment of independent directors Board Meetings not held quarterly
iv. No system / manuals for procurement policy, tender evaluations and award including irregularity in payments to contractors
v. Scaling down testing standards, not witnessing tests, test in non accredited labs and non preserving of test Records, reflects poor quality of performance,
vi. Though phase-I adopted BG, the associated systems were planned for SG with no provision for future increase in capacity available on BG
vii. Premature wear and cracking of wheels and floor of rolling stock – affecting safety and Reducing Life of Rolling Stock to less than 30 yrs
viii. Property development contracts accepted by uncompetitive bidding and at abnormally high prices
ix. Should the above DMRC model of planning and construction of metros be adopted for Pune metro rail fully relying on DMRC’s past achievements and magnified image of brand equity for quality, performance and safety?
x. Time has come to place DMRC under the Rly Min. having technical & organizational expertise in this field of Rly technology
RECENT ACCIDENTS
CAUSES OF FAILURES AND ACTION TAKEN
CAUSES
ACTION TAKEN
Design failure
Suspension of senior & junior officers
Material failure
Blacklisting consultants
System failure
Show cause notice to Gammons
Cracks in cantilever & piers
87 cantilevers on piers of 5 lines of phase-II &
38 piers for cracks on airport express being reinvestigated
THIS IS DMRC MODEL
STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN BY DMRC TO MAKE THE STRUCTURE SAFE.
• What are these steps ?
• What steps – to avoid repetition of such failures?
• What steps – PMC and PCMC propose to take, to avoid similar failures in Pune Metro?
• The committee’s report to be made public
• When DMRC as organization was responsible, should there not be an independent organization to go into the details of such accidents, to bring out hidden defects in systems and responsibility?
IMPORTANT FEATURES OF DMRC MODEL AS PROJECTED BY FMRC (Self Projected, Magnified Image by DMRC)
• Innovative management system and decisions making (No records of decisions kept –CAG Report).
• Adoption of international standards of safety – (Reflected by recent accidents)
• Innovative systems / procurement policy – (no documentation / manuals – (CAG)
• Noise levels within international standards – (Noise levels exceeded above minimum standards – CAG)
• Best in the world imported Rolling Stock – (Premature wear and cracks in wheels and floors) - CAG
• A fare system of bid acceptance – major irregularities in bid acceptance – NOT based on technical quality cum cost basis and defective contracts of Rolling Stock. - CAG
• Best international testing standards – Testing standards lowered on adhoc basis and no records of tests kept - CAG
• Phase – I Delhi metro is a landmark of metro construction – (though constructed on BG, associated standards are on SG with no provision for future adoption of wider coaches, feasible on BG, for increasing the capacity. – CAG)
IMPACT OF DMRC MODEL
• Cracks and collapse of structures
• Killing one Engineers and workers
• Heavy financial Damages
• Abnormally high prices at cost to exchequer
• Narrow vision – limited capacity – 25 years
• Self magnified image – quality, performance, innovative management system, best in the world system?
• Misguided - Govt., Politicians, Bureaucracy and the public on technical & other issues
• Creation of a virtual wall between Railway Ministry and MOUD on technical and all planning matters to get a free hand in planning and execution
• One man model – No Technical & Organizational back up for policy directive and management control
COMPARISON OF DMRC AND PPP MODELS
DMRC Model
PPP Model
No responsibility for final costs
Freezing of final prices
No responsibility for delay in time
Penalty provisions for non completion in time
No responsibility on quality and failure of structures
Penalty provisions for quality
No responsibility for durability for coaches and structures
Full responsibility during 30 yr concession period
No penalty for performance during operations
Full responsibility for maintenance and operations
Will the Govt of Maharashtra provide satisfactory comments on the observations made above by the Citizens Technical Core Group, before approving DMRC DPR / PPR (Paper Project Report) for Pune Metro Rail and sanction the project for its implementation without modifications and resubmission and at the cost of exchequer and against public interest?
Will the Govt of Maharashtra perform their obligations to the citizens who elected them?
V K J Rane – IRSE (Retd.)
Ex-MD/IRCON
Hon’ble Chief Minister of Maharashtra
Sub – Pune Metro Rail Planning
Dear Sir,
We have been reading through the press reports, regarding the initiative taken by the State Govt., for implementation of Pune Metro Rail Project on priority, on the basis the recommendations made by DMRC in the DPR presented by them to PMC, as their technical consultant cum advisor for Planning and Implementation of the Pune Metro Rail Project. Though we are happy to learn that the metro rail project is being taken on priority, we would like to bring to your notice the defects, deficiency in transportation and technical planning and the substandard quality of the DPR presented by DMRC recently (March 2009). The Technical Core Committee of Pune, Experts in the Metro Rail Project, have submitted a detailed critical appreciation of the DPR presented by DMRC to PMC and had requested the PMC commissioner to receive a presentation on the subject from our Technical Expert Group. Accordingly PMC commissioner requested us to be present during the presentation made by MD/DMRC to PMC on 9th June 09. Thereupon we were requested by him to make our presentation in presence of MD/DMRC. The Congress Party representative, however, were not willing to allow us to make the presentation on the subject. Thereafter the Municipal Commissioner and Mayor of Pune promised that, we would allowed to make a separate presentation within a week’s time. More than 2 months has passed, this promise has not been kept and the subject is being taken at the State Level to approve the project for its implementation. It is unfortunate that technology is being politicized against the interest of the citizens of Pune under your leadership and support.
I would request you to call for a copy of the detailed para wise comments made by us on the Pune Metro Rail project DPR. This DPR, apart from its substandard quality in contents and presentation, the same has not been adequately scrutinized in the field, to check up the technical feasibility of the alignment proposed, nor have discussed the various techno-economic alternatives and merits of the systems, to enable the State Govt. to take decisions on approving the project. Group of Ministers had directed, in the year 2006, to the State Govt. that they should take the decision, on the techno-economic merits, for deciding the gauge for the Metro Rail Projects. I am sorry to say that the DPR submitted by DMRC in March 09 is NOT a Detailed Project Report, but is a Paper Project Report (PPR) and the alignment has not been pegged out nor checked up for its feasibility in the field. This would result in, large scale modifications during implementation, resulting in increased cost and technical feasibility for its implementation.
A brief summary of our comments is given below, for your understanding and our Technical Core Group of Pune headed Ex-Chairman Railway Board, Additional Member Railway Board, Ex-GM/ICF, Ex-GM/Kolkata Metro, Ex-MD/KRCL, Ex-GMs in electrification and signalling and management of Metro Projects have put their expertise together to make this presentation.
We would be happy to give a presentation to you and your team of experts on the Pune Metro Rail Planning. Our brief comments cover
Deficient, Transportation planning
Defective technical planning
Limited Capacity Planning
Techno-economic issues of gauge
Other Technical issues
Cost and financial implications
Legal issues
Adoption of DMRC model for Pune, in the context of CAG report 2008 and recent construction failures and cracks in concrete and in wheels and flooring of Rolling Stock.
A) DEFICIENT TRANSPORTATION PLANNING
i. Traffic forecast has been limited up to 2031 for a period of 17 years after proposed opening of the corridor in 2014 instead of at least upto 30 years i.e. 2044
ii. The priorities of the corridor proposed for phase-I are not in accordance with the Traffic densities (PPHPD) indicated in the project report and least priority corridors have been given the first priority, resulting in the financial viability being seriously affected
iii. The Techno-economic merits of various alternatives have not been discussed to enable the govt. to take rational and logical decisions in public interest
B) DEFECTIVE TECHNICAL PLANNING
i. A proposal of 5km of UG corridor –I, between Hill Range to Swargate is without technical justification and necessity resulting in abnormally high cost of the project.
ii. The corridor-I & II proposed have no track connectivity necessitating costly UG station (100ft deep) (additional Rs 50cr) and has further necessitated the need for 2 independent depots for coach maintenance resulting in additional cost of Rs 100cr
iii. The UG corridor proposed under the Mutha River has not been technically investigated in detail, regarding the nature of the subsoil and its safety during construction and operations. It is feasible to provide an alternative elevated corridor for the same resulting in a saving of Rs 1250cr for 5km length.
iv. The DPR does not indicate the location for transportation of 30 lac cum of earth work removed from the UG tunnel and the lead involved therefore.
v. The technical feasibility of crossing Pavana – Mula river, Mula-Mutha river near Bund Garden and Mutha River near the High court has not been detailed in the project report indicating spans, depth of foundations, type of foundations, height of piers and the type of superstructure etc. The cost of bridges across these rivers is based on Lump sum adhoc basis.
vi. Instead of having a common UG station at ASI it is desirable and feasible to have a central elevated common junction station at ASI with 2 to 3 basement levels for parking, 2 levels for stations above ground and a multistoried commercial complex above this central station. This will provide track connectivity for all the routes.
vii. The proposed location of the alignment crossing Pune Railway station is technically not suitable and it is feasible to explore the alternative, ensuring the crossing of the minimum number of railway tracks.
C) LIMITED CAPACITY PLANNING
i. The DPR recommends the adoption of 2.9m (9’-6”) wide coaches on SG for Pune Metro Rail as against 3.2m (10’-6”) proposed for Mumbai Metro SG and 3.66m (12’-0”) wide operating on the Mumbai Suburban BG system. This results in the reduction of the capacity of SG coach and train by 70 to 75% over that of BG systems
ii. Adoption of wider coaches would enable the length of the trains to be reduced for BG to 4 coaches/train as against 6 coaches/train for the proposed SG with narrow width coaches, thereby reducing the total number of coaches required to be purchased for a given volume of traffic to be carried. This would save Rs 2300cr in the capital cost of the coaches itself. This would further reduced the operating cost of electrical consumption and also the land cost required for depots and stabling sidings for equivalent volume of traffic. This would also reduce the initial capital investment for station platforms and platform covers due to reduction in the train length
iii. By adoption of narrow width coaches on SG with no provision for future increase in capacity by use of wider coaches on BG to meet the increase traffic demand beyond 25 years, the entire way structure for the corridors will have to be dismantled to convert the section to BG and adopt wider coaches to meet the future increased demand of traffic. There is no logic nor techno-economic merits, in providing a crush capacity life for the above corridor, limited to 25 years. The solution proposed by MMRDA & DMRC is to provide an alternative route for another elevated corridor after 25 years. Is this is in Public Interest?
iv. AFTER 25 YEARS WHAT ?
PRESENT CONDITIONS ON JAPANIES METRO WITH NARROW WIDTH COACHES
You need 3 pushers per door. With 4 doors per coach and with 6 coach train, you will need 3x4x6 = 72 pushers per train, to ensure closing of doors in 20sec, to start the train, for ensuring 2min service during peak hours.
v. The present corridor has been planned for a limiting frequency / headway of 4.5min for corridor –I and 3.5min for corridor – II in the year 2031. Mumbai suburban section is being operation at 3min service with present color light signalling system. Hence there is no need to adopt advance signalling ATC & ATO (driverless Operations) at an exorbitant initial signalling cost of Rs 170cr (70% of the parts will have to be replaced after 16 years)
vi. The capacity increase from 3min to 2min frequency, which can also be provided on BG system, will need extra cost of Rs 1000cr for additional imported SG Rolling stock, in addition to Rs 170cr for advance signalling. The additional capacity increased by this method on SG narrow width coaches would be 15740 PPHPD as against 27000 PPHPD for BG wider coaches.
D) TECHNO-ECONOMIC ISSUES OF GAUGE
i. BG is superior to SG in terms of
a. Capacity – 70 to 75% more – life more than 100 yrs
b. Cost – 40% less – Economy 30% less coaches / train for equal traffic
c. O & M – Reduction in cost
d. Land – Reduction in depot land and station platform land for equal traffic,
e. Compatibility - No duplication of infrastructure
f. Connectivity – ensures seamless travel
g. Comfort – More comfort for equivalent traffic
h. Safety – Improved safety on curves against over turning and permits higher speeds on curves than on SG
i. Expertise – Indigenous / RDSO/ICF/IR
j. Imports –No imports – saves foreign exchange
k. Technology – Available within the country for construction, manufacture, O&M and training. Best in the world technology – Implemented in San Francisco in the year 2003 ( Technology is independent of Gauge)
l. VGF subsidy – nil for BG with indigenous wider coaches
m. Fares – 30% reduction in commuter fares
ii. So why adopt SG and import limited capacity narrow width coaches at exorbitant cost (Rs 2300cr extra) at tax payers money?
The 21st century “best in the world” technology has been adopted on BG, since 2003, by BART metro at San-Francisco USA, though they have SG system for their existing lines.
Further extensions are also being done on BG.
• NO Need to purchase & import the entire asset for induction of technology
• IMPORTATION OF TECHNOLOGY IS INDEPENDENT OF GAUGE.
E) OTHER TECHNICAL ISSUES
• INTEGRATION WITH ROAD TRAFFIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE AT STATION
• IMPORTED TURNOUTS
• DEFECTIVE TRACK LAYOUT 4m & 4.5m
• DEFECTIVE TRACK LAYOUT FOR UG SECTION (9m island platform and 4.5m track approaches)
• POWER SUPPLY AND TRACTION
• WATER SUPPLY ASSESSMENT
• ENVIRONMENT – Dumping ground for 30 lacs cum of earth from tunnels
• DIVERSION OF UTILITILTIES
• Signalling – ATC & ATO not required as accidents cannot be avoided (Location of Ghatkopar Station is not free from disaster in case of a train overshooting will fall across the railway track on the suburban section of the Central Rly near Ghatkopar. This was advised by MTR to MMRDA through REL metro one project developers.
§ BEST IN THE WORLD TECHNOLOGY DOES NOT ELIMINATE ACCIDENTS
On 25 April 2006, in Japan, a seven-car metro train derailed on a curve and smashed into a multistory apartment building.
“The derailment at the curve was allegedly caused by the 23-year-old driver’s over speed.”
F) COST AND FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS
§ Cost for Pune metro rail has been grossly underestimated and is based on adhoc basis without detailed investigation and analysis
§ DPR does not indicate the time frame through a bar chart, methodology of construction and detailed analysis of cost
§ The project cost is expected to be in the range of Rs 12500cr as against Rs 7000 to 8000cr estimated for the 2 corridors of Pune Phase-I
§ The FIRR even at lower cost works out to 1.98% indicating abnormally low financial viability necessitating a high percentage of VGF subsidy (30% of Project cost)
§ The EIRR of 18% has been grossly inflated to justify the project on economic consideration and needs to be investigated by independent third party financial experts
§ The proposed financial resources assumed by commercial development of land is not acceptable to the public for acquisition of 500m radius land along the route and by giving an FSI of 4
§ Generating resources by imposing additional taxes on the citizens of Pune by way of 1% professional tax on salaries, cess on petrol and diesel sales in the city, a surcharge on motor vehicle tax in the city, and an entry tax on the commercial articles entering in the city are not acceptable to the citizens of Pune
§ Hence the adoption of BG wider indigenous coaches, resulting in saving Rs 4000cr in the project cost in addition to the savings in operation and maintenance cost, will obviate the need for imposing these taxes, the need for VGF subsidy and will ensure 30 to 40% reduction in fares to the commuters
Our proposal for BG with indigenous wide coaches (12’6”) in lieu of imported narrow width (9’-6”) SG coaches will save cost as under:
Savings in BG coaches in lieu of SG coaches Rs 2300cr
Replacement of UG by an elev. corridor Rs 1250cr
Elimination of ATP, ATC & ATO signalling Rs 170cr
Replacement of 2 depots by 1 & providing Track
Connectivity Rs 100cr
Elimination of imported track components Rs 50cr
Savings in central taxes and duties Rs 300cr
========
Total Rs 4170cr
(Say Rs 4000cr)
• No reduction has been made in the standard of construction of the station buildings and provision has been made for increased cost of indigenous coaches for AC, furnishings, communication systems and other inputs, at par with those adopted for SG by DMRC.
§ (In addition to above replacement of 11km of elevated corridor between PCMC to Range Hills by dedicated surface corridor adjoining to the existing Lonavala Pune Section would result in saving Rs 1430cr (11km x Rs 150cr/km = Rs 1650cr minus 11km x Rs 20cr/km = Rs 220cr. Rs 1650cr minus Rs 220cr = Rs 1430cr)
§ Hence acceptance of our proposal would save Rs 4170cr + Rs 1430cr Rs 5600cr to the exchequer.
§ Should not the Govt. of Maharashtra look into the techno-economic merits of gauge as director by the Group of Ministers in the decision of 24th Apr 2006
G) LEGAL ISSUES
§ Under the present constitution, vide Art, 366/20, and article 246, VIIth schedule List I, State Govts. do NOT have a legal Jurisdiction to construct even a tramway connecting two Municipal Corporations.
§ This power vests with the Centre only,
§ Art. 366/20 defines that - “railway” does not include
§ “a) A tramway wholly within a Municipal area or
§ b) Any other line of communication wholly situated in one state and declared by parliament by law not to be a railway.”
§ Unless the constitution is changed to exclude Metro Rail from the definitions of a Railway, the construction of metro connecting PMC & PCMC would be void under the constitution under Art. 254 of the constitution.
i) METRO RAIL IS A RAILWAY
§ The DPR states that “The Metro rail is a Railway and has to be implemented under the Indian Railways Act”
§ But has not followed the standards laid down in the Indian Railways engineering code for preparation of DPR for getting sanction and financial approval of the project for its implementation.
§ Indian Railway code further specifies that “any deviation from this code prior permission of the Railway Board, is necessary giving reasons for such deviations”
§ DMRC has also not followed the DPR regulations laid down the MOUD – The Ministry under which DMRC is working
§ The Advocate General, in his opinion, has expressed that “ if Metro Railway is confined to Municipal Area, the State Legislature will have legislative competence under Entry 13 of List II, otherwise the competence would rest with parliament in view of Entry 22 of List I, unless parliament passes a law to the effect that Metro Railway even beyond Municipal limit is not a railway. Therefore, I agree with the view of Ministry of Law and Justice Department of Legal Affairs”
§ This clearly shows that connecting PMC & PCMC by metro rail needs approval of the parliament to change the constitutional provision under Art 366/20 and Art. 246, VIIth schedule Entry 22 List I.
H.) Adoption of DMRC model in the context of CAG report 2008
i. DMRC in their presentation to PMC on 9th June 09 recommends adoption of DMRC model for Pune Metro Rail project
ii. The latest report (2008) of Controller and Auditor General (CAG) of India on DMRC need to be studied specially in the background of the latest accident on 12th & 13th July 09.
iii. Should Pune adopt DMRC model in the context of the above report?
I) Some of the critical comments of CAG are as under
i. No policy directives nor management monitoring/controls by Administrative Ministry
ii. No system of recording minutes for major joint technical and other management decisions by the company.
iii. No appointment of independent directors Board Meetings not held quarterly
iv. No system / manuals for procurement policy, tender evaluations and award including irregularity in payments to contractors
v. Scaling down testing standards, not witnessing tests, test in non accredited labs and non preserving of test Records, reflects poor quality of performance,
vi. Though phase-I adopted BG, the associated systems were planned for SG with no provision for future increase in capacity available on BG
vii. Premature wear and cracking of wheels and floor of rolling stock – affecting safety and Reducing Life of Rolling Stock to less than 30 yrs
viii. Property development contracts accepted by uncompetitive bidding and at abnormally high prices
ix. Should the above DMRC model of planning and construction of metros be adopted for Pune metro rail fully relying on DMRC’s past achievements and magnified image of brand equity for quality, performance and safety?
x. Time has come to place DMRC under the Rly Min. having technical & organizational expertise in this field of Rly technology
RECENT ACCIDENTS
CAUSES OF FAILURES AND ACTION TAKEN
CAUSES
ACTION TAKEN
Design failure
Suspension of senior & junior officers
Material failure
Blacklisting consultants
System failure
Show cause notice to Gammons
Cracks in cantilever & piers
87 cantilevers on piers of 5 lines of phase-II &
38 piers for cracks on airport express being reinvestigated
THIS IS DMRC MODEL
STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN BY DMRC TO MAKE THE STRUCTURE SAFE.
• What are these steps ?
• What steps – to avoid repetition of such failures?
• What steps – PMC and PCMC propose to take, to avoid similar failures in Pune Metro?
• The committee’s report to be made public
• When DMRC as organization was responsible, should there not be an independent organization to go into the details of such accidents, to bring out hidden defects in systems and responsibility?
IMPORTANT FEATURES OF DMRC MODEL AS PROJECTED BY FMRC (Self Projected, Magnified Image by DMRC)
• Innovative management system and decisions making (No records of decisions kept –CAG Report).
• Adoption of international standards of safety – (Reflected by recent accidents)
• Innovative systems / procurement policy – (no documentation / manuals – (CAG)
• Noise levels within international standards – (Noise levels exceeded above minimum standards – CAG)
• Best in the world imported Rolling Stock – (Premature wear and cracks in wheels and floors) - CAG
• A fare system of bid acceptance – major irregularities in bid acceptance – NOT based on technical quality cum cost basis and defective contracts of Rolling Stock. - CAG
• Best international testing standards – Testing standards lowered on adhoc basis and no records of tests kept - CAG
• Phase – I Delhi metro is a landmark of metro construction – (though constructed on BG, associated standards are on SG with no provision for future adoption of wider coaches, feasible on BG, for increasing the capacity. – CAG)
IMPACT OF DMRC MODEL
• Cracks and collapse of structures
• Killing one Engineers and workers
• Heavy financial Damages
• Abnormally high prices at cost to exchequer
• Narrow vision – limited capacity – 25 years
• Self magnified image – quality, performance, innovative management system, best in the world system?
• Misguided - Govt., Politicians, Bureaucracy and the public on technical & other issues
• Creation of a virtual wall between Railway Ministry and MOUD on technical and all planning matters to get a free hand in planning and execution
• One man model – No Technical & Organizational back up for policy directive and management control
COMPARISON OF DMRC AND PPP MODELS
DMRC Model
PPP Model
No responsibility for final costs
Freezing of final prices
No responsibility for delay in time
Penalty provisions for non completion in time
No responsibility on quality and failure of structures
Penalty provisions for quality
No responsibility for durability for coaches and structures
Full responsibility during 30 yr concession period
No penalty for performance during operations
Full responsibility for maintenance and operations
Will the Govt of Maharashtra provide satisfactory comments on the observations made above by the Citizens Technical Core Group, before approving DMRC DPR / PPR (Paper Project Report) for Pune Metro Rail and sanction the project for its implementation without modifications and resubmission and at the cost of exchequer and against public interest?
Will the Govt of Maharashtra perform their obligations to the citizens who elected them?
V K J Rane – IRSE (Retd.)
Ex-MD/IRCON
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