Monday, December 14, 2009
PUNE CITIZENS TO UNITE
To demand metro rail project, to international standards, with wider coaches (12’-0”) on BG for seamless, non congested travel, even for the grandchildren of this city.
1. DMRC has goofed up, Pune Metro Rail Planning, by proposing narrow width (9’-6”) imported coaches & track, on SG(Standard Gauge-4’-8.5”), with NO provision for future increase in capacity, thus restricting capacity life to 25 years only (instead of 100 years feasible with wider coaches on BG –Broad Gauge—5’-6”)
2. Adoption of wider BG coaches, will provide 74% higher capacity than that with narrow width SG coaches and will save Rs 2300cr in capital investment in coaches only.
3. Best in the world 21st Century Metro Rail Technology is on BG (5’-6”) is commissioned in the year 2003 by BART – San Francisco USA, due to safer and more comfortable to commuters.
4. BG can negotiate sharp curves of 100 to 120m radius at higher speeds and can provide 2min service if required in future.
5. For equivalent volume of traffic, BG with wider coaches, will need less number of coaches per train, thereby, reducing train length, resulting in economy in land acquisition in depot, station platform, roof length and effect economy in energy consumption, operation and maintenance costs due to less number coaches.
6. BG with wider coaches will provide compatibility and connectivity with the existing BG network in Pune and help in disaster management in emergency
7. BG with wider coaches will save 40% of the cost of the project resulting in no provision for VGF subsidy and will reduce the fare structure to the commuters by almost 1/3rd.
8. DMRC’s latest DPR (Detailed Project Report) is defective, deficient and inconsistent in planning and selection of alignment priorities and lacks detailed investigation for its technical feasibility, specially, in crossing Pavna, Mula & Mutha rivers, alignment along the Paund Phata, underground alignment under the river, without adequate geotechnical investigations and grossly underestimates the cost by about 40%
9. The DPR prepared by DMRC Staff with limited / no expertise in this field, has not located the alignment in the field, as required under govt. guidelines, and is actually “a PPR” (a Reconnaissance Paper Project Report) with “Copy Paste” techniques, adopted from “Ludhiana and Faridabad” project reports earlier prepared by RITES
10. The priorities of alignment recommended are NOT in accordance with those recommended in the report, by the traffic experts and the assessment of future traffic demand has been limited to the year 2031, that is, 17 years after opening to traffic in 2014, instead of assessing it for at least 30 years i.e. up to 2045
11. DMRC has misguided the politicians and the bureaucrats, on techno-economic merits of SG vs BG and on the selection of alignment and on project costs.
12. Our experts comments on the technical feasibility, alignment selection, and all other basis of assessment of project requirements and costs, have been communicated, in writing DPR- chapter wise, to DMRC & PMC, with no replies, as they have no defense on our comments.
13. PMC & the Govt. want to, some how, push up the project irrespective of their merits, at the cost of the citizens, by way of heavy taxation and permanent inconvenience and abnormal high cost of the project, without taking the citizens into confidence.
14. The project is financially un-remunerative, at FIRR of 1.98, involving a VGF subsidy of around Rs 2500cr, which will be utilized for handing over to overseas manufactures for importing coaches & tracks and payment of fees of the foreign consultant which is not required for such projects, in view of IR’s capacity and expertise for planning and executing such projects. A shear waste of valuable foreign exchange of the country and is against the advice of the IR.
15. The Intelligent Citizens of Pune must unite and understand and appreciate, the wasteful expenditure of crores of rupees being incurred, under the advice and pressure of the foreign manufactures, in spite of the country having expertise in manufacture and execution of similar projects and standards, by imposing heavy taxation on Pune citizens by way of increased property tax, additional Cess on diesel and petrol, demolition of all structures within a radius of 500m of the alignment, cutting large number of trees, without environmental clearance of the project and causing permanent misery to the residents along the alignment
16. Implementation of BART project in Pune, without proper planning, has created a mess in Road Mass Transit Technology. Similarly, Pune Metro as planned, will result in creation of “hell” for the citizens of this city. Politicians should stop “Politicizing Technology”. And citizens must unite and empower their strength against the wrongful acts and decisions of the politicians and the bureaucrats, against the will of the citizens. Let citizens of Pune lead the country in this respect.
V.K.J. Rane – IRSE (Retd.) Ex-MD/IRCON -
Mr. Shankar Kalmani – Secretary Pune City Congress Committee
1. DMRC has goofed up, Pune Metro Rail Planning, by proposing narrow width (9’-6”) imported coaches & track, on SG(Standard Gauge-4’-8.5”), with NO provision for future increase in capacity, thus restricting capacity life to 25 years only (instead of 100 years feasible with wider coaches on BG –Broad Gauge—5’-6”)
2. Adoption of wider BG coaches, will provide 74% higher capacity than that with narrow width SG coaches and will save Rs 2300cr in capital investment in coaches only.
3. Best in the world 21st Century Metro Rail Technology is on BG (5’-6”) is commissioned in the year 2003 by BART – San Francisco USA, due to safer and more comfortable to commuters.
4. BG can negotiate sharp curves of 100 to 120m radius at higher speeds and can provide 2min service if required in future.
5. For equivalent volume of traffic, BG with wider coaches, will need less number of coaches per train, thereby, reducing train length, resulting in economy in land acquisition in depot, station platform, roof length and effect economy in energy consumption, operation and maintenance costs due to less number coaches.
6. BG with wider coaches will provide compatibility and connectivity with the existing BG network in Pune and help in disaster management in emergency
7. BG with wider coaches will save 40% of the cost of the project resulting in no provision for VGF subsidy and will reduce the fare structure to the commuters by almost 1/3rd.
8. DMRC’s latest DPR (Detailed Project Report) is defective, deficient and inconsistent in planning and selection of alignment priorities and lacks detailed investigation for its technical feasibility, specially, in crossing Pavna, Mula & Mutha rivers, alignment along the Paund Phata, underground alignment under the river, without adequate geotechnical investigations and grossly underestimates the cost by about 40%
9. The DPR prepared by DMRC Staff with limited / no expertise in this field, has not located the alignment in the field, as required under govt. guidelines, and is actually “a PPR” (a Reconnaissance Paper Project Report) with “Copy Paste” techniques, adopted from “Ludhiana and Faridabad” project reports earlier prepared by RITES
10. The priorities of alignment recommended are NOT in accordance with those recommended in the report, by the traffic experts and the assessment of future traffic demand has been limited to the year 2031, that is, 17 years after opening to traffic in 2014, instead of assessing it for at least 30 years i.e. up to 2045
11. DMRC has misguided the politicians and the bureaucrats, on techno-economic merits of SG vs BG and on the selection of alignment and on project costs.
12. Our experts comments on the technical feasibility, alignment selection, and all other basis of assessment of project requirements and costs, have been communicated, in writing DPR- chapter wise, to DMRC & PMC, with no replies, as they have no defense on our comments.
13. PMC & the Govt. want to, some how, push up the project irrespective of their merits, at the cost of the citizens, by way of heavy taxation and permanent inconvenience and abnormal high cost of the project, without taking the citizens into confidence.
14. The project is financially un-remunerative, at FIRR of 1.98, involving a VGF subsidy of around Rs 2500cr, which will be utilized for handing over to overseas manufactures for importing coaches & tracks and payment of fees of the foreign consultant which is not required for such projects, in view of IR’s capacity and expertise for planning and executing such projects. A shear waste of valuable foreign exchange of the country and is against the advice of the IR.
15. The Intelligent Citizens of Pune must unite and understand and appreciate, the wasteful expenditure of crores of rupees being incurred, under the advice and pressure of the foreign manufactures, in spite of the country having expertise in manufacture and execution of similar projects and standards, by imposing heavy taxation on Pune citizens by way of increased property tax, additional Cess on diesel and petrol, demolition of all structures within a radius of 500m of the alignment, cutting large number of trees, without environmental clearance of the project and causing permanent misery to the residents along the alignment
16. Implementation of BART project in Pune, without proper planning, has created a mess in Road Mass Transit Technology. Similarly, Pune Metro as planned, will result in creation of “hell” for the citizens of this city. Politicians should stop “Politicizing Technology”. And citizens must unite and empower their strength against the wrongful acts and decisions of the politicians and the bureaucrats, against the will of the citizens. Let citizens of Pune lead the country in this respect.
V.K.J. Rane – IRSE (Retd.) Ex-MD/IRCON -
Mr. Shankar Kalmani – Secretary Pune City Congress Committee
Wednesday, August 19, 2009
Will Pune get a Metro Rail by 2014 ?
Will Pune get a Metro Rail by 2014 ?
Reference your article dated 10th June 09 – “Will Pune get a Metro Rail by 2014 ?”
My comments on some of the paras presented in the above are given below
“There are 175 metro rails in the world today. Internationally, standard gauge is the preferred systems”
What is good internationally is not necessarily good for our country. This is particularly when we have 100% BG within our country operating for the more than 150 years. For our population and rate of growth, BG is the right system from capacity considerations and for performance for more than 100 years unlike the SG system which reaches a saturated crush capacity in 25 years as stated by DMRC.
“In India too, wherever metro project is implemented or is in the process, the standard gauge system is adopted”
All existing metro projects in Mumbai suburban section, Kolkata, Chennai and constructed and operated by Indian Railways as well as by Delhi Metro Phase-I constructed by DMRC are on BG. No SG metro project has yet been completed for operations in India. The projects now planned by DMRC are on SG against the directive of the Indian Railways.
“The standard gauge system has numerous technical and commercial advantages over the broad gauge, which has many handicaps”
This statement is technically and commercially wrong and is misguiding to the non technical bureaucrats and public. The BG system has technical and commercial advantages in all areas identified by DMRC.
“Since the standard gauge was the most widely used system globally, it gave a more competitive option to select imported accessories — mainly, coaches and spare parts, Sreedharan said.”
This statement is again factually wrong and misguiding, the coaches and spare parts are not at all competitive, compared to indigenous BG coaches. The imported accessories like coaches etc. cost Rs 10cr/coach as against Rs 2cr manufactured in India with higher capacity. This has resulted in the need for VGF subsidy and higher fare structure against the countries interest. The coaches imported in 2002 to 2005 for Delhi metro phase-I have resulted in cracked wheels and cracked floor systems, as reported by the Controller and Auditor General (CAG)
“The four feet 8.5 inches wide standard gauge coaches are lighter and only slightly smaller than the five feet six inches wide broad gauge coaches. In Delhi too, although the broad gauge system was used in the first phase, all the new metro lines are going to be standard gauge,” Sreedharan said.
This statement is again factually misguiding. The width of BG coach is 12’-0” and that of narrow width Pune coach is 9’-6”. The capacity of each BG coach is 74% higher than the proposed narrow width SG coach for Pune Metro Rail. The SG track cannot accommodate coaches wider than a maximum width of 10’-6” from safety considerations, The SG parameters for coaches proposed by DMRC for all their metro system are such that in future, these systems cannot accommodate wider coaches in future, ensuring a permanent disadvantage from capacity considerations. The 21st century best in the world Metro Technology commissioned in the year 2003 by BART, in San Francisco (USA) has preferred to adopt BG for their metro systems from additional safety and comfort considerations.
He added that introduction of 12 feet wide broad gauge coaches for metro operations was debated a number of times and was discarded due to the enormous civil and engineering costs involved for wider tunnels, bigger stations and elaborate dispersal arrangements at stations, with no special advantages for the country.
The debates on BG and SG coaches held by DMRC was with those technical experts who favored SG coaches only. Those members who objected to BG wider coaches were removed from the technical committees. The objections made by the technical experts were not recorded in the minutes. Indian Railways had repeatedly stressed and debated the techno-economic merits in favour of BG, they were overruled for considerations other than techno-economic merits.
For more details see blog
http://vkjrane1930.blogspot.com/
Reference your article dated 10th June 09 – “Will Pune get a Metro Rail by 2014 ?”
My comments on some of the paras presented in the above are given below
“There are 175 metro rails in the world today. Internationally, standard gauge is the preferred systems”
What is good internationally is not necessarily good for our country. This is particularly when we have 100% BG within our country operating for the more than 150 years. For our population and rate of growth, BG is the right system from capacity considerations and for performance for more than 100 years unlike the SG system which reaches a saturated crush capacity in 25 years as stated by DMRC.
“In India too, wherever metro project is implemented or is in the process, the standard gauge system is adopted”
All existing metro projects in Mumbai suburban section, Kolkata, Chennai and constructed and operated by Indian Railways as well as by Delhi Metro Phase-I constructed by DMRC are on BG. No SG metro project has yet been completed for operations in India. The projects now planned by DMRC are on SG against the directive of the Indian Railways.
“The standard gauge system has numerous technical and commercial advantages over the broad gauge, which has many handicaps”
This statement is technically and commercially wrong and is misguiding to the non technical bureaucrats and public. The BG system has technical and commercial advantages in all areas identified by DMRC.
“Since the standard gauge was the most widely used system globally, it gave a more competitive option to select imported accessories — mainly, coaches and spare parts, Sreedharan said.”
This statement is again factually wrong and misguiding, the coaches and spare parts are not at all competitive, compared to indigenous BG coaches. The imported accessories like coaches etc. cost Rs 10cr/coach as against Rs 2cr manufactured in India with higher capacity. This has resulted in the need for VGF subsidy and higher fare structure against the countries interest. The coaches imported in 2002 to 2005 for Delhi metro phase-I have resulted in cracked wheels and cracked floor systems, as reported by the Controller and Auditor General (CAG)
“The four feet 8.5 inches wide standard gauge coaches are lighter and only slightly smaller than the five feet six inches wide broad gauge coaches. In Delhi too, although the broad gauge system was used in the first phase, all the new metro lines are going to be standard gauge,” Sreedharan said.
This statement is again factually misguiding. The width of BG coach is 12’-0” and that of narrow width Pune coach is 9’-6”. The capacity of each BG coach is 74% higher than the proposed narrow width SG coach for Pune Metro Rail. The SG track cannot accommodate coaches wider than a maximum width of 10’-6” from safety considerations, The SG parameters for coaches proposed by DMRC for all their metro system are such that in future, these systems cannot accommodate wider coaches in future, ensuring a permanent disadvantage from capacity considerations. The 21st century best in the world Metro Technology commissioned in the year 2003 by BART, in San Francisco (USA) has preferred to adopt BG for their metro systems from additional safety and comfort considerations.
He added that introduction of 12 feet wide broad gauge coaches for metro operations was debated a number of times and was discarded due to the enormous civil and engineering costs involved for wider tunnels, bigger stations and elaborate dispersal arrangements at stations, with no special advantages for the country.
The debates on BG and SG coaches held by DMRC was with those technical experts who favored SG coaches only. Those members who objected to BG wider coaches were removed from the technical committees. The objections made by the technical experts were not recorded in the minutes. Indian Railways had repeatedly stressed and debated the techno-economic merits in favour of BG, they were overruled for considerations other than techno-economic merits.
For more details see blog
http://vkjrane1930.blogspot.com/
AFTER 25 YEARS WHAT ?
AFTER 25 YEARS WHAT ?
OVERCROWDING DURING PEAK HOURS
PRESENT CONDITIONS ON JAPANIES METRO WITH NARROW WIDTH COACHES
You need 3 pushers per door. With 4 doors per coach and with 6 coach train, you will need 3x4x6 = 72 pushers per train, to ensure closing of doors in 20sec, to start the train, for ensuring 2min service during peak hours.
Bhoomipujan of Charkop-Bandra-Mankhurd Metro Rail Project.
V. K. J. RANE – IRSE (Retd.) Ex-M.D./IRCON
F-5, 2nd floor, 48/49 Grafikon Paradise, NIBM Road, Kondhwa Khurd, Pune - 411 048
Tel: (020) 2685 4132, Mobile: 093710 05396 Email: vkjrane1930@hotmail.com
F-5, 2nd floor, 48/49 Grafikon Paradise, NIBM Road, Kondhwa Khurd, Pune - 411 048
Tel: (020) 2685 4132, Mobile: 093710 05396 Email: vkjrane1930@hotmail.com
Date 17th Aug 2009
Respected Smt. Pratibha Patil,
Hon’ble President of India
New Delhi - 1
Sub - Bhoomipujan of Charkop-Bandra-Mankhurd Metro Rail Project.
Let me congratulate you for Bhoomipujan of Charkop-Bandra-Mankhurd Metro Rail Project.”
Your kind attention is drawn to my letter dated 14th July 2008 which was forwarded by your office to the Ministry of Railways vide S.N. PI-D/4088 dated 29th Aug 08, who in turn forwarded the same to the Ministry of Urban Development vide their letter no – 99/Proj./DLI/37/3Pt dated 31.10.08, for remarks, with copy endorsed to me, stating that the Ministry of Railways are in favour of adoption of BG for all metro projects in the country.
I am still awaiting a reply from you on the above subject.
Today’s full page advertisement for the above Bhoomi Puja given by MMRDA in Indian Express dated Monday 17th Aug 09 is a sad reflection of how the country is spending huge amounts on infrastructure projects without consideration of techno-economic merits of the project and spending precious foreign exchange, in their implementation, when the country has the capability of implementing this project on BG at 40% less, cost with indigenous expertise for equivalent standards of performance.
I would request an early reply to my comments at annexure A.
The grand children of this country deserve a better and wider vision, while planning infrastructure Metro projects in the country.
With highest regards
V K J Rane – IRSE (Retd)
Ex-MD/IRCON
Copy to:
1. Shri Manmohan Singh/ Hon’ble The Prime Minister of India,
2. Mr. Pranad Mukharjee - Hon’ble Finance Minister
3. Mr. Jaipal Reddy / Hon’ble Urban Development Minister
4. Mr. Gurudas Kamat – Union Min. of State for Communication information and technology
5. Mr. S.C. Jamir/ Hon’ble The Governer of Maharashtra
6. Mr. Ashok Chavan / Hon’ble Chief Minister of Maharasthra
7. Mr. Chhagan Bhujban – Hon’ble Deputy Chief Minister.
8. Mr. Chandrakant Handore – Hon’ble Minister of Social Justice
9. Mr. Hasan Mushrif – Hon’ble Minister of State for Urban Development
10. Dr. (Smt) Subha Raul – Hon’ble Mayor of Mumbai
11. Shri Priya Dutt – Hon’ble Member of the Parliament
12. Mr. Kri pashankar – Hon’ble Member of the Legislative assembly
13. Mr. Janardan Chandurkar - Hon’ble Member of the Legislative assembly
14. Mr. Johny Joseph – Chief Secretary Govt. of Maharashtra
15. Mr. T.C. Benjamin Hon’ble Principle Secretary Urban Development Department Govt. of Maharashtra
16. Mr. Ratnakar Gaikwad – Metropolitan Commissioner & Additional Chief Secretary Govt. of Maharashtra – Bandra – Kurla Complex
Annexure A
CHARKOP – BANDRA – MANKHURD METRO RAIL PROJECT
Hearty Congratulations on the occasion of “Bhoomipujan of Charkop-Bandra-Mankhurd Metro Rail Project.” In Mumbai.
I would request you to find time to go through my critical observations, in national interest, on the various issues brought out in the MMRDA’s advertisement in the Indian Express dated 17th Aug 09, for the above occasion, in projecting a narrow and misguided vision to the public in connection with the planning of the above metro rail project.
AS ADVERTISED BY MMRDA
CRITICAL COMMENTS
1) MUMBAI VISION
Transforming Mumbai into a world classs metropolis with vibrant economy and globally comparable quality of life for all its citizens
1) WHY NARROW MUMBAI VISION? Advertisement does not indicate the gauge and the narrow width imported coaches of 3.2m wide with reduced capacity less than 25% on Standard Gauge (SG), against wider indigenous coaches 12’-0” adopted on the Mumbai Suburban Section, providing crush capacity life of more than 100 years in lieu of 25 yrs as now proposed on SG.
2) This corridor will provide North-South and East-West connectivity
2) There is no track connectivity with the existing North-South Mumbai Virar – Churchgate section at Bandra, due to adoption of narrow width SG (4’-8.5”) instead of the existing Broad Gauge (BG) 5’-6”
3) Serves areas not having rail based mass transport
3) Does not serve public requiring to carry more than 15kg luggage NOR the Dabbewalas, even during non-peak period
4) The master plan consists of 146.5 km metro network to be implemented in three phases
4) As indicated by MMRDA & DMRC in their DPR the crush capacity of this corridor would be reached within 25 years rendering the corridor NOT useful to the commuters for comfortable travel, thereafter.
The corridor cannot be converted to BG to adopt wider coaches without dismantling the concrete way structure and track.
5) Work on 11 km Versova-Andheri-Ghatkopar (VAG) corridor (cost Rs 2356cr) is already under execution- Expected to be completed by 2010, ahead of schedule
5) This corridor is being constructed at Rs 214 cr / km (Rs 2356cr / 11km) against the project estimated cost of Rs 1500cr (Rs 1500cr / 11km = 136.36cr/km)
The present progress of the VAG corridor is much behind schedule and cannot be completed by 2010.
6) The consortium led by Reliance Infrastructure will construct the Charkop-Bandra-Mankhurd corridor
6) This consortium is in association of overseas Company. Why it is necessary to have consortium with a foreign company, paying inflated price for the project, when the construction, manufacturing, operation and maintenance technology is available with the Indian Railways for the last more than 75 yrs. in Mumbai suburban section? No consortium was required for Kolkata Underground Metro.
7) Govt. of India to provide Viability Gap Funding of Rs 1532cr and MMRDA to provide the balance viability gap funding of Rs 766cr
7) The project is being awarded at a price of Rs 11,000 cr (Rs 343.75cr/km) at an abnormally high cost as compare to the MMRDA’s estimates of Rs 6100cr (Rs 190cr/km). With indigenous wider coaches on BG the project can be executed at 40% less cost, with no need for VGF subsidy and the fares will be reduced by 50%
8) This is the longest metro corridor of 32km on Public Private Partnership
8) The project cost has abnormally increased because the PPP model. For railways / metros The PPP model has not been economically adopted. Procurement of Mobile assets and Operation should have been done by DMRC as was done for Delhi metro, while fixed assets and maintenance could be done under PPP/BOT, with payments spread over the concession period.
9) Trains will be fully air-conditioned and will run from 5.00 am till midnight
9) Air-cooled trains are being operated on the existing suburban section in Mumbai from 5:00am till midnight.
BENEFIT OF CHARKOP-BANDRA-MANKHURD CORRIDOR
1) Connects Central & Western suburbs by environment – friendly, safe, reliable and efficient mass transit system
1) Mumbai suburban section on BG is also environmental friendly, and is more safe, more reliable and comfortable and more efficient, mass transit system than the one proposed at abnormally high cost and high fare charges
2) Provides interchange facility with other corridors
2) Does not provide track connectivity due to adoption of SG. Adoption of BG would have provided seemless travel without physical interchange of passengers at lower fares and less capital investment and reduced operation and maintenance cost.
3) Travel time expected to be reduced from about 2hrs. to 1hr.
3) Due to a single line in each direction, the corridor cannot provide fast trains to reduce travel time from 1hr to 30 min.
On the existing suburban section on Western and Central Railways, the distance of 32km is covered in less than 30min, unlike the proposed 1 hr. on the SG Metro
4) Scope for future extension from Mankhurd to proposed airport in Navi Mumbai
4) The existing constitution –Article 366/20 and Art. 246 does not provide legal jurisdiction to the States to extend the metro lines from Mankhurd to Navi Mumbai, unless “Metro Railway” is specifically excluded from the definition of “Railways” in the constitution
The best of the world technology on metros has been provided by Bay Area Regional Authority, San Francisco USA, on BG, since 2003 and is being further extended on BG for improved safety considerations against overturning, though their existing system is on SG. The above BG metro is on 120m radius sharp curves. The metro system can be designed for identical performance, to provide connectivity and computability with the existing BG system, which has the additional advantage during emergencies and disaster management.
Do you think that we are serving the nation for the good of the people by adoption of imported metro coaches on SG, at abnormally high costs, with no provision for increasing their capacity beyond 25 yrs, specifically when the country has the expertise and experience and capability of implementing metro projects with indigenous coaches on BG for identical performance and to suit the capacity requirements of more than 100yrs.
The Govt. should ask themselves if they are really serving the future generation of this city by the adoption of the proposed metros on SG.
Awaiting an early reply
With highest regards
V K J Rane – IRSE (Retd)
Ex-MD/IRCON
Date : 17th Aug 2009
Tuesday, August 18, 2009
V. K. J. RANE – IRSE (Retd.) Ex-M.D./IRCON
F-5, 2nd floor, 48/49 Grafikon Paradise, NIBM Road, Kondhwa Khurd, Pune - 411 048
Tel: (020) 2685 4132, Mobile: 093710 05396 Email: vkjrane1930@hotmail.com
F-5, 2nd floor, 48/49 Grafikon Paradise, NIBM Road, Kondhwa Khurd, Pune - 411 048
Tel: (020) 2685 4132, Mobile: 093710 05396 Email: vkjrane1930@hotmail.com
Date 19th Aug 09
Dear Mr. Zagade
Municipal Commissioner
The news paper reports dated 19th Aug 09 on the foundation ceremony of the Charkop-Bandra-Mankhurd metro project indicate the project cost accepted in favour of Reliance Group at Rs 8208cr for a fully elevated corridor of 32km with a VGF subsidy of Rs 2298cr (at 28% project cost). From the above it is seen that the elevated corridor in Mumbai under the PPP model works out to Rs 8208cr / 32km = Rs 256.50cr/km. The Municipal commissioner of Pune should recall the DMRC DPR for Pune Metro Rail which has estimated the fully elevated corridor II at Rs 148cr/km. The two Pune corridors totaling to about 32km includes a 5km of UG section and has been estimated by DMRC at Rs 7147cr at Rs 227cr/km. This indicates the gross underestimation of the cost of the project and we expect that the Pune Metro Rail corridor as proposed would cost around Rs 400cr/km amounting to Rs 12,800cr and will need a VGF subsidy of more than Rs 3000cr.
Do you still want to import SG coaches at exorbitant prices by imposing heavy taxes on the Pune Citizens?
With warm regards
V K J Rane – IRSE (Retd.)
Ex-MD/IRCON
Pune Metro Rail Planning
V. K. J. RANE – IRSE (Retd.) Ex-M.D./IRCON
F-5, 2nd floor, 48/49 Grafikon Paradise, NIBM Road, Kondhwa Khurd, Pune - 411 048
Tel: (020) 2685 4132, Mobile: 093710 05396 Email: vkjrane1930@hotmail.com
F-5, 2nd floor, 48/49 Grafikon Paradise, NIBM Road, Kondhwa Khurd, Pune - 411 048
Tel: (020) 2685 4132, Mobile: 093710 05396 Email: vkjrane1930@hotmail.com
Date 17th Aug 2009
Shri Ashok Chavanji
Hon’ble Chief Minister of Maharashtra
Sub – Pune Metro Rail Planning
Dear Sir,
We have been reading through the press reports, regarding the initiative taken by the State Govt., for implementation of Pune Metro Rail Project on priority, on the basis the recommendations made by DMRC in the DPR presented by them to PMC, as their technical consultant cum advisor for Planning and Implementation of the Pune Metro Rail Project. Though we are happy to learn that the metro rail project is being taken on priority, we would like to bring to your notice the defects, deficiency in transportation and technical planning and the substandard quality of the DPR presented by DMRC recently (March 2009). The Technical Core Committee of Pune, Experts in the Metro Rail Project, have submitted a detailed critical appreciation of the DPR presented by DMRC to PMC and had requested the PMC commissioner to receive a presentation on the subject from our Technical Expert Group. Accordingly PMC commissioner requested us to be present during the presentation made by MD/DMRC to PMC on 9th June 09. Thereupon we were requested by him to make our presentation in presence of MD/DMRC. The Congress Party representative, however, were not willing to allow us to make the presentation on the subject. Thereafter the Municipal Commissioner and Mayor of Pune promised that, we would allowed to make a separate presentation within a week’s time. More than 2 months has passed, this promise has not been kept and the subject is being taken at the State Level to approve the project for its implementation. It is unfortunate that technology is being politicized against the interest of the citizens of Pune under your leadership and support.
I would request you to call for a copy of the detailed para wise comments made by us on the Pune Metro Rail project DPR. This DPR, apart from its substandard quality in contents and presentation, the same has not been adequately scrutinized in the field, to check up the technical feasibility of the alignment proposed, nor have discussed the various techno-economic alternatives and merits of the systems, to enable the State Govt. to take decisions on approving the project. Group of Ministers had directed, in the year 2006, to the State Govt. that they should take the decision, on the techno-economic merits, for deciding the gauge for the Metro Rail Projects. I am sorry to say that the DPR submitted by DMRC in March 09 is NOT a Detailed Project Report, but is a Paper Project Report (PPR) and the alignment has not been pegged out nor checked up for its feasibility in the field. This would result in, large scale modifications during implementation, resulting in increased cost and technical feasibility for its implementation.
A brief summary of our comments is given below, for your understanding and our Technical Core Group of Pune headed Ex-Chairman Railway Board, Additional Member Railway Board, Ex-GM/ICF, Ex-GM/Kolkata Metro, Ex-MD/KRCL, Ex-GMs in electrification and signalling and management of Metro Projects have put their expertise together to make this presentation.
We would be happy to give a presentation to you and your team of experts on the Pune Metro Rail Planning. Our brief comments cover
Deficient, Transportation planning
Defective technical planning
Limited Capacity Planning
Techno-economic issues of gauge
Other Technical issues
Cost and financial implications
Legal issues
Adoption of DMRC model for Pune, in the context of CAG report 2008 and recent construction failures and cracks in concrete and in wheels and flooring of Rolling Stock.
A) DEFICIENT TRANSPORTATION PLANNING
i. Traffic forecast has been limited up to 2031 for a period of 17 years after proposed opening of the corridor in 2014 instead of at least upto 30 years i.e. 2044
ii. The priorities of the corridor proposed for phase-I are not in accordance with the Traffic densities (PPHPD) indicated in the project report and least priority corridors have been given the first priority, resulting in the financial viability being seriously affected
iii. The Techno-economic merits of various alternatives have not been discussed to enable the govt. to take rational and logical decisions in public interest
B) DEFECTIVE TECHNICAL PLANNING
i. A proposal of 5km of UG corridor –I, between Hill Range to Swargate is without technical justification and necessity resulting in abnormally high cost of the project.
ii. The corridor-I & II proposed have no track connectivity necessitating costly UG station (100ft deep) (additional Rs 50cr) and has further necessitated the need for 2 independent depots for coach maintenance resulting in additional cost of Rs 100cr
iii. The UG corridor proposed under the Mutha River has not been technically investigated in detail, regarding the nature of the subsoil and its safety during construction and operations. It is feasible to provide an alternative elevated corridor for the same resulting in a saving of Rs 1250cr for 5km length.
iv. The DPR does not indicate the location for transportation of 30 lac cum of earth work removed from the UG tunnel and the lead involved therefore.
v. The technical feasibility of crossing Pavana – Mula river, Mula-Mutha river near Bund Garden and Mutha River near the High court has not been detailed in the project report indicating spans, depth of foundations, type of foundations, height of piers and the type of superstructure etc. The cost of bridges across these rivers is based on Lump sum adhoc basis.
vi. Instead of having a common UG station at ASI it is desirable and feasible to have a central elevated common junction station at ASI with 2 to 3 basement levels for parking, 2 levels for stations above ground and a multistoried commercial complex above this central station. This will provide track connectivity for all the routes.
vii. The proposed location of the alignment crossing Pune Railway station is technically not suitable and it is feasible to explore the alternative, ensuring the crossing of the minimum number of railway tracks.
C) LIMITED CAPACITY PLANNING
i. The DPR recommends the adoption of 2.9m (9’-6”) wide coaches on SG for Pune Metro Rail as against 3.2m (10’-6”) proposed for Mumbai Metro SG and 3.66m (12’-0”) wide operating on the Mumbai Suburban BG system. This results in the reduction of the capacity of SG coach and train by 70 to 75% over that of BG systems
ii. Adoption of wider coaches would enable the length of the trains to be reduced for BG to 4 coaches/train as against 6 coaches/train for the proposed SG with narrow width coaches, thereby reducing the total number of coaches required to be purchased for a given volume of traffic to be carried. This would save Rs 2300cr in the capital cost of the coaches itself. This would further reduced the operating cost of electrical consumption and also the land cost required for depots and stabling sidings for equivalent volume of traffic. This would also reduce the initial capital investment for station platforms and platform covers due to reduction in the train length
iii. By adoption of narrow width coaches on SG with no provision for future increase in capacity by use of wider coaches on BG to meet the increase traffic demand beyond 25 years, the entire way structure for the corridors will have to be dismantled to convert the section to BG and adopt wider coaches to meet the future increased demand of traffic. There is no logic nor techno-economic merits, in providing a crush capacity life for the above corridor, limited to 25 years. The solution proposed by MMRDA & DMRC is to provide an alternative route for another elevated corridor after 25 years. Is this is in Public Interest?
iv. AFTER 25 YEARS WHAT ?
PRESENT CONDITIONS ON JAPANIES METRO WITH NARROW WIDTH COACHES
You need 3 pushers per door. With 4 doors per coach and with 6 coach train, you will need 3x4x6 = 72 pushers per train, to ensure closing of doors in 20sec, to start the train, for ensuring 2min service during peak hours.
v. The present corridor has been planned for a limiting frequency / headway of 4.5min for corridor –I and 3.5min for corridor – II in the year 2031. Mumbai suburban section is being operation at 3min service with present color light signalling system. Hence there is no need to adopt advance signalling ATC & ATO (driverless Operations) at an exorbitant initial signalling cost of Rs 170cr (70% of the parts will have to be replaced after 16 years)
vi. The capacity increase from 3min to 2min frequency, which can also be provided on BG system, will need extra cost of Rs 1000cr for additional imported SG Rolling stock, in addition to Rs 170cr for advance signalling. The additional capacity increased by this method on SG narrow width coaches would be 15740 PPHPD as against 27000 PPHPD for BG wider coaches.
D) TECHNO-ECONOMIC ISSUES OF GAUGE
i. BG is superior to SG in terms of
a. Capacity – 70 to 75% more – life more than 100 yrs
b. Cost – 40% less – Economy 30% less coaches / train for equal traffic
c. O & M – Reduction in cost
d. Land – Reduction in depot land and station platform land for equal traffic,
e. Compatibility - No duplication of infrastructure
f. Connectivity – ensures seamless travel
g. Comfort – More comfort for equivalent traffic
h. Safety – Improved safety on curves against over turning and permits higher speeds on curves than on SG
i. Expertise – Indigenous / RDSO/ICF/IR
j. Imports –No imports – saves foreign exchange
k. Technology – Available within the country for construction, manufacture, O&M and training. Best in the world technology – Implemented in San Francisco in the year 2003 ( Technology is independent of Gauge)
l. VGF subsidy – nil for BG with indigenous wider coaches
m. Fares – 30% reduction in commuter fares
ii. So why adopt SG and import limited capacity narrow width coaches at exorbitant cost (Rs 2300cr extra) at tax payers money?
The 21st century “best in the world” technology has been adopted on BG, since 2003, by BART metro at San-Francisco USA, though they have SG system for their existing lines.
Further extensions are also being done on BG.
• NO Need to purchase & import the entire asset for induction of technology
• IMPORTATION OF TECHNOLOGY IS INDEPENDENT OF GAUGE.
E) OTHER TECHNICAL ISSUES
• INTEGRATION WITH ROAD TRAFFIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE AT STATION
• IMPORTED TURNOUTS
• DEFECTIVE TRACK LAYOUT 4m & 4.5m
• DEFECTIVE TRACK LAYOUT FOR UG SECTION (9m island platform and 4.5m track approaches)
• POWER SUPPLY AND TRACTION
• WATER SUPPLY ASSESSMENT
• ENVIRONMENT – Dumping ground for 30 lacs cum of earth from tunnels
• DIVERSION OF UTILITILTIES
• Signalling – ATC & ATO not required as accidents cannot be avoided (Location of Ghatkopar Station is not free from disaster in case of a train overshooting will fall across the railway track on the suburban section of the Central Rly near Ghatkopar. This was advised by MTR to MMRDA through REL metro one project developers.
§ BEST IN THE WORLD TECHNOLOGY DOES NOT ELIMINATE ACCIDENTS
On 25 April 2006, in Japan, a seven-car metro train derailed on a curve and smashed into a multistory apartment building.
“The derailment at the curve was allegedly caused by the 23-year-old driver’s over speed.”
F) COST AND FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS
§ Cost for Pune metro rail has been grossly underestimated and is based on adhoc basis without detailed investigation and analysis
§ DPR does not indicate the time frame through a bar chart, methodology of construction and detailed analysis of cost
§ The project cost is expected to be in the range of Rs 12500cr as against Rs 7000 to 8000cr estimated for the 2 corridors of Pune Phase-I
§ The FIRR even at lower cost works out to 1.98% indicating abnormally low financial viability necessitating a high percentage of VGF subsidy (30% of Project cost)
§ The EIRR of 18% has been grossly inflated to justify the project on economic consideration and needs to be investigated by independent third party financial experts
§ The proposed financial resources assumed by commercial development of land is not acceptable to the public for acquisition of 500m radius land along the route and by giving an FSI of 4
§ Generating resources by imposing additional taxes on the citizens of Pune by way of 1% professional tax on salaries, cess on petrol and diesel sales in the city, a surcharge on motor vehicle tax in the city, and an entry tax on the commercial articles entering in the city are not acceptable to the citizens of Pune
§ Hence the adoption of BG wider indigenous coaches, resulting in saving Rs 4000cr in the project cost in addition to the savings in operation and maintenance cost, will obviate the need for imposing these taxes, the need for VGF subsidy and will ensure 30 to 40% reduction in fares to the commuters
Our proposal for BG with indigenous wide coaches (12’6”) in lieu of imported narrow width (9’-6”) SG coaches will save cost as under:
Savings in BG coaches in lieu of SG coaches Rs 2300cr
Replacement of UG by an elev. corridor Rs 1250cr
Elimination of ATP, ATC & ATO signalling Rs 170cr
Replacement of 2 depots by 1 & providing Track
Connectivity Rs 100cr
Elimination of imported track components Rs 50cr
Savings in central taxes and duties Rs 300cr
========
Total Rs 4170cr
(Say Rs 4000cr)
• No reduction has been made in the standard of construction of the station buildings and provision has been made for increased cost of indigenous coaches for AC, furnishings, communication systems and other inputs, at par with those adopted for SG by DMRC.
§ (In addition to above replacement of 11km of elevated corridor between PCMC to Range Hills by dedicated surface corridor adjoining to the existing Lonavala Pune Section would result in saving Rs 1430cr (11km x Rs 150cr/km = Rs 1650cr minus 11km x Rs 20cr/km = Rs 220cr. Rs 1650cr minus Rs 220cr = Rs 1430cr)
§ Hence acceptance of our proposal would save Rs 4170cr + Rs 1430cr Rs 5600cr to the exchequer.
§ Should not the Govt. of Maharashtra look into the techno-economic merits of gauge as director by the Group of Ministers in the decision of 24th Apr 2006
G) LEGAL ISSUES
§ Under the present constitution, vide Art, 366/20, and article 246, VIIth schedule List I, State Govts. do NOT have a legal Jurisdiction to construct even a tramway connecting two Municipal Corporations.
§ This power vests with the Centre only,
§ Art. 366/20 defines that - “railway” does not include
§ “a) A tramway wholly within a Municipal area or
§ b) Any other line of communication wholly situated in one state and declared by parliament by law not to be a railway.”
§ Unless the constitution is changed to exclude Metro Rail from the definitions of a Railway, the construction of metro connecting PMC & PCMC would be void under the constitution under Art. 254 of the constitution.
i) METRO RAIL IS A RAILWAY
§ The DPR states that “The Metro rail is a Railway and has to be implemented under the Indian Railways Act”
§ But has not followed the standards laid down in the Indian Railways engineering code for preparation of DPR for getting sanction and financial approval of the project for its implementation.
§ Indian Railway code further specifies that “any deviation from this code prior permission of the Railway Board, is necessary giving reasons for such deviations”
§ DMRC has also not followed the DPR regulations laid down the MOUD – The Ministry under which DMRC is working
§ The Advocate General, in his opinion, has expressed that “ if Metro Railway is confined to Municipal Area, the State Legislature will have legislative competence under Entry 13 of List II, otherwise the competence would rest with parliament in view of Entry 22 of List I, unless parliament passes a law to the effect that Metro Railway even beyond Municipal limit is not a railway. Therefore, I agree with the view of Ministry of Law and Justice Department of Legal Affairs”
§ This clearly shows that connecting PMC & PCMC by metro rail needs approval of the parliament to change the constitutional provision under Art 366/20 and Art. 246, VIIth schedule Entry 22 List I.
H.) Adoption of DMRC model in the context of CAG report 2008
i. DMRC in their presentation to PMC on 9th June 09 recommends adoption of DMRC model for Pune Metro Rail project
ii. The latest report (2008) of Controller and Auditor General (CAG) of India on DMRC need to be studied specially in the background of the latest accident on 12th & 13th July 09.
iii. Should Pune adopt DMRC model in the context of the above report?
I) Some of the critical comments of CAG are as under
i. No policy directives nor management monitoring/controls by Administrative Ministry
ii. No system of recording minutes for major joint technical and other management decisions by the company.
iii. No appointment of independent directors Board Meetings not held quarterly
iv. No system / manuals for procurement policy, tender evaluations and award including irregularity in payments to contractors
v. Scaling down testing standards, not witnessing tests, test in non accredited labs and non preserving of test Records, reflects poor quality of performance,
vi. Though phase-I adopted BG, the associated systems were planned for SG with no provision for future increase in capacity available on BG
vii. Premature wear and cracking of wheels and floor of rolling stock – affecting safety and Reducing Life of Rolling Stock to less than 30 yrs
viii. Property development contracts accepted by uncompetitive bidding and at abnormally high prices
ix. Should the above DMRC model of planning and construction of metros be adopted for Pune metro rail fully relying on DMRC’s past achievements and magnified image of brand equity for quality, performance and safety?
x. Time has come to place DMRC under the Rly Min. having technical & organizational expertise in this field of Rly technology
RECENT ACCIDENTS
CAUSES OF FAILURES AND ACTION TAKEN
CAUSES
ACTION TAKEN
Design failure
Suspension of senior & junior officers
Material failure
Blacklisting consultants
System failure
Show cause notice to Gammons
Cracks in cantilever & piers
87 cantilevers on piers of 5 lines of phase-II &
38 piers for cracks on airport express being reinvestigated
THIS IS DMRC MODEL
STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN BY DMRC TO MAKE THE STRUCTURE SAFE.
• What are these steps ?
• What steps – to avoid repetition of such failures?
• What steps – PMC and PCMC propose to take, to avoid similar failures in Pune Metro?
• The committee’s report to be made public
• When DMRC as organization was responsible, should there not be an independent organization to go into the details of such accidents, to bring out hidden defects in systems and responsibility?
IMPORTANT FEATURES OF DMRC MODEL AS PROJECTED BY FMRC (Self Projected, Magnified Image by DMRC)
• Innovative management system and decisions making (No records of decisions kept –CAG Report).
• Adoption of international standards of safety – (Reflected by recent accidents)
• Innovative systems / procurement policy – (no documentation / manuals – (CAG)
• Noise levels within international standards – (Noise levels exceeded above minimum standards – CAG)
• Best in the world imported Rolling Stock – (Premature wear and cracks in wheels and floors) - CAG
• A fare system of bid acceptance – major irregularities in bid acceptance – NOT based on technical quality cum cost basis and defective contracts of Rolling Stock. - CAG
• Best international testing standards – Testing standards lowered on adhoc basis and no records of tests kept - CAG
• Phase – I Delhi metro is a landmark of metro construction – (though constructed on BG, associated standards are on SG with no provision for future adoption of wider coaches, feasible on BG, for increasing the capacity. – CAG)
IMPACT OF DMRC MODEL
• Cracks and collapse of structures
• Killing one Engineers and workers
• Heavy financial Damages
• Abnormally high prices at cost to exchequer
• Narrow vision – limited capacity – 25 years
• Self magnified image – quality, performance, innovative management system, best in the world system?
• Misguided - Govt., Politicians, Bureaucracy and the public on technical & other issues
• Creation of a virtual wall between Railway Ministry and MOUD on technical and all planning matters to get a free hand in planning and execution
• One man model – No Technical & Organizational back up for policy directive and management control
COMPARISON OF DMRC AND PPP MODELS
DMRC Model
PPP Model
No responsibility for final costs
Freezing of final prices
No responsibility for delay in time
Penalty provisions for non completion in time
No responsibility on quality and failure of structures
Penalty provisions for quality
No responsibility for durability for coaches and structures
Full responsibility during 30 yr concession period
No penalty for performance during operations
Full responsibility for maintenance and operations
Will the Govt of Maharashtra provide satisfactory comments on the observations made above by the Citizens Technical Core Group, before approving DMRC DPR / PPR (Paper Project Report) for Pune Metro Rail and sanction the project for its implementation without modifications and resubmission and at the cost of exchequer and against public interest?
Will the Govt of Maharashtra perform their obligations to the citizens who elected them?
V K J Rane – IRSE (Retd.)
Ex-MD/IRCON
Hon’ble Chief Minister of Maharashtra
Sub – Pune Metro Rail Planning
Dear Sir,
We have been reading through the press reports, regarding the initiative taken by the State Govt., for implementation of Pune Metro Rail Project on priority, on the basis the recommendations made by DMRC in the DPR presented by them to PMC, as their technical consultant cum advisor for Planning and Implementation of the Pune Metro Rail Project. Though we are happy to learn that the metro rail project is being taken on priority, we would like to bring to your notice the defects, deficiency in transportation and technical planning and the substandard quality of the DPR presented by DMRC recently (March 2009). The Technical Core Committee of Pune, Experts in the Metro Rail Project, have submitted a detailed critical appreciation of the DPR presented by DMRC to PMC and had requested the PMC commissioner to receive a presentation on the subject from our Technical Expert Group. Accordingly PMC commissioner requested us to be present during the presentation made by MD/DMRC to PMC on 9th June 09. Thereupon we were requested by him to make our presentation in presence of MD/DMRC. The Congress Party representative, however, were not willing to allow us to make the presentation on the subject. Thereafter the Municipal Commissioner and Mayor of Pune promised that, we would allowed to make a separate presentation within a week’s time. More than 2 months has passed, this promise has not been kept and the subject is being taken at the State Level to approve the project for its implementation. It is unfortunate that technology is being politicized against the interest of the citizens of Pune under your leadership and support.
I would request you to call for a copy of the detailed para wise comments made by us on the Pune Metro Rail project DPR. This DPR, apart from its substandard quality in contents and presentation, the same has not been adequately scrutinized in the field, to check up the technical feasibility of the alignment proposed, nor have discussed the various techno-economic alternatives and merits of the systems, to enable the State Govt. to take decisions on approving the project. Group of Ministers had directed, in the year 2006, to the State Govt. that they should take the decision, on the techno-economic merits, for deciding the gauge for the Metro Rail Projects. I am sorry to say that the DPR submitted by DMRC in March 09 is NOT a Detailed Project Report, but is a Paper Project Report (PPR) and the alignment has not been pegged out nor checked up for its feasibility in the field. This would result in, large scale modifications during implementation, resulting in increased cost and technical feasibility for its implementation.
A brief summary of our comments is given below, for your understanding and our Technical Core Group of Pune headed Ex-Chairman Railway Board, Additional Member Railway Board, Ex-GM/ICF, Ex-GM/Kolkata Metro, Ex-MD/KRCL, Ex-GMs in electrification and signalling and management of Metro Projects have put their expertise together to make this presentation.
We would be happy to give a presentation to you and your team of experts on the Pune Metro Rail Planning. Our brief comments cover
Deficient, Transportation planning
Defective technical planning
Limited Capacity Planning
Techno-economic issues of gauge
Other Technical issues
Cost and financial implications
Legal issues
Adoption of DMRC model for Pune, in the context of CAG report 2008 and recent construction failures and cracks in concrete and in wheels and flooring of Rolling Stock.
A) DEFICIENT TRANSPORTATION PLANNING
i. Traffic forecast has been limited up to 2031 for a period of 17 years after proposed opening of the corridor in 2014 instead of at least upto 30 years i.e. 2044
ii. The priorities of the corridor proposed for phase-I are not in accordance with the Traffic densities (PPHPD) indicated in the project report and least priority corridors have been given the first priority, resulting in the financial viability being seriously affected
iii. The Techno-economic merits of various alternatives have not been discussed to enable the govt. to take rational and logical decisions in public interest
B) DEFECTIVE TECHNICAL PLANNING
i. A proposal of 5km of UG corridor –I, between Hill Range to Swargate is without technical justification and necessity resulting in abnormally high cost of the project.
ii. The corridor-I & II proposed have no track connectivity necessitating costly UG station (100ft deep) (additional Rs 50cr) and has further necessitated the need for 2 independent depots for coach maintenance resulting in additional cost of Rs 100cr
iii. The UG corridor proposed under the Mutha River has not been technically investigated in detail, regarding the nature of the subsoil and its safety during construction and operations. It is feasible to provide an alternative elevated corridor for the same resulting in a saving of Rs 1250cr for 5km length.
iv. The DPR does not indicate the location for transportation of 30 lac cum of earth work removed from the UG tunnel and the lead involved therefore.
v. The technical feasibility of crossing Pavana – Mula river, Mula-Mutha river near Bund Garden and Mutha River near the High court has not been detailed in the project report indicating spans, depth of foundations, type of foundations, height of piers and the type of superstructure etc. The cost of bridges across these rivers is based on Lump sum adhoc basis.
vi. Instead of having a common UG station at ASI it is desirable and feasible to have a central elevated common junction station at ASI with 2 to 3 basement levels for parking, 2 levels for stations above ground and a multistoried commercial complex above this central station. This will provide track connectivity for all the routes.
vii. The proposed location of the alignment crossing Pune Railway station is technically not suitable and it is feasible to explore the alternative, ensuring the crossing of the minimum number of railway tracks.
C) LIMITED CAPACITY PLANNING
i. The DPR recommends the adoption of 2.9m (9’-6”) wide coaches on SG for Pune Metro Rail as against 3.2m (10’-6”) proposed for Mumbai Metro SG and 3.66m (12’-0”) wide operating on the Mumbai Suburban BG system. This results in the reduction of the capacity of SG coach and train by 70 to 75% over that of BG systems
ii. Adoption of wider coaches would enable the length of the trains to be reduced for BG to 4 coaches/train as against 6 coaches/train for the proposed SG with narrow width coaches, thereby reducing the total number of coaches required to be purchased for a given volume of traffic to be carried. This would save Rs 2300cr in the capital cost of the coaches itself. This would further reduced the operating cost of electrical consumption and also the land cost required for depots and stabling sidings for equivalent volume of traffic. This would also reduce the initial capital investment for station platforms and platform covers due to reduction in the train length
iii. By adoption of narrow width coaches on SG with no provision for future increase in capacity by use of wider coaches on BG to meet the increase traffic demand beyond 25 years, the entire way structure for the corridors will have to be dismantled to convert the section to BG and adopt wider coaches to meet the future increased demand of traffic. There is no logic nor techno-economic merits, in providing a crush capacity life for the above corridor, limited to 25 years. The solution proposed by MMRDA & DMRC is to provide an alternative route for another elevated corridor after 25 years. Is this is in Public Interest?
iv. AFTER 25 YEARS WHAT ?
PRESENT CONDITIONS ON JAPANIES METRO WITH NARROW WIDTH COACHES
You need 3 pushers per door. With 4 doors per coach and with 6 coach train, you will need 3x4x6 = 72 pushers per train, to ensure closing of doors in 20sec, to start the train, for ensuring 2min service during peak hours.
v. The present corridor has been planned for a limiting frequency / headway of 4.5min for corridor –I and 3.5min for corridor – II in the year 2031. Mumbai suburban section is being operation at 3min service with present color light signalling system. Hence there is no need to adopt advance signalling ATC & ATO (driverless Operations) at an exorbitant initial signalling cost of Rs 170cr (70% of the parts will have to be replaced after 16 years)
vi. The capacity increase from 3min to 2min frequency, which can also be provided on BG system, will need extra cost of Rs 1000cr for additional imported SG Rolling stock, in addition to Rs 170cr for advance signalling. The additional capacity increased by this method on SG narrow width coaches would be 15740 PPHPD as against 27000 PPHPD for BG wider coaches.
D) TECHNO-ECONOMIC ISSUES OF GAUGE
i. BG is superior to SG in terms of
a. Capacity – 70 to 75% more – life more than 100 yrs
b. Cost – 40% less – Economy 30% less coaches / train for equal traffic
c. O & M – Reduction in cost
d. Land – Reduction in depot land and station platform land for equal traffic,
e. Compatibility - No duplication of infrastructure
f. Connectivity – ensures seamless travel
g. Comfort – More comfort for equivalent traffic
h. Safety – Improved safety on curves against over turning and permits higher speeds on curves than on SG
i. Expertise – Indigenous / RDSO/ICF/IR
j. Imports –No imports – saves foreign exchange
k. Technology – Available within the country for construction, manufacture, O&M and training. Best in the world technology – Implemented in San Francisco in the year 2003 ( Technology is independent of Gauge)
l. VGF subsidy – nil for BG with indigenous wider coaches
m. Fares – 30% reduction in commuter fares
ii. So why adopt SG and import limited capacity narrow width coaches at exorbitant cost (Rs 2300cr extra) at tax payers money?
The 21st century “best in the world” technology has been adopted on BG, since 2003, by BART metro at San-Francisco USA, though they have SG system for their existing lines.
Further extensions are also being done on BG.
• NO Need to purchase & import the entire asset for induction of technology
• IMPORTATION OF TECHNOLOGY IS INDEPENDENT OF GAUGE.
E) OTHER TECHNICAL ISSUES
• INTEGRATION WITH ROAD TRAFFIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE AT STATION
• IMPORTED TURNOUTS
• DEFECTIVE TRACK LAYOUT 4m & 4.5m
• DEFECTIVE TRACK LAYOUT FOR UG SECTION (9m island platform and 4.5m track approaches)
• POWER SUPPLY AND TRACTION
• WATER SUPPLY ASSESSMENT
• ENVIRONMENT – Dumping ground for 30 lacs cum of earth from tunnels
• DIVERSION OF UTILITILTIES
• Signalling – ATC & ATO not required as accidents cannot be avoided (Location of Ghatkopar Station is not free from disaster in case of a train overshooting will fall across the railway track on the suburban section of the Central Rly near Ghatkopar. This was advised by MTR to MMRDA through REL metro one project developers.
§ BEST IN THE WORLD TECHNOLOGY DOES NOT ELIMINATE ACCIDENTS
On 25 April 2006, in Japan, a seven-car metro train derailed on a curve and smashed into a multistory apartment building.
“The derailment at the curve was allegedly caused by the 23-year-old driver’s over speed.”
F) COST AND FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS
§ Cost for Pune metro rail has been grossly underestimated and is based on adhoc basis without detailed investigation and analysis
§ DPR does not indicate the time frame through a bar chart, methodology of construction and detailed analysis of cost
§ The project cost is expected to be in the range of Rs 12500cr as against Rs 7000 to 8000cr estimated for the 2 corridors of Pune Phase-I
§ The FIRR even at lower cost works out to 1.98% indicating abnormally low financial viability necessitating a high percentage of VGF subsidy (30% of Project cost)
§ The EIRR of 18% has been grossly inflated to justify the project on economic consideration and needs to be investigated by independent third party financial experts
§ The proposed financial resources assumed by commercial development of land is not acceptable to the public for acquisition of 500m radius land along the route and by giving an FSI of 4
§ Generating resources by imposing additional taxes on the citizens of Pune by way of 1% professional tax on salaries, cess on petrol and diesel sales in the city, a surcharge on motor vehicle tax in the city, and an entry tax on the commercial articles entering in the city are not acceptable to the citizens of Pune
§ Hence the adoption of BG wider indigenous coaches, resulting in saving Rs 4000cr in the project cost in addition to the savings in operation and maintenance cost, will obviate the need for imposing these taxes, the need for VGF subsidy and will ensure 30 to 40% reduction in fares to the commuters
Our proposal for BG with indigenous wide coaches (12’6”) in lieu of imported narrow width (9’-6”) SG coaches will save cost as under:
Savings in BG coaches in lieu of SG coaches Rs 2300cr
Replacement of UG by an elev. corridor Rs 1250cr
Elimination of ATP, ATC & ATO signalling Rs 170cr
Replacement of 2 depots by 1 & providing Track
Connectivity Rs 100cr
Elimination of imported track components Rs 50cr
Savings in central taxes and duties Rs 300cr
========
Total Rs 4170cr
(Say Rs 4000cr)
• No reduction has been made in the standard of construction of the station buildings and provision has been made for increased cost of indigenous coaches for AC, furnishings, communication systems and other inputs, at par with those adopted for SG by DMRC.
§ (In addition to above replacement of 11km of elevated corridor between PCMC to Range Hills by dedicated surface corridor adjoining to the existing Lonavala Pune Section would result in saving Rs 1430cr (11km x Rs 150cr/km = Rs 1650cr minus 11km x Rs 20cr/km = Rs 220cr. Rs 1650cr minus Rs 220cr = Rs 1430cr)
§ Hence acceptance of our proposal would save Rs 4170cr + Rs 1430cr Rs 5600cr to the exchequer.
§ Should not the Govt. of Maharashtra look into the techno-economic merits of gauge as director by the Group of Ministers in the decision of 24th Apr 2006
G) LEGAL ISSUES
§ Under the present constitution, vide Art, 366/20, and article 246, VIIth schedule List I, State Govts. do NOT have a legal Jurisdiction to construct even a tramway connecting two Municipal Corporations.
§ This power vests with the Centre only,
§ Art. 366/20 defines that - “railway” does not include
§ “a) A tramway wholly within a Municipal area or
§ b) Any other line of communication wholly situated in one state and declared by parliament by law not to be a railway.”
§ Unless the constitution is changed to exclude Metro Rail from the definitions of a Railway, the construction of metro connecting PMC & PCMC would be void under the constitution under Art. 254 of the constitution.
i) METRO RAIL IS A RAILWAY
§ The DPR states that “The Metro rail is a Railway and has to be implemented under the Indian Railways Act”
§ But has not followed the standards laid down in the Indian Railways engineering code for preparation of DPR for getting sanction and financial approval of the project for its implementation.
§ Indian Railway code further specifies that “any deviation from this code prior permission of the Railway Board, is necessary giving reasons for such deviations”
§ DMRC has also not followed the DPR regulations laid down the MOUD – The Ministry under which DMRC is working
§ The Advocate General, in his opinion, has expressed that “ if Metro Railway is confined to Municipal Area, the State Legislature will have legislative competence under Entry 13 of List II, otherwise the competence would rest with parliament in view of Entry 22 of List I, unless parliament passes a law to the effect that Metro Railway even beyond Municipal limit is not a railway. Therefore, I agree with the view of Ministry of Law and Justice Department of Legal Affairs”
§ This clearly shows that connecting PMC & PCMC by metro rail needs approval of the parliament to change the constitutional provision under Art 366/20 and Art. 246, VIIth schedule Entry 22 List I.
H.) Adoption of DMRC model in the context of CAG report 2008
i. DMRC in their presentation to PMC on 9th June 09 recommends adoption of DMRC model for Pune Metro Rail project
ii. The latest report (2008) of Controller and Auditor General (CAG) of India on DMRC need to be studied specially in the background of the latest accident on 12th & 13th July 09.
iii. Should Pune adopt DMRC model in the context of the above report?
I) Some of the critical comments of CAG are as under
i. No policy directives nor management monitoring/controls by Administrative Ministry
ii. No system of recording minutes for major joint technical and other management decisions by the company.
iii. No appointment of independent directors Board Meetings not held quarterly
iv. No system / manuals for procurement policy, tender evaluations and award including irregularity in payments to contractors
v. Scaling down testing standards, not witnessing tests, test in non accredited labs and non preserving of test Records, reflects poor quality of performance,
vi. Though phase-I adopted BG, the associated systems were planned for SG with no provision for future increase in capacity available on BG
vii. Premature wear and cracking of wheels and floor of rolling stock – affecting safety and Reducing Life of Rolling Stock to less than 30 yrs
viii. Property development contracts accepted by uncompetitive bidding and at abnormally high prices
ix. Should the above DMRC model of planning and construction of metros be adopted for Pune metro rail fully relying on DMRC’s past achievements and magnified image of brand equity for quality, performance and safety?
x. Time has come to place DMRC under the Rly Min. having technical & organizational expertise in this field of Rly technology
RECENT ACCIDENTS
CAUSES OF FAILURES AND ACTION TAKEN
CAUSES
ACTION TAKEN
Design failure
Suspension of senior & junior officers
Material failure
Blacklisting consultants
System failure
Show cause notice to Gammons
Cracks in cantilever & piers
87 cantilevers on piers of 5 lines of phase-II &
38 piers for cracks on airport express being reinvestigated
THIS IS DMRC MODEL
STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN BY DMRC TO MAKE THE STRUCTURE SAFE.
• What are these steps ?
• What steps – to avoid repetition of such failures?
• What steps – PMC and PCMC propose to take, to avoid similar failures in Pune Metro?
• The committee’s report to be made public
• When DMRC as organization was responsible, should there not be an independent organization to go into the details of such accidents, to bring out hidden defects in systems and responsibility?
IMPORTANT FEATURES OF DMRC MODEL AS PROJECTED BY FMRC (Self Projected, Magnified Image by DMRC)
• Innovative management system and decisions making (No records of decisions kept –CAG Report).
• Adoption of international standards of safety – (Reflected by recent accidents)
• Innovative systems / procurement policy – (no documentation / manuals – (CAG)
• Noise levels within international standards – (Noise levels exceeded above minimum standards – CAG)
• Best in the world imported Rolling Stock – (Premature wear and cracks in wheels and floors) - CAG
• A fare system of bid acceptance – major irregularities in bid acceptance – NOT based on technical quality cum cost basis and defective contracts of Rolling Stock. - CAG
• Best international testing standards – Testing standards lowered on adhoc basis and no records of tests kept - CAG
• Phase – I Delhi metro is a landmark of metro construction – (though constructed on BG, associated standards are on SG with no provision for future adoption of wider coaches, feasible on BG, for increasing the capacity. – CAG)
IMPACT OF DMRC MODEL
• Cracks and collapse of structures
• Killing one Engineers and workers
• Heavy financial Damages
• Abnormally high prices at cost to exchequer
• Narrow vision – limited capacity – 25 years
• Self magnified image – quality, performance, innovative management system, best in the world system?
• Misguided - Govt., Politicians, Bureaucracy and the public on technical & other issues
• Creation of a virtual wall between Railway Ministry and MOUD on technical and all planning matters to get a free hand in planning and execution
• One man model – No Technical & Organizational back up for policy directive and management control
COMPARISON OF DMRC AND PPP MODELS
DMRC Model
PPP Model
No responsibility for final costs
Freezing of final prices
No responsibility for delay in time
Penalty provisions for non completion in time
No responsibility on quality and failure of structures
Penalty provisions for quality
No responsibility for durability for coaches and structures
Full responsibility during 30 yr concession period
No penalty for performance during operations
Full responsibility for maintenance and operations
Will the Govt of Maharashtra provide satisfactory comments on the observations made above by the Citizens Technical Core Group, before approving DMRC DPR / PPR (Paper Project Report) for Pune Metro Rail and sanction the project for its implementation without modifications and resubmission and at the cost of exchequer and against public interest?
Will the Govt of Maharashtra perform their obligations to the citizens who elected them?
V K J Rane – IRSE (Retd.)
Ex-MD/IRCON
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